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Introduction
When we first wrote about the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)
in 1990, it was still a little-known and lightly funded government program that played a relatively minor role in the government’s broad set
of antipoverty policies. The EITC, as it is usually known, had been
around since 1975, when it was introduced as a small ‘‘work bonus’’
for very low income working families. It had barely been revised or
expanded in the intervening years. Despite the cutbacks of the Reagan
years, welfare thoroughly dominated the antipoverty policy approach.
Expenditures on Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
and Food Stamps, the two most well-known transfer programs, were
about $20 billion each and Medicaid, the medical assistance program
for the poor, added another $70 billion. In contrast, total payments
under the EITC were about $7.5 billion and the average recipient family received just $601. It was still several years before candidate Bill
Clinton would promise ‘‘to end welfare as we know it’’ and 6 years
before welfare reform, in a form that truly was the end of welfare as
we had known it, would actually come to pass.
Yet, even then, the EITC was clearly something different. Unique
among income-transfer programs for the poor, the EITC conditioned
its benefits on earnings. Families without earnings received nothing,
reflecting its linkage to work. Benefits actually increased with family
earnings through a portion of the income distribution, before eventually phasing out at higher incomes. This was just the opposite of the
traditional welfare programs like AFDC and Food Stamps, which provided maximum benefits to families without earnings and then reduced
benefits at a very high rate as family earnings increased. Married couples as well as single parents were eligible for EITC under identical
rules—another difference from AFDC, which provided far more generous treatment of single-parent families than married couples. In fact,
the EITC wasn’t technically a welfare program. It was a tax credit,
administered by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), not through the
welfare system. And nearly unique among tax credits, it was refundable, which meant that poor working families could fully realize its
benefits, even if they owed little or no taxes.
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For these reasons, and many more, the EITC was even then emerging as a government antipoverty program that both liberals and conservatives could support. It could be broadly seen as endorsing work,
since its benefit structure rewarded rather than penalized work, at least
among the poorest of its recipients. Conservative politicians, weary of
the low workforce activity of AFDC recipients, found that very appealing. Liberals viewed it not as a replacement for traditional welfare, but
as a supplement and as a potential source of cash assistance for the
working poor, a group often overlooked by most poverty programs.
Others noted that it could function as a kind of substitute for a higher
minimum wage and that it could do so without the concerns about
higher minimum wages reducing employment opportunities and with
better targeting of its benefits to low and moderate income households.
The EITC operated without a large bureaucracy and without the welfare offices that neither clients nor administrators liked. It was fast
becoming, as we wrote then, ‘‘a rallying point in redirecting poverty
policy.’’ We noted that its ‘‘time in the national agenda has clearly
come,’’ and we predicted that it would grow and change.
We were certainly correct about that! Indeed, it has grown and
changed, well beyond even our own expectations. Who could have
predicted then that, a decade later, the EITC, and not AFDC, would be
the centerpiece of antipoverty programs? How did that happen?
Two major policy actions were decisive in this change in emphasis.
The first was change in the EITC program itself, the result of an unusual alliance of conservatives and liberals, a linking of ‘‘conservative
values’’ with ‘‘liberal funding.’’ The decade began with an important
EITC expansion. This increase, which came under the Bush Administration, was effective in 1991. Then came candidate Clinton who had
promised not only to reform welfare but also ‘‘to make work pay,’’ a
phrase that signaled his interest in helping the working poor. He made
good on this latter promise in 1993, when he proposed and Congress
passed a major increase in the EITC.
By 1996, when the changes were fully phased in, the program was
almost unrecognizable from its former modest self. As a result of the
two sets of changes, the earnings subsidy rate had nearly tripled from
14 percent to 40 percent for a family with two children. The maximum
credit had more than doubled and now exceeded $3,000 for a family
with two children, nearly three and a half times higher than the maximum in 1990. Adults without children, who had been ineligible for
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EITC benefits, were offered a modest credit. The total number of families receiving benefits jumped by nearly 70 percent to more than 20
million in 1998. Total EITC expenditures nearly quadrupled to $25
billion in 1995 and over $30 billion in 2000 (U.S. Committee on Ways
and Means 2000).
The second important policy change was the ‘‘end of welfare as we
knew it.’’ Welfare reform was a high priority of the Clinton Administration, but it waited in the wings while the ill-fated health care reform
initiative was advanced and ultimately defeated. When the administration did finally present a specific welfare reform program in the summer of 1994, it was a casualty of the November 1994 elections when
the Republicans took control of the House of Representatives. The
president’s welfare reform proposal was never considered. The House
Republicans included a very conservative version of welfare reform as
a major element in their Contract with America, and they passed an
ambitious and wide-sweeping reform. That particular version was vetoed by the president, but the president signed a somewhat modified
and slightly milder version of welfare reform in the summer of 1996.
That law, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, effectively abolished rather than reformed
welfare. Effective July 1, 1997, AFDC, the primary cash assistance
program for the poor since the mid 1930s, was replaced with the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program. While TANF
is essentially similar in its overall benefit structure to AFDC—it provides maximum benefits to families with no income—it is not a legal
entitlement as AFDC was, and it imposes strict time limits on lifetime
usage as well as other requirements that each state may choose to impose. Most states have revamped their programs, substituting employment activities for check-writing. Almost all states now require
recipients to move quickly into available jobs. Nearly half of the states
now require TANF applicants to participate in job search or other
work-related activities as a condition of eligibility. Strict penalties for
noncompliance have been imposed in most states. There is little doubt
that the world of welfare has changed dramatically and probably permanently.
Following welfare reform and buoyed by the strong economy and
low unemployment rates of the mid and late 1990s, welfare rolls have
plummeted. The number of welfare recipients fell sharply from 13
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million in 1996 to under 6 million in mid-year 2000; the number of
families fell similarly, from 4.6 million to 2.2 million. The TANF
caseload is now less than one-ninth of the number of households who
receive EITC benefits.
As a result of these two important and related policy changes—the
expansion of EITC and the reform of welfare—the EITC has emerged
as the largest cash transfer program for the poor and the near-poor.
There is little doubt that it will retain that status in the foreseeable
future.
In this volume, we offer an overview of the EITC as it stands early
in the twenty-first century after the tumultuous decade of the 1990s.
We describe, analyze, evaluate, summarize, and critique the EITC in
the year 2001, and we also make recommendations for changes on the
basis of our analysis. The enormous expansion of the program has
brought both a great increase in research about the EITC and its impact
on the economy as well as controversy and criticism, both among economists and politicians. A more generous program naturally has more
substantial impacts, and not all of them are necessarily positive. High
implicit tax rates of the EITC, created by the need to phaseout the
more generous benefits it now provides, are suspected of providing
substantial work disincentives among some recipients. President Bush
has spoken of the tax system as the ‘‘tollbooth on the road to the middle
class’’; ironically, some argue that the EITC phase-out rate is now part
of the toll. Others contend that substantial marriage penalties are imbedded in the program, while still others allege that the EITC is subject
for excessive fraud.
Our own view, reinforced by the many studies we have reviewed,
is that the EITC is a government program that, on the whole, works
and works well. That alone is no small achievement in the policy
world of antipoverty programs, many of which have a well-documented
history of failure and/or unanticipated negative effects. The EITC continues to offer substantial and meaningful earnings supplements to low
and moderate income households. It successfully pushes many working families out of poverty. It is a viable and attractive alternative to
an increase in the minimum wage. It does all of this, we will show,
while creating relatively few substantial problems of its own. It is,
however, not perfect, and we offer a set of very specific suggestions
for revising the problems we do identify.
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The accomplishments of the EITC are many and they are discussed
throughout this volume. Chief among them are the following.
• The EITC provided cash assistance to a total of over 18 million
households and provided them an average of about $1,625 in
the year 2000. These households included about 6 million
working-poor households who received an average of over
$1,450 and another 3.75 million near-poor households who received an average of $1,650.
• The EITC reduced the poverty rate in 1999 by 1.5 percentage
points. About 4 million persons were lifted out of poverty as a
result of the cash assistance they received from the EITC.
• As an income-transfer policy for poor households, the EITC is
clearly preferable to the minimum wage. For workers in the
poorest households, the EITC operates exactly like an increase
in the minimum wage, but without the potentially troubling increase in the wage price of labor that may reduce employment
opportunities. For such a worker with two children, the effective
minimum wage in 2000 was not its statutory rate of $5.15, but
rather $7.21, courtesy of the 40 percent wage subsidy provided
by the EITC. Additionally, the EITC targets its benefits to low
and moderate income households with far more precision than
the minimum wage does.
• The EITC has increased the labor force participation of many
groups. For example, all estimates indicate that the EITC has
increased labor force participation among single mothers,
among married women whose husbands have low incomes, and
among married men with children. While other factors such as
welfare reform and the strong economy are undoubtedly important contributing factors, the EITC has had a major impact on
the sharp increase in the labor force participation of single
mothers and may well be the leading causal factor.
• Estimates of the impact of the EITC on the hours of work of
current workers are relatively small in absolute value, whether
positive or negative. There is no empirical evidence that the
EITC has had serious adverse effects on hours of work among
current workers, as some critics have claimed.
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• Concerns about the negative impact of the EITC on marriage
appear not to be warranted at this time.
There are, however, some emerging problem areas.
• The EITC penalizes work among workers with incomes at the
high end of the EITC schedule, typically a family with earnings
in the $25,000 range. Like any income support program, EITC
benefits eventually decrease as a family’s income increases. For
families with two or more children, this ‘‘phase-out’’ rate is 21
percent. When combined with the federal income tax and the
payroll tax, this adds up to a total marginal tax rate of about 50
percent. There is growing evidence that this high tax rate has
discouraged work in married-couple families with moderate incomes.
• The EITC imposes substantial financial marriage penalties. If a
childless full-time minimum wage worker marries a full-time
minimum wage worker with two children, they suffer an EITC
marriage penalty of more than $1,600 compared to what they
could have if they remained single. In the unlikely event that
they each had two children, their EITC financial sacrifice to
marry would be $5,600! EITC marriage bonuses are possible
but appear to be less common in practice.
• The EITC still leaves larger families with low wage workers in
poverty. A married couple with two children and a single wage
earner working full time at $6.50 an hour is still poor even after
adding in its $4,000 EITC income.
• The eligibility criteria are needlessly complex. This is especially
true regarding whether or not a household has ‘‘a qualifying
child’’ and thus is eligible for the more generous benefits available to households with children. As a result, compliance issues
have arisen. Some estimates suggest that as much as 25 percent
of EITC payments are ‘‘in error,’’ meaning that they do not comply with a strict interpretation of the complex EITC rules.
These problems are not, in fact, independent. This dependence is,
in fact, a virtue when attempting to improve the program: a revision
that addresses one problem also contributes to solving the others. In
Chapter 8, we propose three very specific changes to alleviate these
problems: 1) reducing the current EITC phase-out rate for a family
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with two or more children; 2) establishing a separate, more generous
EITC schedule for married couples; and 3) providing a new rate schedule for families with three or more children. These three simple
changes go a long way toward alleviating the above problems.
As is perhaps inevitable in writing about important public policies,
the ground is constantly shifting. When we began our research in the
summer of 2000, the Clinton Administration had proposed changes in
the EITC, but no legislation was passed. As we completed our work
in the summer of 2001, the major tax cut legislation of the Bush Administration had just been passed. The legislation included three
changes that affected the EITC and/or its interaction with the broader
tax code: 1) a new 10 percent tax bracket for the first $12,000 of income for a married couple, effective in 2001; 2) a refundable child tax
credit, worth up to $1,200 for a family with two children, also effective
in 2001; and 3) a change in the EITC benefit schedule for married
couples, effective in 2002 and phased in slowly through 2007. The
legislation also calls for these changes and all the other changes in
the legislation to be eliminated in 2011, although few knowledgeable
observers believe that will actually occur.
The tax cut of 2001 did not change the basic structure of the EITC,
and our best guess is that the unique structure of the EITC will emerge
from the first decade of the 2000s relatively unchanged as compared
with the 1990s. Its basic benefit structure, conditioned on earnings and
with benefits that first increase with earnings, is now well-established.
There may, of course, be changes in benefit rates and other program
details, although none appear to be on President Bush’s current economic agenda. We hope that the analyses we present will serve not
only those who want to know about the EITC as it stands now but
also help understand the likely impact of any changes that may be
implemented in future years. To that end, we have tried to emphasize
general analytical principles. At the same time, we have tried to present
a relatively complete account of how the EITC works and what is currently known about the impacts of the EITC. We hope that this volume
will be a useful source book for anyone interested in learning about the
EITC.
Throughout the book, whenever we use specific numbers to describe the EITC program, we have used the EITC as it stood in the year
2001. That year is the most current for which, at the time of this
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research, all EITC program parameters, including the various income
thresholds that are an integral part of the benefit schedule, were known.
We took full account of the tax code changes in 2001 that affected the
EITC in 2001 but not of those that become effective only in future
years.
Chapter 1 provides an overview of the history and operation of the
EITC. It focuses especially on the unique EITC benefit formula and its
implication for marginal tax rates. We include there a full discussion of
the newest tax code changes and how they alter the EITC landscape.
Chapter 2 looks at the EITC recipient population—who they are, how
much they work, what they earn, and what they get from the EITC
program. It also examines the impact of the EITC on the poverty rate.
In Chapters 3 through 7, we evaluate the impact of the EITC program.
In Chapters 3 and 4, we look at the impact of the EITC on individual
behavior—labor supply and wage rates in Chapter 3 and marriage in
Chapter 4. In Chapter 5, we compare the EITC to other antipoverty and
transfer programs, including the minimum wage and TANF. Chapter 6
examines the impact of the EITC on the economy from the standpoint
of its efficiency cost. Transfer and tax policies alter the relative prices
that individuals face and in the process change the behavior of both
recipients (who get the benefits) and taxpayers (who finance the benefits). These changes can end up costing the economy something in
addition to the apparent dollar expenditures of the program itself; those
additional costs are what economists call efficiency cost. Finally,
Chapter 7 looks at the compliance problems of the EITC.
Based on the evaluations presented in Chapter 3 through 7, we
offer ideas about how to strengthen the EITC program in Chapter 8.
We firmly believe that the program works well in most respects but that
modest changes would make a difference. We make a specific proposal
to reform the EITC program in a very few selective ways. We then
simulate the impact to assess the cost of the reform and see how it
would be likely to change the program. Our approach is, of course,
not the only way to accomplish reform. Other reforms have been proposed and we describe some of the well-known alternative proposals.
We also discuss changes in the EITC program that will become effective after 2001.
Finally, in Chapter 9, we look both backwards at what the EITC
has accomplished and forward toward what can be done to strengthen it.

1
An Overview of the
Earned Income Tax Credit
The EITC provides a cash benefit through the tax system to low
income working households. Unless the household actually earns labor
income, it is ineligible for the credit. To receive an EITC benefit, a
household must have positive labor earnings and total income less than
a specified ceiling. Figure 1.1 shows the fundamental difference between the EITC and welfare. Panel A shows a simplified EITC schedule: when earnings are zero, the benefit is zero; as earnings increase,
the benefit increases until a maximum benefit is reached; and then, as
income continues to increase, the benefit is phased out. Panel B shows
a simplified welfare schedule: when earnings are zero, the benefit is at
its maximum, and as income increases, the benefit is phased out.
The size of the EITC depends on the number of children in the
household. Throughout this chapter, we often focus on a family of
four with two children and use the numerical values that apply to such
a family.
Figure 1.2 shows a simplified EITC schedule that makes it easier
for nonspecialists to remember the key magnitudes of the current EITC
Figure 1.1 The Relationship Between Earnings and Benefits Under EITC
and Welfare

Benefits

Benefits
(B) Welfare

(A) EITC

Earnings

Earnings
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Figure 1.2 Simplified EITC Schedule, Family with Two or More
Children
Credit

$4,000

20%

40%

$10,000

$30,000

Earnings

program. The simplified schedule presents round numbers and percentages that are roughly accurate for a family with two or more children in 2001 (note that the figure omits the small flat range that
connects the phase-in range and the phase-out range under the actual
EITC; this flat range is an optional component of an EITC). The family
receives an EITC of $40 for each $100 of wage income it earns until
its wage income reaches $10,000 and its EITC benefit reaches $4,000.
Further family income (from either labor or capital) causes a phase-out
of the credit; the credit is reduced $20 for every additional $100 of
income the family obtains so that the credit falls to zero when the
family’s income reaches $30,000. Note that the phase-in of the EITC
depends on labor earnings, whereas the phase-out depends on income
(whether from labor or capital). Because the phase-in requires labor
earnings, we label the horizontal axis of all EITC figures in this chapter
‘‘earnings,’’ even though the phase-out depends on income. It should
be noted, however, that if the family’s investment income (for example,
interest, dividends, and capital gains) exceeds $2,450, the family is
ineligible for the EITC. Thus, the EITC excludes families with significant investment income.
The EITC is a refundable tax credit on the federal personal income
tax. Like any tax credit, it enables an eligible household to reduce the
tax it would otherwise pay. For example, if a household’s tax would
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have been $800, but its EITC is $600, then the household must only
pay $200 in tax. Refundable means that if the tax credit exceeds the
tax the household would otherwise owe (the tax before credit), then
the government pays the household the difference. For example, if a
household’s tax (before EITC) is $200 and its EITC is $600, then the
government will pay the household $400.

A HISTORY OF THE EITC
The EITC began quietly and modestly in 1975—so quietly that it
was virtually unnoticed by the general public for many years, in sharp
contrast to welfare and the minimum wage. Under the original version,
a household with at least one child received a supplement of 10 percent
of its wage earnings until earnings reached $4,000 and the credit
reached $400; then, for each $100 of income above $4,000, the credit
was reduced $10 so that the credit completely phased out when household income reached $8,000. By comparison, for a household with
two children today, the phase-in rate is 40 percent, not 10 percent, and
the maximum credit is roughly $4,000, not $400 (today’s maximum is
much larger even when adjusted for inflation).
One rationale often given for the EITC is that it offsets the burden
of the Social Security payroll tax for low income households. But why
not simply exempt the first few thousand dollars of wage income from
the payroll tax? One reason is that this exemption would complicate
the employer’s task of implementing the payroll tax for Social Security. Another is that an exemption might weaken the political claim of
these workers to Social Security benefits upon retirement. Another is
that such an exemption would be poorly targeted because many workers with low wage income are members of families that are high income due to the labor or investment income of other family members.
Thus, the EITC can be viewed as a well-targeted vehicle for offsetting
the burden of the payroll tax on low income workers.
Historically, however, the initiative for the enactment of the EITC
in the 1970s came mainly from conservatives who viewed the EITC as
an alternative to welfare (Howard 1997, Ventry 2000). The driving
force behind the EITC was Senator Russell Long, the conservative
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chairman of the Senate Finance Committee. Long came to propose an
EITC in the early 1970s in reaction to liberal welfare programs and to
moderate welfare reform proposed by the Nixon Administration—the
controversial Family Assistance Plan (FAP)—which proposed a low
guaranteed income coupled with a work requirement. Long believed
that the welfare system discouraged work, that any guaranteed income
would exacerbate the problem, and that the FAP work requirement
would not be enforceable. Howard wrote:
When FAP was reconsidered in 1972, Long proposed an alternative. His ‘‘workfare’’ bill declared all employable persons ineligible for cash assistance. They would instead have to find work or
accept a government job paying 60 percent of the minimum wage.
By setting the wage scale so low, Long clearly intended to minimize the need for public jobs. As an added incentive, Long stipulated that workers earning low wages in the private sector would
be eligible for a 10 percent work bonus. Heads of households
with children would be eligible for a cash payment equivalent to
10 percent of their income as long as family income was less than
$4,000. (p. 67)

This 10 percent work bonus (for earnings up to $4,000) appears to
be the earliest actual EITC proposal. The first EITC, enacted 3 years
later in 1975, was in fact a 10 percent credit on earnings up to $4,000.
The testimony before Long’s committee in early 1972 of another
conservative, then-Governor Ronald Reagan, may have contributed to
Long’s development of the 10 percent work bonus proposal. Although
most of Reagan’s testimony focused on his conservative approach to
welfare in California, it contained a passage in which Reagan suggested
that the federal government should exempt low income families from
income taxes and give them a rebate for their Social Security taxes.
Long endorsed Reagan’s general testimony, and several months later
proposed the 10 percent work bonus.
Although the House passed Nixon’s FAP, the Senate Finance Committee rejected it in favor of Long’s workfare proposal (including the
work bonus), and the House and Senate could not agree on a welfare
reform law. In 1973, Long introduced the work bonus proposal, not in
the context of welfare reform, but as an offset to an increase in Social
Security taxes. In this context, liberals voted for it and it passed 57 to
21. Its failure to become law, however, may have been due to the
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opposition of liberal House members who remembered its conservative
workfare origin. The work bonus lay dormant until 1975.
The recession of 1975, resulting partly from the world oil price
shock of 1974, gave Long an opportunity as Congress contemplated
legislation to combat the recession. The main provision of the Tax
Reduction Act of 1975 was a tax rebate to all households to stimulate
consumption spending. Virtually unnoticed, however, Long attached
to the bill a new refundable 10 percent tax credit for poor families—the
‘‘Earned Income Tax Credit.’’ Thus, the EITC became law, not as part
of a debate on social welfare legislation, but as part of an effort to
respond to a recession. With most other Americans receiving a new
income tax rebate, it seemed only fair to give some cash assistance to
the working poor, all of whom were subject to the payroll tax, but
many of whom did not pay any income tax. Hence, the new tax credit
had to be ‘‘refundable’’ in order to reach them. Although Long played
the key role, it should be noted that it was the moderate chairman of
the House Ways and Means Committee, Al Ullman, who initially
attached a version of the EITC to the administration’s tax package.
Howard (1997) wrote:
Regardless of the precise explanation, the important points to note
are that the EITC was a small part of a larger revenue bill; that no
hearings were held or votes taken specifically concerning the
EITC; that it generated little debate and reflected little input from
interest groups; that moderate to conservative members of the revenue committees were instrumental to its passage; that it appealed
simultaneously to proponents of welfare reform and tax relief for
the working poor . . . (p. 72)

Howard concluded this way:
Although all the traditional explanations for new social programs
stress the rare and the extraordinary, what sets the EITC apart is
how mundane and ordinary were its origins. Politicians who were
moderate to conservative on social policy . . . were responsible for
the timing and structure of the EITC. The key figure was Long, a
strategically located member of the Senate Finance Committee
and a conservative Democrat. Long transformed the family assistance supplement into the work bonus, kept the work bonus idea
alive between 1972 and 1975, and successfully portrayed the
EITC as an amalgam of welfare reform and tax relief for low-

14 Helping Working Families: The Earned Income Tax Credit

income workers. He did not have to publicize the merits of his
proposal or engineer any groundswell of popular support. He did
not have to win the president’s endorsement, knit together a coalition of support in Congress, or even engage in explicit log-rolling.
Instead, Long had to find the right legislative vehicle to essentially
hide the EITC and the right language to portray its objectives to
anyone who noticed. He then used his power as Senate Finance
chairman, which happened to reach a high water mark in 1975, to
guarantee passage of this tax credit. (p. 74)

The EITC hardly grew over the next decade (U.S. Committee on
Ways and Means 2000). At the end of the 1970s the phase-in range
was raised from $4,000 to $5,000, thereby raising the maximum credit
from $400 to $500. The late 1970s were a period of high inflation,
however, so the adjustment mainly offset inflation. Total credits rose
only from $1.3 billion in 1975 to $2.1 billion in 1985. The first real
growth occurred in the second half of the 1980s. In the mid 1980s the
phase-in rate was raised from 10 percent to 14 percent, the phase-in
range was raised so that the maximum credit increased from $550 in
1985 to $953 in 1990, and the phase-out rate was reduced from over
12 percent to 10 percent. Total credits rose from $2.1 billion in 1985
to $7.5 billion in 1990.
The EITC’s conservative origins delayed its acceptance by liberals,
but eventually liberals came to appreciate the merits of the EITC. Liberals found that conservatives would oppose any expansion of welfare
because it aided people who didn’t work, but they would accept an
expansion of the EITC because it aided only people who worked. Liberals might want to aid both groups, but they eventually decided that it
made sense to join with conservatives to use the EITC to aid people
who worked. Similarly, conservatives opposed liberal efforts to increase the legal minimum wage, partly because of its cost to small
businesses but also because its impact was poorly targeted—
beneficiaries were often teenagers from affluent homes. Liberals realized they could make political headway with the well-targeted EITC,
in contrast to welfare and the minimum wage. By 1990, liberals had
become supporters of the EITC despite its conservative origins. In
1990, the EITC enjoyed strong support across the entire political spectrum (Hoffman and Seidman 1990). The stage was set for a dramatic
expansion.
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Two major EITC expansions were enacted in 1990 and 1993. The
1990 expansion (enacted by a Democratic Congress and signed by a
Republican president) raised the phase-in rate from 14 percent to 18.5
percent in 1993 for a family with one child and to 19.5 percent for a
family with two or more children, thereby providing a small additional
credit (1 percent) for the second child for the first time. The expansion
raised the maximum credit from $953 in 1990 to $1,511 in 1993 for a
family with two or more children. Total credits rose from $7.5 billion
in 1990 to $15.5 billion in 1993. The 1993 expansion (enacted by a
Democratic Congress and signed by a Democratic president) raised the
phase-in rate from 18.5 percent to 34 percent for a family with one
child in 1995 and from 19.5 percent to 40 percent for a family with
two or more children in 1996, thereby raising the additional credit for
the second child from 1 percent to 6 percent. The expansion more than
doubled the maximum credit from $1,511 in 1993 to $3,556 in 1996
for a family with two or more children. For the first time, a small credit
(7.65 percent up to a maximum of $323 in 1996) was given to a family
with no children (provided the head was between ages 24 and 65).
Total credits rose from $15.5 billion in 1993 to $28.8 billion in 1996.
Thus, the two expansions nearly quadrupled total credits from 1990 to
1996 (from $7.5 billion to $28.8 billion).
This rapid expansion in the first half of the 1990s resulted in criticism from some conservatives (Ventry 2000) in the second half of the
1990s. In 1995 Senator Roth (R-DE), chairman of the Senate Finance
Committee, expressed the view of some conservatives when he said
(Ventry 2000 p. 1005): ‘‘The EITC was to create incentives for lowincome parents to work. It was that simple. But as they say about too
much of a good thing becoming dangerous, such is what happened to
this once well-intended program.’’
One concern was an IRS study reporting a high ‘‘error rate’’ for the
EITC: perhaps 25 percent of EITC payments were technically incorrect
according to a strict interpretation of the complex EITC rules concerning the definition of a qualifying child, the required filing status, and
the determination of which family member should file for the EITC.
Ironically, some of this complexity resulted from well-intentioned efforts to improve the targeting of the EITC. In response to the apparently high error rate, hearings were held in both houses of Congress.
Other concerns were that the EITC might be imposing a significant
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marriage penalty, discouraging recipients on its phase-out range from
additional work, and costing taxpayers too much.
Despite these concerns, the EITC has retained enough support to
avert any repeal of its two expansions. Its phase-in rates have been
maintained (34 percent for a family with one child and 40 percent for
a family with two or more children), and its maximum credit has risen
automatically with inflation from $3,556 in 1996 for a family with two
or more children to $4,008 in 2001. Total credits increased from $28.8
billion in 1996 to a projected $30.7 billion in 2001.
The tax act of 2001 maintained the EITC phase-in rates and maximum credits and reduced the marriage penalty (beginning in 2002) by
making benefits larger for married couples.

MECHANICS OF THE EITC
In this section, we explain how the EITC works and its interaction
with the income tax and the child tax credit (CTC). We use the numerical parameters of the EITC program and the tax system for the year
2001. We include all changes for the year 2001 that were the enacted
in the tax act of 2001 (passed by Congress in May 2001 and signed
into law by the president on June 7). The phase-in and phase-out
thresholds are automatically adjusted each year for inflation so these
numbers will increase automatically beyond 2001. The tax act of 2001
reduced the EITC marriage penalty beginning in 2002, but this change
does not affect our analysis of the 2001 EITC program. In a section at
the end of this chapter, we describe the changes in the EITC that were
adopted in the tax act of 2001 but did not go into effect until after
2001. The EITC for a family varies with the number of children.
Throughout this section, we will use the numerical values that apply to
a family of four with two children.
There are three distinguishing features of an EITC. First, if a
household has no labor earnings, it receives no credit. Second, the
EITC begins with a phase-in range where the credit rises as the household’s labor earnings rise. Third, the EITC ends with a phase-out range
where the credit falls as income rises.
Note that the phase-in of the EITC depends on labor earnings,
whereas the phase-out depends on income (from both labor and capi-
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tal). Because the phase-in requires labor earnings, we label the horizontal axis of all EITC figures in this chapter ‘‘earnings,’’ even though
the phase-out depends on income. Note, however, that under the current EITC, if the family’s investment income (for example, interest,
dividends, and capital gains) exceeds $2,450 (in 2001), the family is
ineligible for the EITC. Thus, the EITC excludes families with significant investment income. One feature of the current EITC is a flat
range between the phase-in range and the phase-out range. When the
EITC was enacted in 1975 there was no flat range, but the EITC has
contained a flat range for many years.
Figure 1.3 shows the EITC schedule for 2001 for a household with
two or more children. If the household’s earnings are zero, its credit
is zero. The phase-in rate is 40 percent, so when the household earns
its first $100, it receives a credit of $40; it continues to receive $40 for
each additional $100 of earnings until earnings reach $10,020 and the
credit reaches $4,008 (40 percent of $10,020). There is a stationary
range from $10,020 to $13,090 where the credit remains $4,008. The
phase-out begins at $13,090. The phase-out rate is 21.06 percent; for
each additional $100 of income, the credit is reduced by $21.06. Because the maximum credit is $4,008, it takes $19,031 of additional
income to phase out the credit completely (because $4,008/0.2106 ⳱
$19,031). Thus, when earnings reach $32,121, the credit is zero (beFigure 1.3 EITC Schedule, Family with Two or More Children (2001)
Credit
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$4,008
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cause $13,090 Ⳮ $19,031 ⳱ $32,121), so the EITC phase-out income
is $32,121.
Under the 2001 EITC schedule, the credit C for a household with
two or more children with labor earnings E and total income Y is given
by1:
C⳱0.40E
C⳱$4,008
C⳱$4,008ⳮ0.2106 (Yⳮ$13,090)
C⳱0

if E ⱕ $10,020.
if $10,020 ⱕ E and Y ⱕ $13,090.
if $10,020 ⱕ E and $13,090 ⱕ Y ⱕ $32,121.
if Y ⱖ $32,121.

With this 2001 EITC schedule, there is a nice round number example for a household with two or more children: if the household’s income is $25,000, its EITC is $1,500 (because C ⳱ 4,008 ⳮ 0.2106
(25,000 ⳮ 13,090) ⳱ 1,500). Thus, we can summarize the current
EITC schedule this way: the maximum credit is $4,008 when earnings
are between $10,020 and $13,090; the credit phases down to $1,500
when income reaches $25,000; and the credit phases out to $0 when
income reaches $32,121. See Appendix A for the algebra of a general
EITC schedule.
The ‘‘Marginal Tax Rate’’ Generated by the EITC
Whenever any government benefit phases down as a person earns
additional income, the phase-down reduces the person’s net gain from
earning additional income. For example, suppose that, when a person
earns an additional $100, the government benefit is reduced $20. Then,
the person’s net gain from earning the additional $100 is $80. It is as
though the person were being taxed 20 percent on the additional earnings. Economists therefore describe this situation by saying the person
faces a marginal tax rate of 20 percent.
But, of course, the person is not actually being taxed. The person
is not making a payment to the government. The government is making a payment to the person, and the person is better off because of the
program. Economists may not realize that, when they say the EITC
imposes a marginal tax rate of 21.06 percent, some listeners may be
misled into thinking that the EITC makes the person pay the government 21.06 percent of any additional earnings and that the EITC therefore reduces the person’s income and makes the person worse off. In
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fact, the EITC always raises a person’s income and makes the person
better off than he would be without the EITC.
The marginal tax rate, however, does tell how much a person gains
by earning another $100. If the marginal tax rate is 21.06 percent, then
the person gains $78.94 by earning another $100. Thus, a high marginal tax rate may discourage individuals from making the effort to
earn more. Even if they do earn more, they may be discouraged because their net gain is less than their additional earnings. It is therefore
important to analyze the pattern of marginal tax rates generated by the
EITC.
Figure 1.4 shows the pattern of marginal tax rates. Look first at
the phase-out range from $13,090 to $32,121. In the phase-out range,
for every additional $100 of income, the EITC is reduced $21.06, so
the household’s net gain (after earning an additional $100) is only
$78.94. This net gain of $78.94 is the same that an ordinary taxpayer
would obtain if she were in a 21.06 percent tax bracket. Thus, the
EITC recipient in the phase-out range faces a marginal tax rate of 21.06
percent. As we emphasized above, this marginal tax rate of 21.06
percent does not mean that families in this income range (between
$13,090 and $32,121) are hurt by the EITC; on the contrary, they are
helped by it—they receive an EITC payment from the government that
raises their income.
Figure 1.4 EITC Marginal Tax Rates, Family with Two or More
Children (2001)
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In the phase-in range from $0 to $10,020, the EITC recipient faces
a negative marginal tax rate equal to ⳮ40 percent (a marginal subsidy
rate of Ⳮ40 percent) because, for every $100 of earnings, the household gains $140. Thus, the current EITC for a household with two or
more children is characterized by three marginal tax rates: ⳮ40 percent in the phase-in range, 0 percent in the stationary range, and
Ⳮ21.06 percent in the phase-out range.2
THE EITC, THE CHILD TAX CREDIT, AND THE
INCOME TAX
In this section, we ignore any other tax credits or taxes in order to
focus on the EITC, the child tax credit (CTC), and the income tax. A
working family of four with two children receives an EITC if its income is less than $32,121. If its earnings are above $10,000, it also
receives a CTC. At the same time, if its earnings are above $19,200, it
faces an income tax rate of 10 percent until its income reaches $31,200,
at which point the tax rate jumps to 15 percent; this schedule determines its tax-before-credits (TBC), that is, its tax before deducting the
two credits. The household’s net payment to the government therefore
equals TBC ⳮ CTC ⳮ EITC. If this amount is negative, it means the
household receives a net payment from the government equal to EITC
Ⳮ CTC ⳮ TBC. Thus, the family’s net receipt from or payment to
the government, and the combined marginal tax rate it faces, depends
on the interaction of the EITC, CTC, and TBC. In this section we
analyze this interaction.
Figure 1.5 shows the EITC, CTC, and TBC schedules for a household with a husband, wife, and two children in 2001. It also shows the
sum EITC Ⳮ CTC.
The TBC is zero until $19,200 because of the standard deduction,
$7,600, and four personal exemptions ($2,900 each) totaling $11,600
($7,600 Ⳮ $11,600 ⳱ $19,200). The tax act of 2001 set a tax rate of
10 percent on the first $12,000 of taxable income ($12,000 of income
above $19,200); when income reaches $31,200 ($12,000 Ⳮ $19,200),
the tax rate jumps to 15 percent.
The tax act of 2001 made the CTC refundable, so there are now
two important refundable tax credits implemented through the federal
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Figure 1.5 EITC, CTC, and TBC Family of Four with Two Children
(2001)
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personal income tax: the EITC and the CTC (Seidman and Hoffman
2001). The CTC equals 10 percent of the excess of earnings over
$10,000, plus the amount needed to cancel the TBC (CTC ⳱ 0.1 [earnings ⳮ $10,000] Ⳮ TBC), up to a limit of $1,200 (2 ⳯ $600 per
child). As shown in Figure 1.5, the CTC begins at earnings of $10,000
and phases in at a 10 percent rate until earnings reach $19,200 (where
the TBC schedule begins with the new first-bracket rate of 10 percent)
and the CTC reaches $920. The phase-in rate then jumps to 20 percent
(the additional 10 percent is due to the 10 percent needed to cancel the
new first-bracket tax rate under the TBC) until income reaches $20,600
and the CTC reaches $1,200 (because the CTC ⳱ 0.1[earnings ⳮ
$10,000] Ⳮ TBC ⳱ 0.1[$20,600 ⳮ $10,000] Ⳮ 0.1 ($20,600 ⳮ
$19,200) ⳱ $1,060 Ⳮ $140 ⳱ $1,200). Thereafter, the CTC remains
constant at $1,200 until the family’s income is very high, after which
it phases out (not shown in the figure).
The EITC Ⳮ CTC schedule is also shown in Figure 1.5. From $0
to $10,000 (where the CTC begins), it coincides with the EITC schedule with a phase-in rate of 40 percent. Over the tiny range from
$10,000 to $10,020, not visible on the figure, it has a phase-in rate of
50 percent (40 Ⳮ 10). From $10,020 to $13,090 (where the EITC
phase-out begins) its phase-in rate is 10 percent, due entirely to the
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CTC (because the EITC is constant over this range). At $13,090, EITC
Ⳮ CTC is at its maximum value of $4,317 (an EITC of $4,008 and a
CTC of $309). From $13,090 to $19,200, the EITC Ⳮ CTC phasedown rate is 11.06 percent (21.06 ⳮ 10); from $19,200 to $20,600,
1.06 percent (21.06 ⳮ 20); from $20,600 to $31,121 (where the EITC
phases out to zero), 21.06 percent (21.06 ⳮ 0); at $32,121, EITC Ⳮ
CTC reaches $1,200 and then remains constant (until a high income),
after which it phases out (not shown).
If EITC Ⳮ CTC is greater than TBC, the household receives a net
payment from the government. This is the case until income reaches
$31,738.3 Thus, a family of four must earn more than $31,738 before
its TBC exceeds EITC Ⳮ CTC.
Figure 1.6 shows the marginal tax rate facing the family as a consequence of the interaction of the EITC, CTC, and TBC. From $0 to
$10,000, the marginal tax rate equals ⳮ40 percent (due to the EITC
alone); over the tiny range from $10,000 to $10,020, ⳮ50 percent (due
to the EITC and CTC phase-in rates of 40 percent and 10 percent);
from $10,020 to $13,090, ⳮ10 percent (due to the CTC alone); from
$13,090 to $19,200, 11.06 percent (because the EITC phases out at
21.06 percent rate but the CTC phases in at a 10 percent rate); from
$19,200 to $20,600, 11.06 percent (the income tax rate is 10 percent
Figure 1.6 Marginal Tax Rate, Family of Four with Two Children (2001)
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and the EITC phase-out rate is 21.06 percent, but the CTC phase-in
rate is 20 percent, so 10 Ⳮ 21.06 ⳮ 20 ⳱ 11.06); from $20,600 to
$31,200, 31.06 percent (the income tax rate is 10 percent, the EITC
phase-out rate is 21.06, and the CTC is constant); over the small range
from $31,200 to $32,121, 36.06 percent (the EITC phase-out rate of
21.06 percent plus the income tax rate of 15 percent); and above
$32,121, 15 percent (due to the income tax alone).

PROVISIONS OF THE 2001 EITC4
This section gives a brief description of the main provisions of the
2001 EITC program. We discuss these provisions in greater detail in
Chapter 7 on compliance issues. The tax act of 2001 adopted several
changes that will begin after 2001—these changes will be noted in the
next section.
Table 1.1 shows the earned income credit parameters for 1975–
2001. The table shows how the size of the EITC varies with the number of children. Prior to 1993, eligibility required at least one child,
but a small credit was established in 1993 for workers without children
(the worker must be over the age of 24 and under 65). There was a
single schedule until 1990 regardless of the number of children, but the
credit for a household with more than one child was made larger than
the credit for a household with one child beginning in 1991. All income thresholds have been indexed annually for inflation since 1987.
Note particularly the numerical values for 2001, which vary with the
number of children.
A ‘‘qualifying’’ child must satisfy a relationship test, a residency
test, and an age test. The child may be a stepchild, descendent of a
child, or a foster or adopted child of the taxpayer. The child must have
the same place of abode as the taxpayer for more than half the taxable
year, and the household must be located in the United States. Finally,
the child must be under 19 (24 for a full-time student) or be permanently and totally disabled.
Several provisions are aimed at excluding persons with significant
investment income so that the EIC targets low-income workers. Thus,
a household is ineligible for the EITC if its investment income (‘‘disqualified’’ income) exceeds $2,450 in 2001 (this threshold is indexed
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Table 1.1 Earned Income Credit Parameters, 1975–2002
(Dollar amounts unadjusted for inflation)

Calendar year

Credit
rate
%

Minimum
income
for
maximum
credit ($)

Phase-out range ($)
Maximum
credit
($)

Phase-out
rate
%

Beginning
income

Ending
income

1975–78

10.00

4,000

400

10.00

4,000

8,000

1979–84

10.00

5,000

500

12.50

6,000

10,000

1985–86

14.00

5,000

550

12.22

6,500

11,000

1987

14.00

6,080

851

10.00

6,920

15,432

1988

14.00

6,240

874

10.00

9,840

18,576

1989

14.00

6,500

910

10.00

10,240

19,340

1990

14.00

6,810

953

10.00

10,730

20,264

1991
One child
Two children

16.70
17.30

7,140
7,140

1,192
1,235

11.93
12.36

11,250
11,250

21,250
21,250

1992
One child
Two children

17.60
18.40

7,520
7,520

1,324
1,384

12.57
13.14

11,840
11,840

22,370
22,370

1993
One child
Two children

18.50
19.50

7,750
7,750

1,434
1,511

13.21
13.93

12,200
12,200

23,050
23,050

1994
No children
One child
Two children

7.65
26.30
30.00

4,000
7,750
8,425

306
2,038
2,528

7.65
15.98
17.68

5,000
11,000
11,000

9,000
23,755
25,296

1995
No children
One child
Two children

7.65
34.00
36.00

4,100
6,160
8,640

314
2,094
3,110

7.65
15.98
20.22

5,130
11,290
11,290

9,230
24,396
26,673

1996
No children
One child
Two children

7.65
34.00
40.00

4,220
6,330
8,890

323
2,152
3,556

7.65
15.98
21.06

5,280
11,610
11,610

9,500
25,078
28,495

1997
No children
One child
Two children

7.65
34.00
40.00

4,340
6,500
9,140

332
2,210
3,656

7.65
15.98
21.06

5,430
11,930
11,930

9,770
25,750
29,290
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Table 1.1 (continued)

Calendar year

Credit
rate
%

Minimum
income
for
maximum
credit ($)

Maximum
credit
($)

Phase-out
rate
%

Beginning
income

Ending
income

1998
No children
One child
Two children

7.65
34.00
40.00

4,460
6,680
9,390

341
2,271
3,756

7.65
15.98
21.06

5,570
12,260
12,260

10,030
26,473
30,095

1999
No children
One child
Two children

7.65
34.00
40.00

4,460
6,800
9,540

347
2,312
3,816

7.65
15.98
21.06

5,670
12,460
12,460

10,200
26,928
30,580

2000
No children
One child
Two children

7.65
34.00
40.00

4,600
6,900
9,750

353
2,353
3,888

7.65
15.98
21.06

5,800
12,700
12,700

10,380
27,413
31,152

2001
No children
One child
Two children

7.65
34.00
40.00

4,760
7,140
10,020

364
2,428
4,008

7.65
15.98
21.06

5,950
13,090
13,090

10,710
28,281
32,121

Phase-out range ($)

SOURCES: Values from 1975–1999; U.S. Committee on Ways and Means 2000 (p.
809, table 13–12). Values from 2000 and 2001; 1040 Instruction Booklet, Internal
Revenue Service.

for inflation). Disqualified income is the sum of interest (taxable and
tax exempt), dividends, net rent and royalty income, capital gains net
income, and net passive income that is not self-employment income.
The EITC phases out according to ‘‘modified’’ adjusted gross income
(AGI). Modified AGI includes tax-exempt interest and nontaxable distributions from pensions, annuities, and individual retirement accounts,
and it disregards a variety of losses (such as net capital losses and net
losses from trusts and estates, nonbusiness rents and royalties).
Taxpayers file for an EITC or refund, like other tax credits, on their
annual federal income tax returns. Note that although the return is due
by April 15, a taxpayer can file her return as early as January 1 and
therefore receive a refund before April 15. Many EITC recipients (not
surprisingly) do file early and receive early refunds from the U.S. Treasury. Since 1979, an advanced payment option has been offered that
would permit taxpayers to receive the credit in their paychecks, rather
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than waiting until their annual returns are filed and processed. The
advanced payment option would therefore be a kind of negative withholding. This option requires administrative tasks of the employer. In
practice, very few taxpayers have elected to request the advanced payment option. The once-a-year payment of the EITC may encourage
saving, the purchase of durables, and social mobility (Smeeding, Phillips, and O’Connor 2000; Romich and Weisner 2000; Barrow and McGranahan 2000).
Table 1.2 indicates who is projected to receive the EITC in 2000.
In 2000, 18.4 million taxpayers will receive an EITC or refund, totaling
$30 billion. Roughly 72 percent of the EITC expenditure goes to taxpayers who file as singles or heads of households and 28 percent to
married taxpayers. The EITC is well targeted: most of the EITC expenditure goes to working households with less than $30,000 of income.
Table 1.3 shows the growth in the EITC since its inception in 1975.
The most rapid growth has occurred since 1990. From 1990 to 2000
(projected), the number of recipient families has risen about 50 percent
(from 12.5 million to 18.4 million; see Figure 1.7). One source of the
increase in recipients was the creation of the childless EITC in 1993.
Over that decade, the total amount of credit has quadrupled (from $7.5
Table 1.2 Distribution of Earned Income Credit, 2000, by Income Class
Head of household
and single returns

Joint returns

All returns

Amount
($)

Number

Amount
($)

Number

Amount
($)

592

1,041

4,490

4,575

5,082

5,616

$10,000–$20,000

1,187

2,993

4,724

10,056

5,910

13,049

$20,000–$30,000

1,747

3,196

3,312

5,989

5,059

9,185

$30,000–$40,000

1,026

996

1,143

970

2,169

1,966

$40,000–$50,000

172

130

17

12

189

141

$50,000–$75,000

29

43

0

0

29

43

$75,000 and over

0

0

0

0

0

0

4,754

8,398

13,685

21,602

18,459

30,000

25.8

28.0

74.2

72.0

100.0

100.0

Income class
$0–$10,000

Total
Percent distribution
by type of return

Number

SOURCE: U.S. Committee on Ways and Means 2000 (p. 812, table 13–13).
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Table 1.3 Number of EITC Recipients and Amount of Credit, 1975–2002

Year

Number of
recipient families
(thousands)

Total amount
of credit
(million $)

1975

6,215

1,250

900

201

1976

6,473

1,295

890

200

1977

5,627

1,127

880

200

1978

5,192

1,048

801

202

1979

7,135

2,052

1,395

288

1980

6,954

1,986

1,370

286

1981

6,717

1,912

1,278

285

1982

6,395

1,775

1,222

278

1983

7,368

1,795

1,289

224

1984

6,376

1,638

1,162

257

1985

7,432

2,088

1,499

281

1986

7,156

2,009

1,479

281

1987

8,738

3,391

2,930

450

1988

11,148

5,896

4,257

529

1989

11,696

6,595

4,636

564

1990

12,542

7,542

5,266

601

1991

13,665

11,105

8,183

813

1992

14,097

13,028

9,959

924

1993

15,117

15,537

12,028

1,028

1994

19,017

21,105

16,598

1,110

1995

19,334

25,956

20,829

1,342

1996

19,464

28,825

23,157

1,481

1997

19,391

30,389

24,396

1,567

a

1998

20,273

32,340

27,175

1,595

1999a

19,440

29,965

25,800

1,541

a

2000

18,439

30,002

26,148

1,625

2001a

18,502

30,662

26,763

1,657

2002

18,233

31,010

26,916

1,701

a

Refunded portions
of credit
(million $)

Average credit
per family ($)

Estimated
SOURCE: U.S. Committee on Ways and Means 2000 (p. 813, table 13–14).
a
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Figure 1.7 Number of EITC Recipient Households, 1975–2000
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billion to $30.0 billion) and, as shown in Figure 1.8, the real (inflationadjusted) average EITC per family has doubled. From 1990 to 2000,
the nominal credit per family increased from $601 to $1,625, a multiple
of 2.7 (by comparison, the consumer price index (CPI) increased by a
multiple of only 1.3 so, if the credit had simply kept up with the CPI,
it would have risen from $601 to $781). Figure 1.8 shows both the rise
in nominal credit and the inflation-adjusted rise in ‘‘real’’ credit. The
refunded portion of the credit was about 87 percent of the total credit
in 2000 ($26.1 billion out of $30.0 billion), indicating the great importance of ‘‘refundability.’’ The refunded 87 percent is categorized as a
‘‘budget outlay,’’ and the remaining 13 percent as a ‘‘tax expenditure.’’
Thus, the EITC budget outlay greatly exceeds the EITC tax expenditure.
Since 1991, Congress has specified that the EITC is not to be
counted as income or as a resource for determining the eligibility or
amount of benefit of AFDC, Medicaid, Supplemental Security Income,
food stamps, or low income housing programs.
The Census Department excludes the EITC in its official count of
poverty, in contrast to cash transfers, which are counted in assessing
whether a household lies above or below the official poverty line.
Several provisions have been adopted to improve compliance and
enforcement in the EITC program. The welfare reform act of 1996
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Figure 1.8 Average EITC Benefits per Recipient Household, 1975–2000
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(the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act)
contained new rules concerning taxpayer identification numbers (while
preserving some rules that were already in effect). Individuals are
ineligible for the credit if they do not include their taxpayer identification number and their qualifying child’s number (and, if married, their
spouse’s taxpayer identification number) on their tax return. For the
EITC, a taxpayer identification number is defined as a Social Security
number issued to an individual by the Social Security Administration.
If an individual fails to provide a correct taxpayer number, the error is
treated as a mathematical or clerical error by the IRS. The Taxpayer
Relief Act of 1997 included provisions that: 1) deny the EITC for 10
years to taxpayers who fraudulently claimed the EITC and for 2 years
for EITC claims that are the result of reckless or intentional disregard
of rules or regulations; 2) require EITC recertification for a taxpayer
who is denied the EITC; 3) impose due diligence requirements on paid
preparers of returns involving the EITC; 4) require information sharing
between the Treasury Department and state and local governments regarding child support orders; and 5) allow expanded use of the Social
Security Administration records to enforce tax laws, including the
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EITC. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 increased the IRS authorization to improve enforcement.

THE TAX ACT OF 20015
The tax act of 2001 made several changes in the EITC beginning
after 2001.
As we will further explain in Chapter 4, the EITC imposes a marriage penalty on many low income couples: the EITC certain couples
receive if they are married is less than the sum of the two EITCs they
would receive if they were single. To address this problem, the tax act
of 2001 provides a more generous credit schedule for married couples
beginning in 2002. Both the beginning and end of the EITC phaseout range is increased by $1,000 from 2002–2004, by $2,000 from
2005–2007, and by $3,000 from 2008 on. Figure 1.9 shows the impact
of the fully phased-in reform for married couples with two children as
if it had been in effect in 2001. If a 3 percent inflation rate is assumed,
Figure 1.9 Comparison of 2001 and Modified EITC, Married Couple,
Two Children
$4,500
$4,000
$3,500
$3,000

EITC

EITC-Modified
$2,500
$2,000
$1,500
EITC 2001
$1,000
$500
$0

$10,020
$15,590
$13,090

$32,121

Household Earnings

$34,621
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$3,000 in 2008 would be equivalent to about $2,500 in 2001, so the
reform would have shifted the beginning and end of the phase-out
range $2,500 to the right in the figure (the beginning of the phase-out
range would shift from $13,090 to $15,590). The impact of this change
is only on households with earnings greater than $13,090, the income
at which the phase-out range began in 2001. Benefits are increased by
$526.50 (equal to the 21.06 percent phase-out rate ⳯ $2,500) at all
incomes between $15,590 and $32,121 (the income at which all EITC
benefits were lost under the old schedule). The change in the schedule
also provides a benefit of between $0 and $526.50 to households with
income between $13,090 and $15,590, and between $32,121 and
$34,621.
As we will see in Chapter 7, the EITC has a compliance problem
partly due to confusion with several complex provisions concerning
eligibility. The tax act of 2001 adopts several measures to reduce
confusion. We simply note these measures here and will explain them
in Chapter 7. The act simplifies the definition of ‘‘qualifying child’’
and modifies the present-law tie-breaking rules. Beginning in 2004,
the IRS is authorized to use ‘‘math error authority’’ to deny the EITC
if the Federal Case Registry of Child Support Orders indicates that the
taxpayer is the noncustodial parent of the child.
Finally, the tax act simplifies the calculation of the EITC by replacing modified AGI with AGI. It simplifies the definition of earned income by excluding nontaxable employee compensation from the
definition for the purpose of the EITC. It also repeals the presentlaw provision that reduces the EITC by the amount of an individual’s
alternative minimum tax.
STATE EITC PLANS
Nearly a third of the states have enacted their own state EITCs as
a supplement to the federal EITC (National Center for Children in Poverty 2001; Johnson 2001). The welfare reform act of 1996 assigned
states a greater role in providing opportunities for low income people;
as a consequence, 11 states plus the District of Columbia have either
enacted new EITCs or expanded existing ones since 1997. State EITCs
are financed from general revenue or from the federal TANF block
grant enacted under the 1996 welfare reform act.
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All but two states simply ‘‘piggyback’’ on the Federal EITC by
providing a state EITC equal to X percent of the federal EITC credit.
This approach avoids subjecting potential recipients to another round
of filling out complex EITC schedules. Once a household has gone
through this process for the federal income tax return, the household is
automatically entitled to X percent of this amount on its state income
tax return. Table 1.4 lists the states with EITC provisions as of 2001
and provides information about program details. As seen there, the
state credit ranges from a low of 4–5 percent in several states to a high
Table 1.4 State EITC Programs, 2001
State

Percentage of federal EITC

Colorado
District of Columbia

10
10

Illinoisa
Indiana
Iowaa
Kansas
Mainea
Maryland

5
3.4 of gap between earnings and $12,000
6.5
10

Massachusetts
Minnesotab
New Jerseya, c

5
15 (refundable)
50 (non-refundable)
15
20–42
10

New York
Oregona
Rhode Island
Vermont

20
5
25
32

Wisconsin

4 (one child)
14 (two children)
43 (three children)

State credit not refundable.
Minnesota credit is not explicitly set as a percentage of federal EITC. Percentages
shown are range of credit across income levels. Average credit is approximately 25%
of federal credit.
c
New Jersey credit limited to families with income ⬍ $20,000.
a

b
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of 43 percent in Wisconsin for families with three or more children.
Ten percent is the most common subsidy rate, currently chosen in five
states. Like the federal EITC, most (but not all) states make their EITC
refundable. Recent research (National Center for Children in Poverty
2001) found that these state EITCs have increased the income-to-needs
ratio of poor families by an average of about 4–5 percent.

SUMMARY
The EITC has moved from relative obscurity when it began in the
mid 1970s to center stage today. After a decade and a half in the
shadow of welfare and the minimum wage, the EITC emerged in 1990
as an antipoverty policy that commanded strong support across the
political spectrum, and this support generated two major expansions in
1990 and 1993. Its conservative support derives from the fact that the
EITC provides assistance only to families that actually work, and its
liberal support derives from the fact that the EITC effectively targets
assistance on low income families with children. Although some conservatives have become critical of certain aspects of the EITC following these expansions, the EITC has continued to maintain sufficiently
broad political support to avert any repeal of the expansions, and the
tax act of 2001 included an increase in EITC benefits for married couples beginning in 2002.

Notes
1. Although we have used a formula to describe the 2001 EITC schedule, the actual
schedule consists of discrete brackets in a table on the personal income tax return.
The formula closely approximates the numbers the taxpayer would actually obtain
from the tax return table.
2. For a household with one child, the three marginal tax rates are ⳮ34 percent in
the phase-in range, 0 percent in the stationary range, and Ⳮ15.98 percent in the
phase-out range. For a household with no children, the three marginal tax rates
are ⳮ7.65 percent in the phase-in range, 0 percent in the stationary range, and
Ⳮ7.65 percent in the phase-out range.
3. Let E* be the income at which the household’s net payment under the income tax
is zero. We find E* as follows. At Y ⳱ 31,200, TBC ⳱ 0.1(31,200 ⳮ 19,200)
⳱ 1,200; also, CTC ⳱ 1,200. But EITC ⬎ 0 because it phases out to zero at
32,121. Thus, E* must be greater than 31,200, so at E*, TBC ⳱ 1,200 Ⳮ 0.15
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(E ⳮ 31,200). EITC ⳱ 4,008 ⳮ 0.2106 (E ⳮ 13,090). TBC equals CTC Ⳮ
EITC where 1,200 Ⳮ 0.15 (E ⳮ 31,200) ⳱ 1,200 Ⳮ 4,008 ⳮ 0.2106 (E ⳮ
13,090). Solving for E yields E* ⳱ 31,738.
4. The material in this section is based on the 2000 Green Book, pages 808–813
(U.S. Committee on Ways and Means).
5. The material in this section is based on the ‘‘Summary of Provisions Contained
in the Conference Agreement for H.R. 1836, the Economic Growth and Tax
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001,’’ Joint Committee on Taxation, May 26, 2001.

2
Who Benefits from the EITC?
In this chapter, we examine the demographic and economic characteristics of the EITC population. We present information about who
receives the EITC and the amount of credit various groups receive, as
well as about the labor supply and earnings of EITC recipients. This
information goes well beyond what is available from IRS tables, which
are largely limited to the distribution of the credit across income
classes and provide relatively little information about the characteristics of the recipient families themselves. We also discuss what the
EITC accomplishes in terms of reducing poverty and income inequality.

DATA AND METHODS
To examine the EITC recipient population, we use data from the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The PSID is a nationally
representative survey that has been interviewing families of all ages
about a wide range of economic, demographic, and sociological matters annually since 1967. The original sample included an over-sample
of low income families, so it is well-suited in terms of sample size for
analyses of low and moderate income populations. In 1997, the last
year for which data was available at the time of these analyses, over
6,000 families were interviewed by the PSID.
We use the PSID in our analyses of the EITC because it provides
a nationally representative sample of the entire age range of the population, has extensive information about personal characteristics and labor
market activity, and has accurate and thorough information about
household income.1 Although the PSID collects information on many
detailed sources of income, it does not ask directly about whether a
family received income from the EITC program and, if so, how much
the credit amounted to. This is common practice with surveys of
household income, including the Current Population Survey (CPS). Indeed, because of the way the EITC is received via the tax system, often
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as a reduction in taxes paid rather than as a refundable cash transfer,
it is not clear that families would be able to report this information
accurately.
The PSID does, however, include all the information necessary for
us to compute eligibility and the amount of the credit received. The
key parameters of the EITC formula are age of the householder, number of children, earned income, taxable income, and ‘‘modified’’ AGI
(AGI plus a portion of business and farm losses).2 All of this information is available in the PSID.
Our analysis of EITC participation is based on data for 1996,
which was collected in 1997. This is the last year available in the PSID
as of late 2000.3 Fortunately, the EITC in 1996 was virtually identical
to the EITC in 2001. All phase-in and phase-out rates were exactly the
same and the incomes that define the three credit regions have been
adjusted for inflation since 1996 and nothing else. So, in this respect,
the EITC population in 1996 ought to closely mirror the EITC population in 2001. There are, however, some complicating factors. First,
the unemployment rate was lower in 2001 than in 1996—5.4 percent
in 1996 versus approximately 4.5 percent in 2001. And second, the
low income labor market has been affected by the replacement of
AFDC with TANF and the accompanying state-level reforms that have
imposed time limits and work requirements. The likely net result is
that some portion of families that we find ineligible for EITC because
they had no earnings may, in fact, have been eligible in 2001.
There are also some inherent difficulties in comparing EITC estimates from the PSID or any household survey with the official IRS
figures. First, a single household may contain multiple tax-filing units,
for example households with subfamilies, other adult relatives, and/or
teenagers.4 In 1996, there were approximately 100 million households
in the United States but 120 million tax returns. Households in the
PSID may include other family members whose income and or/earnings
are typically combined with those of the primary family to produce an
estimate of total family income. In computing EITC eligibility, however, we have assumed that other family members file separate tax
returns, and we have included only the earnings and income of the
primary adult(s) as part of that household’s income for tax purposes.5
This is probably a good approximation to actual tax-filing behavior.
Second, since there is no direct information about EITC receipt, we
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necessarily assume that all eligible taxpayers receive the credit and that
no ineligible families do so. Our EITC participation rate is, therefore,
best regarded as an estimate not of the population that may actually
receive the EITC but of the one for which the EITC is intended.
This population differs from the actual EITC population for two
reasons. First, some eligible recipients may not claim the credit because they fail to file a tax return, typically because they owe no net
income taxes. In 1996, for example, a married couple with two children owed no tax if its income was less than $16,900.6 In the early
1990s, the IRS computed the EITC on a return even if the return failed
to claim it; now the IRS sends a notice of potential eligibility to a
taxpayer who has failed to claim a credit for which he appears to be
eligible.7 Relatively little is known about current nonparticipation in
the EITC. Estimates of eligible nonrecipients for 1990, when the potentially eligible population was much smaller, range from 13.6 percent
to 19.5 percent (Scholz 1994).8 Since that time, there has been an
extensive outreach program to encourage eligible low income households to file and claim the EITC, including, for example, milk-carton
advertising and aggressive outreach programs by interest groups. Additionally, the participation rate may have increased on its own because
participation is now more valuable and because the somewhat higher
income households who are now eligible are more likely to file in any
event. It is, therefore, likely that the fraction not claiming the award
has fallen, but there are no firm data about this.
Second, a substantial amount of EITC payments are paid in error,
most often, it appears, to taxpayers who do not have a ‘‘qualifying’’
child9 and who are, therefore, either ineligible or eligible for the much
smaller payments available to households without children. Studies
indicate that approximately 25 percent of EITC dollars were paid in
error in 1994 and 1997 (McCubbin 2000) and perhaps as much as onethird of EITC dollars were paid in error in 1999 (IRS 1999). It is
difficult to assess what proportion of EITC recipients were ineligible.
In 1994, only about 10 percent of the overpayments were due to income
errors among eligible recipients, while about 60 percent were due to
qualifying child errors (McCubbin 2000). This suggests that much of
the excess payments in that year were made to taxpayers who were
probably ineligible for EITC payments.
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THE EITC RECIPIENT POPULATION IN 1996
For 1996, IRS tabulations show that the EITC was received by 19.5
million taxpayers or about 16.3 percent of the 120 million returns it
received. Based on earnings, income, age, and the number of dependent children as reported by households in the PSID, we estimate that
13.1 percent of all households were eligible to receive the EITC in
1996.10 When, however, we adjust the IRS figure to allow for the
inclusion of ineligible recipients and the omission of nonrecipient eligibles, the two estimates are very similar. If 25 percent of recipients are
ineligible and 10 percent fail to claim the credit, then the corresponding
estimate is 13.4 percent, just 0.3 percentage points different than the
PSID estimate.11 If 20 percent are ineligible and 7.5 percent fail to
claim the credit, then the corresponding figure is 14.0 percent. Thus,
the PSID appears to provide an accurate estimate of the intended EITC
population. It will, however, necessarily differ from the actual EITC
recipient population in some ways.
Table 2.1 shows our estimates of the EITC eligibility of all households in 1996 by the range of the EITC in which they fell and, for
ineligible households, the reason they were ineligible. Just over 3 percent of households had incomes and family characteristics that placed
Table 2.1 EITC Receipt Status of the Population, 1996
Receipt status
Eligible, total
Phase-in range
Stationary range
Phase-out range
Ineligible, total
Demographically ineligible
⬍ Age 25, no children
⬎ Age 64, no children
Income or earnings ineligiblea
Zero earnings
Income ⬎ Maximum

Share of population (%)
13.1
3.3
1.3
8.4
86.9
5.3
18.6
6.3
56.7

All income or earnings ineligible households are demographically eligible.
SOURCE: Panel Study of Income Dynamics.
a
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them on the phase-in range of the credit, 1.3 percent were on the stationary range, and 8.4 percent of the population—nearly two-thirds of
those eligible—were on the phase-out range. The ineligibles fall into
three groups. Our classification scheme looks first at demographic
eligibility and then at earnings or income eligibility, so that households
who are ineligible for both reasons are included in the demographic
category. We find that about one-quarter of all households were demographically ineligible because they had no children age 18 or younger
and failed to meet the minimum and maximum age cutoffs. The vast
majority of these demographic ineligibles were elderly, a group the
EITC (with its emphasis on earned income) is largely not expected to
cover. About 80 percent of the demographically ineligible households
also failed the earnings tests. This leaves a relatively small group—
about 3 percent of all families—who would be eligible for the EITC
except for the age restrictions. About two-thirds of these families were
elderly (1.7 percent of all families) and one-third (1.3 percent) were
under the age of 25. Another 6 percent of all households satisfied the
demographic criteria of the EITC but had no earned income. Finally,
57 percent of households were demographically eligible but had incomes that exceeded the EITC maximum for their family situation.
The EITC population is similar to the low and moderate income
population, but it differs from it in several important ways. Obviously,
households with low incomes but no earnings are ineligible. So, too,
are families with low earnings but substantial nonlabor income and
households without children in which the primary adult is either under
age 25 or over age 64. Many households without children and with
modest earnings will nevertheless be ineligible because their income
exceeds the 1996 maximum of $9,500.
Table 2.2 provides further information about the characteristics of
EITC households in 1996. Overall, we estimate that one household in
seven is eligible for the EITC. About one in 12 white households are
eligible, one in four black households, and one of every two Hispanic
households. (Note that the PSID construction of race/ethnicity in 1997
differs from the Census Bureau; white and black here are non-Hispanic,
and the groups are mutually exclusive.) Not unexpectedly, singleparent families with children have high rates of receipt—just under 50
percent for men and over 60 percent for women. Among marriedcouple families with children, nearly one in five receives the EITC.
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Table 2.2 EITC Receipt and Average Credit by Selected Family
Characteristics, 1996
Proportion receiving
EITC (%)

Share of EITC
population (%)

Average
credit ($)

All

13.1

100

1,327

Race
White (non-Hispanic)
Black (non-Hispanic)
Hispanic
Other

8.5
24.4
49.5
17.7

50.8
22.2
20.7
6.3

1,188
1,322
1,711
1,206

Family/marital status
Married with children
Married, no children
Single female with children
Single male with children
Single, no children

18.7
2.5
60.7
47.5
4.7

35.3
5.4
35.9
10.0
13.5

1,597
167
1,615
1,544
157

Age of household head
⬍25
25–34
35–44
45–54
⬎55

17.5
20.3
19.8
12.5
3.2

7.3
30.5
35.7
18.7
7.7

1,507
1,353
1,525
1,146
588

Number of children
None
One
Two
Three or more

3.8
27.7
28.4
37.6

18.8
30.0
28.9
22.3

160
1,198
1,782
1,900

Poverty status
Poor
Non-poor

35.7
9.0

41.3
58.7

1,456
1,237

Poverty ratio
⬍1
1–1.5
1.5–2
⬎2

35.7
35.3
26.9
7.6

41.3
25.8
21.0
11.8

1,456
1,650
973
805

NOTE: Methods for determining poverty ratio are discussed in the text.
SOURCE: Panel Study of Income Dynamics.
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Given the low income thresholds for households without children, very
few of them qualify for benefits—2.5 percent for married couples and
less than 5 percent for single individuals.
Because of the earned income requirement and because the credit
could be received at an income as high as $28,495 in 1996 for families
with two children, the EITC is not particularly sharply targeted at families that are in poverty. It is certainly best understood as a program for
low and moderate income families, rather than poor families. The
poverty ratio brackets shown in Table 2.2 are the ratio of family income
to the official poverty needs standard for a family of given size.12 We
sometimes refer to this measure as the ‘‘income-to-needs’’ ratio. In
computing household income, we follow the official Census Bureau
practice of including all cash income and income from other family
members, but we exclude EITC benefits themselves because they are
technically a tax. This method is consistent with the way taxes are
treated in computing a family’s income, although conceptually the excluded EITC is much like the cash transfers that are included.13 We
estimate that only about 35 percent of poor families are eligible for the
credit and a similar percentage of families between 100 percent and
150 percent of the poverty threshold. More than one in four families
at 150 percent to 200 percent of the poverty threshold are eligible.
Overall, nine percent of nonpoor families are eligible for the EITC.
Why are so many poor families ineligible for the credit? Several
reasons are illustrated in Figure 2.1. About one-third of all poor households are demographically ineligible, that is, they do not have a qualifying child and fail the age test. Most of these are elderly households.
About 30 percent are demographically eligible but have no earnings.
Finally, a small group—about 2.5 percent of poor households—are
demographically eligible and do have earnings, but they are ineligible
because their earnings or taxable income is too high. Almost all of
these are families with no children, and their ineligibility is not a function of some odd and unanticipated interaction: the maximum income
for eligibility for them ($9,500) is less than the poverty threshold for a
two-person family. Moreover, not all of them are two-person families;
in the PSID, about 10 percent of families with no children had a family
size of three or more.
As shown in Table 2.2, column 2, half of all EITC recipient households are white and about one-fifth are black and one-fifth Hispanic.
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Figure 2.1 EITC Status of the Poverty Population, 1996
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Nearly 60 percent of recipients are single-parent households; less than
one-fifth are childless. Two-thirds are ages 25–44. Only about 40
percent of the EITC population is poor, but another quarter have income less than 150 percent of the poverty line. Twelve percent have
an income more than twice the poverty line.
The average credit received (column 3) computed from the PSID
is $1,333, which is about 11 percent below the IRS average credit of
$1,480 in 1996. Again, since the populations naturally differ, the average credit is not necessarily likely to be identical. Strategic misrepresentation of earnings, income, and family status is consistent with the
higher average credit derived from tax filings than from the PSID.14
The average credit received is about 50 to 55 percent of the maximum
for families in each category for number of children; the higher credit
for families with three or more children must reflect their lower income
since the EITC is currently adjusted only through two children. We
find that Hispanic households receive the largest credit, with non-Hispanic black families about $400 lower and non-Hispanic white families
$525 lower. Again, these differences reflect income and/or family size
differences. We do find that poor families get a substantially larger
credit than non-poor families, although the credit for near-poor families (100–150 percent of poverty level) is greater than it is for poor
families. This pattern of benefits that increase with income is a natural
consequence of the EITC formula, which provides its maximum benefit
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to households that, depending on their family size, are at or just above
the poverty threshold.
By combining the proportions of the EITC population in column 2
with the average credit in column 3, we can compute the proportion of
total credits going to various groups. Figure 2.2 shows this proportion
by race/ethnicity, family status, and the ratio of family income to the
poverty threshold. We find that 45 percent of EITC dollars are received
by non-Hispanic white households, 22 percent by non-Hispanic black
households, and about 27 percent by Hispanic households. Households
without children receive less than 2.5 percent of EITC dollars, even
though they account for 19 percent of the recipient population. Well
over half of all credits go to single-parent families, especially femaleheaded families. Finally, we find that EITC dollars are far better targeted than EITC receipt. Forty-five percent of dollars go to poor
households, and more than three-quarters of all dollars go to households with incomes at or below 150 percent of the poverty line.
Table 2.3 presents information about the earnings, income, and
labor supply of EITC recipients in 1996, for all recipients and separately by EITC range. The average income of EITC recipients was
about $20,000, and earned income was just under $13,000. Transfer
income accounts for about three-fourths of the difference between total
income and earned income; the remainder comes from the income of
other family members.15 The average recipient household’s income
placed it at about 25 percent above the poverty level. Labor supply
Figure 2.2 Percent of EITC Dollars Received by Selected Family
Characteristics, 1996
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Table 2.3 Income, Earnings, and Employment Status of EITC Recipient
Households, 1996
Total family income

All

Phase-in

Stationary

Phase-out

$20,361

$8,700

$16,447

$24,478

Earned income

$12,906

$3,025

$8,804

$17,460

EITC income

$1,328

$1,002

$2,380

$1,296

Poverty ratio

1.24

0.69

1.01

1.49

Poor

41.3%

85.6%

65.6%

20.0%

Employment status of householder
Employed
Weeks worked
Hours per week

94.5%
38.8
37.9

91.2%
27.6
31.8

94.0%
38.0
36.4

95.9%
43.3
40.5

Employment status of spouse
No spouse
Employed
Weeks workedb
Hours per weekb

59.3%
22.5%
20.2
17.6

76.3%
11.5%
13.7
11.7

66.1%
21.1%
21.3
21.5

51.6%
27.1%
21.3
18.4

Family labor supply
Single earner
Two earners
Annual hours worked

81.5%
18.5%
1,906

93.7%
6.3%
1,096

84.2%
15.8%
1,816

76.3%
23.7%
2,242

Percent of EITC households

100%

25.6%

9.9%

64.5%

a

Poverty status includes income from all household members, but does not include
EITC income.
b
Average computed for all wives.
SOURCE: Panel Study of Income Dynamics.
a

was substantial. The householder, defined here as the husband in a
married-couple household and a single adult otherwise, worked an average of 38 hours per week and 39 weeks per year. Only five percent
of householders did not work at all during the year; in those cases,
another primary adult in the household must have worked in order to
qualify for the EITC. About 55 percent of the wives in EITC recipient
families worked but, because only 40 percent of EITC households are
married-couple families in the first place, less than a quarter of the
families have a working spouse and less than a fifth have more than a
single earner. On average, wives worked part time (less than 20 hours)
and part year (about 20 weeks). This implies that working wives
worked essentially full time and full year.
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What most distinguishes these households is not their labor supply
but their wage rate and the number of earners. The implied household
wage rate is about $6.77 per hour. Total household labor supply is
1,900 hours, which is about the average for a full-time, year-round
worker in 1996 and is about 900 hours less than for non-elderly, nonEITC households. The difference in average annual work hours between householders in EITC households and in non-elderly, non-EITC
households is about 280 hours; the rest of the difference between the
two groups is due to differences among working wives in number of
hours worked and differences in the proportion of wives working.
For households on the phase-in range, total income and earned
income are necessarily low, with average wage rates at $4.25. These
are typically single-parent households, where the worker is often combining work with welfare or with transfer income from other sources.
Note, for example, that this group’s earned income of about $3,000 is
much less than half its annual family income of about $8,700. Virtually all of these households are poor. Annual labor supply of householders is less than 900 hours and, because so few of these households
have more than a single worker, total household labor supply is less
than 1,100 hours. The EITC makes a substantial addition to income
for these households, boosting it by more than 12 percent.
Across the other two EITC ranges, all employment measures increase. Weeks of work and hours of work increase very sharply for
both householders and spouses, and there is also a large jump in the
proportion of married-couple families and families with two earners.
Average wage rates for householders increase as well, to $6.36 for
workers on the stationary range and to $9.08 for workers on the phaseout range. Household labor supply doubles between the phase-in and
phase-out range.
Even so, there are some labor supply differences between households in the phase-out range and non-elderly, non-EITC households.
The labor supply of householders in the two groups are quite similar—
the EITC phase-out range households report working more hours per
week, but fewer weeks, so that total annual hours are virtually identical.
The non-EITC households are more likely to be married (59 percent
vs. 51.6 percent), and they are much more likely to have an employed
spouse (46 percent vs. 27 percent). They are therefore twice as likely
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to have two earners. Total household labor supply differs by about 550
hours, almost all due to the hours contributed by spouses.
A possible concern about the EITC is that it subsidizes somewhat
higher wage workers who choose for some reason to work fewer hours.
The average household wage of EITC recipients, computed from the
earnings and labor hours in Table 2.3, is $6.77, which is clearly quite
modest. Table 2.4 provides further information on the wage and hours
distribution for household heads and wives. Among household heads,
the modal wage category is less than $6.00 and the median is less than
$7.50. Only 5 percent earn more than $15.00 per hour, an hourly wage
that clearly implies much less than full-time, full-year work. Among
working wives, almost two-thirds earn less than $6.00 and just about 5
percent earn more than $15.00 per hour. The distribution of annual
work hours, shown at the bottom of the table, confirms this pattern.
Among household heads, about one-quarter worked less than 1,000
hours, including in that category the 5.5 percent who did not work at
all. About equal proportions worked 1,000 to 2,000 hours and more
than 2,000 hours, 37 and 38 percent, respectively. Among wives, hours
worked are much more modest. Forty-five percent did not work, and
the working wives are relatively evenly distributed across the work
Table 2.4 Wage and Hours Distribution, EITC Recipient Households,
1996
Household heads (%)

Wives (%)

Wage rate
Did not work
⬍$6.00
$6.00–$7.50
$7.50–$10.00
$10.00–$15.00
⬎$15.00

5.5
38.4
14.1
19.4
17.2
5.4

44.6
35.4
6.4
7.3
3.6
2.7

Annual work hours
Did not work
1–500 Hours
500–1000 Hours
1000–1500 Hours
1500–2000 Hours
⬎2000 Hours

5.5
8.8
10.6
11.8
26.3
37.0

44.6
11.4
12.1
9.5
14.6
7.8

SOURCE: Panel Study of Income Dynamics.
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hour categories. Eleven percent worked fewer than 500 hours and
another 12 percent worked 500 to 1,000 hours. Only a bit under onequarter of all wives in EITC households worked at least 1,500 hours
per year.

CHANGES IN THE EITC RECIPIENT POPULATION
As was discussed in Chapter 1, the EITC program was substantially expanded as part of the Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993.
Phase-in rates for families with children were increased in annual increments between 1994 and 1996, when they reached the rates that
continue to apply. Phase-out rates were also increased, so that, after
adjusting for inflation, the maximum income for eligibility was unchanged for families with one child and increased by about 12 percent
for families with two or more children. Additionally, households with
no children in which the householder was between the ages of 25 and
64 were made eligible for the first time, although benefits remain quite
low. The total number of families receiving the EITC increased by
about 4 million (about 26 percent) between 1993 and 1996. Using our
1996 estimates of the characteristics of the recipient population, we
estimate that about three-quarters of that increase was due to the extension of benefits to childless households.
To see how the expansion of the EITC altered the nature of the
recipient population, we use the PSID again to draw a sample of EITCeligible households in 1991, several years before the reforms. The
EITC in 1991 was essentially the same as in 1993. We use exactly the
same procedures we used for 1996 to identify EITC eligibility and the
amount of the credit for which a household would be eligible. Again,
we identify the EITC-eligible population, rather than the actual EITC
recipient population, which may differ because of both nonparticipation by eligible household and receipt by ineligible households. With
the PSID, we estimate that 9 percent of households were eligible to
receive the EITC in 1991. Figures from the IRS (U.S. Committee on
Ways and Means 2000) show 14.1 million recipients out of 113 million
returns, or 12.4 percent. When this figure is adjusted for ineligible
recipients and for eligible nonfilers, the IRS and PSID proportions are
again quite close. If one-third of recipients are ineligible and 15 per-
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cent of those eligible failed to file, the IRS figure is equivalent to an
eligible proportion of 9.6 percent of households.
Table 2.5 summarizes some of the major differences, both in the
composition of the EITC population and the distribution of EITC benefits in 1991 and 1996.16 As seen in the first two columns, the EITC
population has shifted toward households on the phase-out range, increasing from half to nearly two-thirds. This shift is almost entirely
due to two factors: the higher income eligibility level of families with
two or more children and the very low income level ($5,950) at which
the phase-out range begins for households without children. This is
corroborated in the distributions of households by number of children
and the poverty ratio. Households without children now account for
18.8 percent of all recipient households, with almost all of the decline
among other families coming from the reduced representation of families with one child. The distribution by poverty ratio categories shows
a five-percentage-point drop in the proportion of households with an
income 100 to 150 percent of the poverty line but an offsetting increase
in the proportion between 150 and 200 percent of the poverty line.
In terms of expenditures, the EITC has actually become better focused on lower income households. Forty-five percent of all dollars
went to poor households in 1996, compared with 40 percent in 1991;
this is undoubtedly due to the big increase in the phase-in rates. At the
higher end of the EITC income distribution, the proportion of benefits
going to households with an income more than twice the poverty line
has fallen in half, from about 14 percent to 7 percent. Households on
the phase-in and stationary ranges now get a smaller proportion of total
benefits—down from 56 percent to 37 percent. Finally, families with
two or more children now get more than 70 percent of all benefits,
compared with about 60 percent in 1991.

THE IMPACT OF THE EITC ON THE POVERTY RATE
The official poverty rate in the United States is based on a comparison of a household’s income to a level of income that has been established as necessary to achieve a minimal acceptable (i.e., poverty-level)
standard of living.17 That standard of living, which is called the poverty threshold or poverty standard, was constructed in 1964 as part of
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Table 2.5 Characteristics of the EITC Population, 1991 and 1996
Share of EITC
population (%)

Share of EITC
benefits (%)

1991

1996

1991

1996

EITC range
Phase-in
Stationary
Phase-out

32.3
17.5
50.2

25.6
9.9
64.5

25.7
30.3
43.9

19.3
17.7
62.9

Race
White (non-Hispanic)
Black (non-Hispanic)
Hispanic
Other

64.5
29.7
—
5.8

50.8
22.2
20.7
6.3

64.6
29.7
—
5.7

45.5
22.1
26.7
3.3

Family/marital status
Married, children
Married, no children
Single parent, children
Single, no children

37.7
0.0
62.3
0.0

35.3
5.4
45.9
13.5

35.7
0.0
64.3
0.0

42.4
0.7
55.3
1.6

Age of household head
⬍Age 25
25–34
35–44
45–54
⬎55

12.9
42.4
29.5
10.1
5.1

7.3
30.5
35.7
18.7
7.7

11.6
43.0
29.5
10.1
5.9

8.3
31.1
41.0
16.2
3.4

Number of children
None
One
Two
Three or more

0.0
43.1
34.8
22.1

18.8
30.0
28.9
22.3

0.0
42.9
34.6
22.6

2.3
27.1
38.7
31.9

Poverty status
Poor
Non-poor

39.2
60.8

41.3
58.7

40.1
59.9

45.3
54.7

Poverty ratio
⬍1
1–1.5
1.5–2
⬎2

39.2
30.6
16.2
14.0

41.3
25.8
21.0
11.8

40.1
31.9
13.3
14.7

45.3
32.1
15.4
7.2

SOURCE: Panel Study of Income Dynamics.
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the initial effort to measure the extent of poverty in the United States
and progress in eliminating it. The official U.S. poverty threshold was
based on the minimum cost of a nutritionally adequate diet, as estimated by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. This income was then
adjusted for other basic needs by multiplying by three on the basis of
budget studies that showed that low income families spent approximately one-third of their income on food. Further adjustments are made
for family size, age (elderly/non-elderly), and farm residence. Annual
adjustments are made for inflation. Any household with total income
below the resulting income level is officially considered poor. In 2001,
this income level was about $17,600 for a family of four and about
$8,800 for a single-person household.
The income used in the poverty calculation includes all conventional sources of earnings and income, including cash transfers, but it
excludes all in-kind transfers and all taxes as well as other sources of
income such as unrealized capital gains and the value of health insurance supplements to wage and salary income. It is therefore best understood as a pre-tax, post-cash transfer measure of household income.
Thus, for example, welfare and Social Security benefits are included in
household income because they are received as a cash transfer, but
food stamps and Medicaid benefits are excluded, because they are inkind benefits.18 While the EITC functions as a cash transfer and therefore might quite arguably be included in household income, it is technically a tax credit. Thus, it is excluded from the standard measure of
income used for computing the poverty rate, just like all other taxes.
As a result, the EITC cannot, by construction, have any direct effect on
reducing the official U.S. poverty rate.19
The Census Bureau does, however, publish a set of alternative poverty measures based on different treatment of various excluded items.
Currently, there are 16 such alternative poverty measures; the EITC
figures prominently in several of them, thus these measures can be used
to estimate its impact on the poverty rate.20 It is, however, not possible
to compare the official poverty rate with the poverty rate adjusting only
for the EITC; rather, the Census Bureau tabulations show the EITC
impact relative to an alternative baseline poverty rate. Figure 2.3
shows one of these estimates of the impact of the EITC on the poverty
rate for the time period from 1991 to 1999. In this comparison, the
baseline is the poverty rate when household income is adjusted to in-
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Figure 2.3 Reduction in Poverty Rate Due to EITC, 1991–1999
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clude estimated capital gains and losses (which has virtually no impact
on the poverty rate) and is net of all taxes except the EITC. This
adjustment increases the poverty rate by about 1.0 to 1.2 percentage
points relative to the official poverty rate, depending on the year because the adjustment for taxes paid reduces household income by more
than the inclusion of capital gains. The alternative comparison is the
same income concept, but now including all income received from the
EITC. The numbers shown in the figure are the difference between
these two poverty rates; this provides an estimate of the net reduction
in the poverty rate due to the EITC cash transfer. This is a static exercise
in the sense that it does not account for any behavioral changes on
work and/or marriage that might be partially offsetting.21
On the basis of these two adjusted income measures, the EITC
reduced the poverty rate in 1999 by 1.5 percentage points, which
means that about 4 million persons were lifted out of poverty as a result
of the cash assistance they received from the EITC. This is not trivial,
but neither is it an enormous overall impact. There are two reasons for
this modest impact on the poverty rate. First, recall that only about 35
percent of all poor households receive any cash assistance at all via the
EITC. The EITC is not fundamentally a transfer program for the poor
since its eligibility criteria exclude many poor households. Second,
the EITC benefit structure offers modest benefits to the poorest households and provides its maximum benefits to families just on either side
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of the poverty threshold. As shown in Table 2.2, what we call nearpoor households (those with an income-to-needs ratio between 1.0 and
1.5) actually receive almost $200 more in EITC benefits than poor
households.
We do estimate that the EITC has a substantial impact among the
poor households who do receive benefits. We estimate that just under
one-quarter of poor EITC recipient households are boosted out of poverty by the EITC. This is, unfortunately, a very rough estimate, in part
because EITC receipt is based on household status, while the poverty
estimates are based on an individual count. We estimate that about 6
million poor households receive EITC benefits and, from the Census
Bureau analyses, we estimate that 4 million persons were lifted out of
poverty by the EITC. It is not clear, however, how many households
are represented by those 4 million persons. Our estimate of 25 percent
of recipient households lifted out of poverty assumes that the 4 million
persons resided in 1.5 million households.
The poverty impact of the EITC has been essentially constant since
1995, the year after EITC benefits were substantially increased (Figure
2.3). Between 1991 and 1993, when EITC benefits were considerably
smaller, the impact on the poverty rate was between 0.7 and 1.0 percentage points.
The EITC also figures in an alternative set of poverty rate calculations. In this comparison, the baseline poverty rate is the rate when
household income is reduced by excluding all cash transfers and subtracting estimated federal taxes and is increased by including capital
gains and the value of health insurance supplements to wage and salary
income. The exclusion of cash transfers increases the poverty rate
about 7 percentage points, while the other changes have relatively
small impacts (half a percentage point or less). The alternative rate is
based on this income plus estimated EITC benefits. This comparison
yields a similar estimate for the impact of the EITC on reducing the
poverty rate during the 1990s—roughly 1.5 percentage points in recent
years and 1.0 percentage point in the early 1990s. This measure is also
available back to 1979, during a time period when the EITC was a very
small program. Throughout the 1980s, the EITC impact on the poverty
rate ranges from 0.2 to 0.4 percentage points.
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SUMMARY
We have used data from the PSID for 1996 to describe the demographic and economic characteristics of EITC recipient households.
Our estimates describe the population of EITC-eligible households,
rather than of recipient households. Our estimate of the proportion
eligible for EITC benefits in 1996 (13.1 percent) is therefore substantially lower than the proportion reported by the IRS. When we adjust
for reasonable estimates of ineligible recipients and eligible nonclaimers, however, our estimate is remarkably close to the IRS figure.
We find that about one-quarter of recipient households are on the
phase-in range of the EITC, one-tenth are on the stationary range, and
the remainder—nearly two-thirds of all recipients—are on the phaseout range. About 25 percent of households, mostly elderly, are demographically ineligible for the EITC because they have no children and
do not meet the age requirement for childless households. About 6
percent of households do meet the demographic eligibility requirements but have no earnings. The extension of eligibility to childless
households, age 25–64, has altered the overall composition of EITC
households. Childless households now account for nearly one-fifth of
all households, although they get less than 2.5 percent of all expenditures because their benefits are so modest. The overall population of
EITC households is about 50 percent non-Hispanic white, with roughly
equal proportions of non-Hispanic blacks and Hispanics.
As a poverty program, the EITC is clearly limited by its focus on
households with earnings. We find that only about 35 percent of poor
households received benefits from the EITC in 1996. About one-third
of all poor households are demographically ineligible; most of these
are elderly households, a group that the EITC is certainly not designed
to serve. About 30 percent of poor families were demographically
eligible but had no earnings in 1996. In many ways, the near-poor fare
better from the EITC. Households with an income between 100 percent and 150 percent of the poverty line are just as likely to receive
EITC benefits as poor families, and their greater earnings often enable
them to receive a substantial grant. These near-poor families received
an average credit of $1,650, almost $200 more than poor families.
The labor market activity of EITC recipient households is not terribly different from that of nonrecipient households. The householder
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in an EITC household worked an average of 39 weeks and 38 hours
per week, and the average total annual hours worked for head and
spouse was over 1,900 hours. What most distinguishes household
labor supply of these families is the lack of a second earner. Nearly
60 percent of these families are either single-parent families or singleperson households; in all, less than one-fifth had more than a single
earner.
Finally, the EITC has made a modest contribution to the reduction
of poverty in the United States, reducing it by about 1.5 percentage
points or 4 million people. The impact is muted, because more than
60 percent of poor households are ineligible for the EITC.
A program as large as the EITC has now become may begin to
have an impact on the economic behavior of the households it serves.
This kind of impact has been the norm for safety-net programs, such
as AFDC. In the next chapters, we turn to these issues, examining the
impact of the EITC program on labor supply behavior and marriage.

Notes
1. For a discussion of the continuing representativeness of the PSID, see Fitzgerald,
Gottschalk, and Moffitt (1998). The authors concluded that the PSID remains
representative for most purposes. For a general discussion of the PSID, see Hill
(1992).
2. In 1996, this portion was 50 percent; in 2001, it is 75 percent.
3. We use the early release 1997 family file.
4. A 1998 study by the IRS (Weber 1998) found that, of the nearly 115 million
returns in 1993, over 9 million were filed by someone who was a dependent of
another taxpayer.
5. We do not need to take explicit account of the other family members because the
PSID sample, when weighted, is nationally representative of all households. This
means that individuals like them are already appropriately accounted for in the
PSID sample and thus in our estimates. For example, they may be the primary
householders in a PSID household.
6. This is the sum of the standard deduction ($6,700) and the per person exemption
of $2,250. In 2001, the corresponding figure is $7,500 Ⳮ (4 ⳯ $2,900) ⳱
$19,100.
7. In order to receive the credit, a taxpayer would then have to file an amended
return, which might well be a daunting task.
8. Scholz’s analysis pre-dates the expansion of the EITC to childless households.
Nothing at all is known about EITC participation among this group.
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9. A ‘‘qualifying’’ child is a child under age 19 (or under age 24, if a full-time
student) who lived with the claimant for at least half the year. Only one tax filer
can claim a particular child as a qualifying child even if more than one meets all
requirements. See Chapter 7 for a full discussion of compliance issues.
10. In computing eligibility, we do take account of modified AGI, by adding back
into household income 50 percent of business and farm losses. Like most other
researchers, we do not take account of ineligibility due to interest, dividend, and
capital gains income greater than $2,000, because we lack decent information on
this. This rule typically affects very few cases.
11. To get this figure, multiply 16.3 percent ⳯ 0.75 to find the proportion of the
recipient population who were eligible. Multiplying that figure by 1.15 to adjust
for eligible nonrecipients yields 13.4 percent.
12. The official poverty standard adjusts for family size in a nonlinear way to capture
economies of scale. In 1996, the poverty standard was $10,233 for a two-person
family, $16,036 for a four-person family, and $27,091 for an eight-person family.
The poverty standards in the PSID differ slightly from the official numbers because they account for changes in family size during a calendar year.
13. The Census Bureau treats EITC income in exactly the same way we do in its
calculation of poverty. It also publishes alternative poverty computations in
which EITC income is included. We discuss those measures at the end of this
chapter.
14. For example, claiming additional children can increase the credit. Overstating
income through the end of the stationary range also increases the credit.
15. There is a fundamental inconsistency between the tax-filing unit that is the basis
for the EITC and the household unit that is the basis for poverty calculations. All
of our EITC calculations include only the income of the head and spouse, while
calculations of total family and of poverty status include the income of all household members and, in the case of poverty status, their needs as well.
16. It is important to appreciate that the changes in the distributions between 1991
and 1996 reflect not only the changes in the EITC schedule but also changes in
the underlying distribution of the population across characteristics on which EITC
benefits are based.
17. See the Census Bureau web site at www.census.gov for information on current
year poverty standards and a further discussion. Alternative thresholds, based on
the cost of housing, have been proposed recently.
18. The argument for excluding the bonus value of food stamps is particularly weak,
since food stamps are used as if they were cash by most recipients. This argument
is far less compelling for the value of Medicaid.
19. This is true holding labor supply and earnings constant. It is, however, possible
(see Chapter 3) that the EITC might affect household labor supply and earnings
and thereby affect the poverty rate, either positively or negatively.
20. The Census Bureau uses essentially the same procedures that we use to estimate
the EITC benefits received by households for its poverty computations. Like the
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PSID, the CPS does not provide any direct information about EITC benefits.
EITC benefits are estimated on the basis of income, earnings, age, and number of
children, assuming (just as we do) that all eligible households receive the EITC
and that no ineligible households do.
21. These potential impacts are discussed in Chapters 3 and 4.

3
The EITC and the Labor Market
It is well understood by both economists and policymakers that tax
and transfer programs often have effects on individual behavior and
that these effects may be large, often unintended, and sometimes
counter to the aims and intents of the programs themselves. The potential impact of the welfare system on work, marriage, and fertility is the
most famous of these, with hundreds of studies of its impact on labor
supply, fertility, and marital status; see Moffitt (1992) for a summary.
The impact of the tax system, especially its high marginal tax rates
and the marriage penalty, has been a second major focus. See Alm,
Dickert-Conlin, and Whittington (1999) for a recent summary of demographic effects; see Poterba (1998) and Slemrod (2000) for a recent
summary of labor supply effects.1
When the EITC was a relatively small program in the 1980s and
early 1990s, its behavioral impacts were consequently quite small, perhaps even ignorably small. With the very substantial increase in the
EITC in 1994 and the large impact it now has on individual budgets,
however, it is certainly possible that the EITC might now have more
important behavioral effects. As with the welfare and tax system, there
are two broad areas of likely impacts—labor supply and marriage. The
labor supply impacts occur because the EITC substantially changes an
individual’s after-tax wage rate and net income. The marriage impacts
exist because, depending on their particular circumstances, households
stand to gain or lose considerable EITC benefits by marriage.
In this chapter, we describe the way the EITC may affect work,
show the likely impacts, and then examine the growing empirical literature. We also examine the possible impact of the EITC on wage rates,
via its impact on labor supply. In Chapter 4, we do exactly the same
thing for marriage. In Chapter 8, we use these reviews as a basis for
proposing a reform of the EITC program.
LABOR SUPPLY AND THE EITC
Labor supply refers to the number of hours an individual works in
the labor market. Labor force participation is a related concept that

57

58 Helping Working Families: The Earned Income Tax Credit

measures whether or not an individual works in the labor market.
Hours of work are often called the intensive labor supply margin, while
labor force participation is the extensive labor supply margin.
The standard economic approach to labor supply behavior focuses
on the effects of an individual’s wage rate and of nonlabor income2 on
these two labor supply dimensions—whether or not to work and how
many hours to work. We first discuss the standard economic approach
to labor supply behavior and then show how labor supply choices
might be affected by the EITC. Readers who are familiar with the
basics of labor supply analysis, including indifference curves and budget constraints, may want to skip ahead to the next section or see Appendix B.
The basic idea in labor supply analysis is that individuals make
choices about how much leisure they want to have and how much consumption of market goods and services they want.3 It is assumed that
individuals have sufficient latitude to choose their hours of work by
choice of job, working an additional job, working part time, and so on.
This assumption may be less true in the short run, but it is more so in
the long run. There is an inevitable trade-off between having goods
and services on the one hand and having leisure on the other since, to
have more consumption, an individual must first earn the income to
purchase the goods by giving up leisure time. A wide range of leisure
time/consumption possibilities exist; the exact set of feasible combinations depend on an individual’s wage rate and nonlabor income.4
In analyzing this problem, it is very useful to think of the wage
rate as the price of an hour of leisure time. It is not, of course, a price
that anyone pays in the traditional way. But, it is a price nonetheless,
since taking one more hour of leisure means working one less hour and
thus not earning an amount of income exactly equal to the wage rate.5
An individual’s goal is to choose the best combination of goods
and services and of leisure that is available, where ‘‘best’’ means that
no other feasible combination would be preferred. It is possible to
solve this problem in terms of marginal conditions that must hold at
the best choice; there is a well-known economics formula that captures
that idea (see Appendix B). This choice will depend on an individual’s
underlying preferences for goods and leisure, on the wage rate (price
of leisure), and on the amount of nonlabor income he or she has.

The EITC and the Labor Market 59

For our purposes here, the exact details of this rule are relatively
unimportant. What is more important is how the choice would change
if there were a change in the wage rate or a change in nonlabor income.
In order to analyze the EITC’s possible impacts on labor supply, we
need to extract the general rules and principles of how individual labor
supply choices will respond to changes in wages and/or nonlabor income. Both are substantially affected by the EITC.
The Two Principles of Labor Supply Analysis
There are two basic analytical principles in labor supply analysis:
one concerns the effect of a pure increase in nonlabor income and the
other a pure increase in the price of leisure. Once these principles are
understood, it is possible to readily apply them to a vast array of situations, including the impact of the EITC.
If Only Richer or Poorer
Suppose an individual is somehow made richer at his or her current
hours of work but still has exactly the same wage as before. This could
occur through an increase in nonlabor income or through a change in
the structure of taxes or transfers that decreases an individual’s net
taxes or increases transfers, without changing the marginal tax rate.6
Since the change makes an individual richer but doesn’t change the
price of leisure relative to consumption goods, he or she is likely to
want to consume both more leisure and more consumption goods. In
effect, the additional income is ‘‘spent’’ on both additional consumption goods and on additional hours of leisure. If hours of leisure increase, then hours of work must fall.
This is the first principle of labor supply analysis: Any change that
makes an individual richer at his or her current labor supply without
changing the wage rate will decrease labor supply. Any change that
makes an individual poorer at his or her current labor supply without
changing the wage rate will increase labor supply. This kind of change
is called an income effect. The bigger the change in income, the bigger
the total impact on labor supply.
The income effect applies both to hours of work and labor force
participation. An increase in nonlabor income will reduce hours
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worked by current participants and could, if the income change is large
enough, actually cause some workers to become nonparticipants
(imagine winning the lottery and its impact on labor supply). Similarly,
a decrease in nonlabor income will increase hours worked by current
participants and could, if the income change is large enough, cause
some nonworkers to enter the labor market.
If Only a Change in the Wage Rate
Now consider the opposite kind of change. Suppose that an individual’s wage has increased, but that at the very same moment, nonlabor income is somehow reduced so that the worker is no richer at
current hours of work. For example, if an individual is currently working 30 hours per week and the wage increases by $1.00, imagine that
somehow $30 a week is simultaneously lost, leaving that individual
with exactly the same income as before. This is exactly like having a
higher price for leisure but being no richer. What effect will that have?
The higher price means that leisure is now more expensive relative to
consumption goods than it was before. This provides an incentive for
individuals to cut back on leisure and consume more consumption
goods. Since they are no richer, there is no offsetting impact. If hours
of leisure fall, hours of work will increase.
This response is the second principle of labor supply analysis: An
increase in an individual’s wage rate that does not make him or her
richer at current hours of work will increase labor supply. A decrease
in an individual’s wage rate that does not make him or her poorer at
the current hours of work will decrease labor supply. This kind of
change is called a substitution effect or a compensated wage effect.7
The bigger the change in the wage, the bigger the total impact on labor
supply. Substitution effects rarely occur in the real world by themselves, but they are an important component of many policies that affect wage rates.
Like the income effect, the substitution effect also applies to both
hours of work and labor force participation. Thus, the substitution
effect of a wage increase will increase hours of work among current
workers and may also increase labor force participation, if the change
in the wage rate is large enough. And if the wage rate falls, the substitution effect will decrease hours of work among current workers and
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may decrease labor force participation, if the change in the wage rate
is large enough.
A Change in the Wage Rate
When an individual’s wage rate changes, there is both a substitution effect and an income effect. A higher wage makes leisure more
expensive, but it also makes an individual richer since, at the current
hours of work, total income increases. The substitution effect of the
wage increase causes hours of work to increase, while the income effect makes an individual richer and causes hours of work to fall. What
happens when the two effects are put together? The total change in
work hours when the wage increases is the sum of the changes arising
from the income and substitution effects. The net result cannot be predicted: the income and substitution effects of a wage increase conflict.
The same logic applies in reverse when there is a decrease in the
wage rate. Now the price of leisure is lower, but the individual is
poorer. In this case, the substitution effect causes hours of work to
fall, but the income effect of being poorer causes both leisure and consumption to fall, thus increasing hours of work. Again, the two effects
conflict. If the substitution effect is stronger than the income effect,
hours of work will fall when the wage falls. If the income effect is
stronger, hours of work will rise.
A change in the wage rate also may affect the participation decision. Consider the situation of someone who is currently not working.
That person has a wage rate—what he or she could earn if he or she
took a job consistent with his or her skills and the status of the labor
market. Now suppose this wage rate goes up. In this case, the substitution effect of a wage increase is an incentive to increase hours of work.
The incentive may not be big enough to actually push a worker into the
labor market, but the direction of the impact is clear. Usually there is
an offsetting income effect when the wage increases but not in this
case. Here, precisely because the individual isn’t working to begin
with, he or she isn’t made any richer by the wage increase. Thus, in
the case of a nonworking individual, there is only a substitution effect.
A wage increase will increase the probability of labor market participation and a wage decrease will decrease that probability.
One final point: in all labor supply analyses, the relevant wage rate
is not the market wage rate itself, but rather the net marginal wage.
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The marginal wage is the wage that would be earned, net of all taxes
or subsidies, if an individual worked one more hour. If w is the market
wage and t is the marginal tax rate, then the net marginal wage is
wm  w  (1  t); if there is a wage subsidy at rate s, then wm 
w  (1  s). The distinction between the wage itself and the net
marginal wage is important because many of the effects of the EITC
operate via changes in the marginal wage rate.
How the EITC May Affect Labor Supply
The effects of the EITC on labor supply and labor force participation are complex and varied. That the EITC will affect these decisions
is certainly plausible, since the EITC substantially alters the two factors
that we know are the key determinants of those choices—the net aftertax wage rate and nonlabor income. The impact is complicated, however, by several factors. First, each of the three ranges of the EITC
generates distinct and different potential labor supply effects. Second,
the impacts are different for hours of work by workers already in the
labor market and by potential workers who are not currently working.
Finally, the impact is itself potentially problematic since the EITC is
filtered through the tax system, thereby blurring its structure.
Hours of Work
For workers on the phase-in portion of the EITC schedule, the
EITC subsidy acts exactly like an increase in a worker’s wage rate.
Here, the net marginal wage becomes w  (1  c) where c, the EITC
credit rate, equals 0.0765 for childless workers, 0.34 for workers with
one child, and 0.40 for workers with two or more children. For current
workers, there will be conflicting substitution and income effects, exactly like an increase in the wage rate. The higher wage provides an
incentive to work more hours. But, the higher income (the dollar
amount of the credit received at an individual’s current hours of work)
provides an incentive to work less. The net effect on hours of work is
thus an empirical matter—it depends on which effect is stronger.
For workers on the stationary portion of the EITC schedule, the
EITC acts exactly like a pure increase in nonlabor income with no
accompanying change in the wage rate. Thus, there is an income effect
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that ought to have a negative effect on labor supply, but there is no
potentially offsetting substitution effect. Since the maximum EITC
benefit is quite substantial for workers with children, the effect on work
hours for workers in this income range might well be large.
Finally, for workers on the phase-out range of the EITC schedule,
the EITC operates as both a tax on the marginal wage rate and an
increase in income. A worker’s net wage becomes w  (1  p) where
p, the phase-out rate, equals 0.0765 for childless workers, 0.16 for
workers with one child, and 0.21 for workers with two or more children. For example, if a worker with two children earns an additional
$1,000, he or she will lose $210 of the credit, thus ending up only $790
richer. Despite this lower marginal wage, however, workers in the
phase-out range are richer than they otherwise would be as long as they
still receive a credit from the EITC program. Thus, in this range, there
is a substitution effect of a lower wage and an income effect of being
richer, both of which will reduce labor supply.
This particular configuration of incentives is the standard case of
most income-tested transfer programs, such as AFDC, TANF, and food
stamps. Those programs typically provide maximum benefits to individuals with little or no income and then reduce those benefits as family income rises. The benefits make the individuals better off and
create an income effect that reduces labor supply, while the reduction
in benefits with own earnings lowers the net marginal wage rate, creating a substitution effect that also reduces labor supply. There are,
however, two important differences between EITC and the other
income-tested programs in this respect. First, the phase-out rates in
EITC are substantially lower than in these other programs and, second,
the phase-out rates are applied not at very low earnings, as in most
transfer programs, but at the somewhat higher levels that mark the
beginning of the EITC phase-out range.
The theory of labor supply does identify some situations where the
impacts of the EITC might be particularly strong. For workers on the
phase-in range, the amount of the credit increases with income, so the
income effect should increase as well. In contrast, the increase in the
marginal wage rate is the same at all points along the phase-in range,
so the substitution effect should be similar at all points. This suggests
that the net effect on work might be more positive at very low incomes
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and somewhat less positive or negative at higher incomes within the
phase-in range.
The most negative impact of the EITC would be on workers at or
near the beginning of the phase-out range. They receive the maximum
credit (or close to it) and also face a substantial reduction in their marginal net wage rate. For them, both income and substitution effects
ought to be relatively strong. For workers at the high end of the phaseout range, the income effect will be much weaker because their credit
is smaller, but the substitution effect will be the same.
Since all of the relevant EITC parameters increase with the number
of children (through two), effects should increase with the number of
children. Similarly, since the EITC phase-in and phase-out rates have
increased over time, we would expect that the impacts have increased
as well.
Labor Force Participation
For nonparticipants, the impact of the EITC also depends on
where, prior to their own labor participation decision, their family income places them on the EITC range.
For a current nonworker in a household with no other earned income, the EITC increases the net marginal wage but without making
the worker any richer at his or her current hours of work (which are
zero). Thus, there is only a substitution effect. The EITC very definitely provides an incentive for nonworkers, such as these, to enter the
labor market; the effect could well be large, especially for households
with children where the wage subsidy is either 34 percent or 40 percent. This case would certainly apply to single mothers attempting to
make a transition from welfare to work.
For a current nonworker in a household with other earnings that
already place it on the phase-in range, the phase-in rate acts as a wage
increase and creates a substitution effect that is an incentive to work.
Possibly offsetting this, however, is the credit itself, for which the family is already eligible on the basis of the earnings of other household
members. This operates like an increase in family income and creates
a negative income effect. For these workers, the EITC effect on participation is unknown a priori and is, thus, an empirical question.
For a current nonworker in a household whose income places them
on the EITC stationary range, there is an income effect that comes
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from the credit itself. That effect makes the household richer and will
therefore reduce the incentive to work. In addition, there may also be
a negative substitution effect, if their own labor supply would push
them into the phase-out range. So, the impact is clearly negative for
these workers.
Finally, for a current nonworker in a household already on the
EITC phase-out range, the work incentives are clearly negative. The
household is richer because of the credit, while the marginal net wage
rate is lower because of the phase-out rate. Thus, there is both a substitution effect and an income effect, both of which provide negative work
incentives. These effects could also operate to reduce labor force participation among current workers.
The largest positive effects on labor force participation ought to be
for workers who are currently at the beginning of the phase-in range,
where there is only a strong positive substitution effect. The largest
negative effects on labor force participation ought to be for workers
who are currently at the beginning of the phase-out range, where there
are strong negative income and substitution effects.
All of these impacts on the hours of work of current workers and
the labor force participation of current nonparticipants are summarized
in Table 3.1. Also shown in the table are likely groups affected by the
EITC in each range.
There is one final complication in analyzing the impact of the EITC
on labor supply. All of these effects on the net marginal wage and on
nonlabor income operate through the tax code. While the formulas
that underlie the EITC clearly do result in changes in net marginal
wages and family income, exactly as described above, it is not clear
whether individuals are likely to perceive these marginal effects. Liebman (1998), for example, argued that taxpayers often regard the EITC
as a lump-sum payment and do not clearly recognize that it could be
higher or lower, depending on variations in their labor supply and/or
income and earnings.8 Nearly all EITC recipients receive the credit in
a single payment as part of their annual tax refund check in the year
following the year in which they earned the income entitling them to
the credit. In contrast, the federal income tax and the payroll tax are
withheld from each paycheck, and welfare benefits are received
monthly. Because of the indirect way the EITC operates, the effects of
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Table 3.1 Predicted Effects of the EITC on Hours of Work and Labor
Force Participation
Expected labor supply effect on
EITC range of current
household income
Phase-in

Hours of work of current
workers
Substitution effect:
Income effect:
Net effect:?

Impacted group: workers in
low income families

Labor force participation of
current nonworkers
Substitution effect:
Income effect:
0 (no other workers in
family)
(other workers with
income)
Net effect:
(no other workers in
family)
? (other workers with
income)
Impacted group: single women
on welfare; secondary
workers in very low income
families

Stationary

Substitution effect: 0
Income effect:
Net effect:
Impacted group: workers in
low income families

Substitution effect: 0 or 
Income effect:
Net effect:
Impacted group: secondary
workers in low income
families

Phase-out

Substitution effect:
Income effect:
Net effect:
Impacted group: workers in
moderate income families

Substition effect:
Income effect:
Net effect:
Impacted group: secondary
workers in low and moderate
income families

the EITC could well be somewhat different than those that follow from
a standard rational choice approach.
Evidence—The Effects of the EITC on Labor Supply
Methods
There is a very lengthy empirical literature in economics in the
analysis of individual labor supply and how it is affected by wages,
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nonlabor income, taxes, and transfers.9 There are several stylized facts
from that literature that are helpful in identifying the likely impact of
the EITC. First, the labor force participation decision is much more
responsive to changes in wages and income than are decisions about
hours of work. Heckman (1993), for example, in his review of the
literature on labor supply has emphasized the importance of changes in
the extensive margin (labor force participation) relative to the intensive
margin (hours of work). Second, and consistent with that, women’s
labor supply decisions are more responsive to economic incentives than
men’s decisions are. This is especially true for married women. In
many analyses, men’s labor supply is largely unresponsive to changes
in income and/or wages.
The first evidence on the likely labor supply impact of the EITC
came from simulations that relied on labor supply parameters estimated
in other related contexts. For example, in Hoffman and Seidman
(1990), we used estimates of income and substitution effects for low
income workers from the Seattle and Denver income-maintenance experiments that occurred in the mid-to-late 1970s. We then assumed
that the low and moderate income families eligible for the EITC in
1988 would respond similarly to the wage and income changes created
by the credit. We did not attempt to estimate the labor supply impact
of the EITC directly or independently. A similar approach has also
been followed by Dickert, Houser, and Scholz (1995).
Since then, there have been two broad approaches to determining
the labor supply effects of the EITC. One approach involves the modeling of individual labor supply decisions in a framework that incorporates the income and wage changes created by the EITC. Statistical
methods are then used to estimate behavioral responses. Combining
the observed behavioral response with the actual changes in wages and
nonlabor income created by the EITC provides an estimate of the impact of the EITC on labor supply. Some of these estimates attempt to
characterize individual budget constraints fully, and they are called
‘‘structural’’ estimates. Other estimates are ‘‘reduced form,’’ in that
they do not attempt to fully characterize the budget constraints. The
major benefit of this approach is that the resulting statistical estimates
are not limited to the particular EITC formula or data on which they
are based and can be used to predict the impact of future changes. The
difficulties are primarily in implementation: it is enormously difficult
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to fully characterize the often complex budget constraints that face
individuals and the multiple ways they changed during, for example,
the 1990s. Additionally, these studies necessarily assume that individuals clearly perceive all of the wage and income changes of the EITC.
Structural labor supply models of the EITC have been estimated by
Meyer and Rosenbaum (2000) and by Dickert, Houser, and Scholz
(1995). Reduced form labor supply models of the impact of the EITC
have been estimated by Eissa and Liebman (1996) and Eissa and
Hoynes (1998).
A second popular approach utilizes a natural experiment methodology. A natural experiment shares much in common with a traditional
controlled experiment, like a medical drug trial, in which individuals
are randomly assigned to treatment and control groups. In a experiment with random assignment, the effect of the treatment can be estimated simply as the difference between the two groups in the outcome
of interest. There is no need for complex statistical analysis because
random assignment eliminates all other, potentially confounding, differences between the two groups.
A natural experiment is essentially identical to a traditional experiment except that a natural experiment is not designed and controlled
by an experimenter, but rather it is the result of some policy or some
other action that affects one identifiable group but not some other otherwise similar group.10 Here the treatment might refer to implementation of a particular law or policy that affects a particular group but not
some other otherwise similar group. For example, minimum wage laws
affect the wages and possibly the employment of less-skilled workers,
but they arguably have little or no effect at all on the wages and employment of more-skilled workers. Thus, one way to determine the
impact of the minimum wage on the employment of unskilled workers
is to compare their employment rate to the employment rate of moreskilled workers.
In a natural experiment, the experimental and control group may
have substantial pre-existing differences in the outcome of interest,
something which is typically not true in a controlled experiment. For
example, in the minimum wage example, the employment rate very
likely differs between more-skilled and less-skilled workers even prior
to any change in the level of the minimum wage. In that case, a simple
comparison of the outcomes after the treatment reflects not just the
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treatment but also any pre-existing differences. Therefore, instead of
comparing differences, researchers typically compare the difference in
the differences, that is, the difference after the treatment with the difference before the treatment.11 This difference-in-differences approach is
now the standard method of evaluating a natural experiment in economics.
In the context of the EITC, researchers have identified a number of
natural experiments that are useful for analyzing the labor supply impacts of the EITC. They all share a common structure—a comparison
over time of some labor supply measure for two groups, one of which
is eligible for the EITC, while the other is either not eligible for the
EITC or is eligible for a markedly smaller EITC. Eissa and Liebman
(1996) compared the labor force participation and hours of work of
single mothers with that of single women without children. Eissa and
Hoynes (1998) made the same kind of comparison for married women
and married men. Ellwood (2000) compared labor force participation
of single mothers with relatively low predicted wages (likely to be
eligible for the EITC) with the labor supply of otherwise similar
women with relatively high wages (ineligible for the EITC). He also
compared the labor supply of different groups of married women, classified by whether their husband’s income alone leaves the family on
the phase-in, stationary, or phase-out region of the EITC schedule. In
all of these cases, the impact of the EITC was estimated using the
difference-in-differences approach.
It is important to appreciate both the strengths and weaknesses of
the natural experiment approach in this context. There is no need to
assume anything at all about how individuals perceive the EITC and
its impact on net wages and their income. Researchers can be agnostic
about what individuals know or do not know about the EITC. This is
also true in traditional experiments; an experimenter need not have any
particular theory about why a drug intervention may work in order to
estimate whether it does, in fact, work. This is probably a strength of
this approach, but it also ultimately limits its application to policy analysis. The results of natural experiments are narrowly tied to the particular treatment being investigated. Because they do not model or
estimate the basis of the behavioral response (e.g., the income and
substitution effects themselves) but only its aggregate impact, the experiments are not informative about what the effects would be if the
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EITC were changed in some different way. They cannot be used for
quantitative predictions of the impact of policies different from the
natural experiment itself, although they may be useful for qualitative
predictions.
Findings
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 summarize what we know from the economics
literature about the labor supply effects of the EITC. Table 3.2 examines the effects on labor force participation, and Table 3.3 looks at the
effects on hours of work. Appendix Tables B.1 and B.2 describe the
studies in the tables further, including information about data and
methodology plus interpretative notes. Our discussion focuses on the
two text tables, but we urge interested readers to examine the two background tables.
A few words of introduction are in order. First, most of the studies
are based on the EITC as of the mid 1980s or focus on the major
expansion of the EITC in 1993. Especially in the natural experiment
studies, the impacts are always marginal, that is, they identify the impact of a particular EITC change relative to the immediate status quo.
Second, the tables are organized by population group—single mothers,
married mothers, etc. It is reasonable to expect labor supply impacts
to vary across these groups because they tend to face different EITC
labor supply incentives and all of the natural experiments are structured
around those differences. Still, the groups are not homogeneous and
some dilution of effects is to be expected. Finally, the studies are
consistently well done and virtually all are reliable. Some further editorial comments are included in the Appendix B tables.
Using the summary of data presented in Tables 3.2 and 3.3, we can
draw the following conclusions about the impact of the EITC on labor
supply.
• The empirical evidence is unusually consistent, with very few
anomalous findings. Virtually all estimates are consistent with
the underlying hypotheses generated from the economic model
of labor supply behavior. This is an extremely important finding
for thinking about reform of the EITC. Economic incentives do
seem to matter.
• The findings are also quite consistent with the standard finding
that decisions about hours of work are less responsive to

Table 3.2 Summary of Estimated Effects of EITC on Labor Force Participation and Employment Rate
Population group and
study
Single mothers
Dickert, Houser, and
Scholz (1995)
Eissa and Liebman
(1996)
Ellwood (2000)
Meyer and
Rosenbaum
(1999, 2000)

Methods

Findings

Positive, because most
nonworking single
mothers face incentives
of phase-in range of
EITC.

Natural experiment by
number of children and
by quartile of predicted
wage rate (Ellwood,
Eissa and Liebman,
Meyer and Rosenbaum).
Structural models with
taxes and transfers,
including EITC and
AFDC (Dickert, Houser,
and Scholz; Meyer and
Rosenbaum).

Consistently positive.
• 1986 EITC expansion increased LFPR 2 to 4
percentage points (Eissa and Liebman).
• 1993 EITC expansion and AFDC reform
increased LFPR of low wage single mothers
18–23 percentage points compared to higher
wage single mothers and to single women
without children (Ellwood).
• 6 to 7 percentage point increase in employment
rate of single mothers between 1990 and 1996
compared to single women without children
(Meyer and Rosenbaum 2000).
• 1993 EITC expansion increased LFPR 3.3
percentage points (Dickert, Houser, and Scholz)
• Change in income taxes if work (primarily
EITC) increased LFPR of all single mothers by
1.5 to 2 percentage points, 1992–96,
approximately 35% of total change in LFPR
(Meyer and Rosenbaum 1999).
(continued)
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Expected effects

Population group and
study

Expected effects

Methods

Findings

Married Mothers
Eissa and Hoynes
(1998)
Ellwood (2000)

Negative, because many
married mothers face
incentives of flat and
phase-out ranges of
EITC.

Natural experiment by
number of children and
husband’s income
(Ellwood; Eissa and
Hoynes)
Reduced form model with
simulation of EITC effect
(Eissa and Hoynes).

Negative overall, but depends on particular
incentives.
• 1993 EITC expansion and AFDC reform
decreased LFPR of low wage married mothers
by 3–7 percentage points compared to higher
wage married mothers (Ellwood); decreased
LFPR of less educated married mothers by 2–4
percentage points (Eissa and Hoynes). Reduced
form estimate is smaller but still negative (Eissa
and Hoynes).
• LFPR for married women on phase-in range
increased by 1.1 percentage points (Eissa and
Hoynes); increased 13 percentage points for
low wage married women with family income
low enough to have positive work incentives
(Ellwood).

Married Men
Eissa and Hoynes
(1998)

Weakly positive, because
nonworking married
men face incentives of
phase-in range of EITC.

Natural experiment by
number of children
(Eissa and Hoynes).
Reduced form model with
simulation of EITC effect
(Eissa and Hoynes).

Zero to positive, but very small.
• 1993 EITC expansion increased LFPR of
married men with children and with wife ⬍12
years of education by 0.7–1.6 percentage points
relative to married men without children.
• Reduced form estimates are essentially zero.

NOTE: LFPR is labor force participation.
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Table 3.2 (continued)

Table 3.3 Summary of Estimated Effects of EITC on Hours of Work
Population group and
study

Findings

Mixed, depends on
current earnings,
which determine
EITC range and
resulting labor
supply incentives.

Expected effects

Simulations (Hoffman
and Seidman;
Dickert, Houser
and Scholz)

Negative, but relatively small.
• 1988 EITC reduced annual hours of work 2%
relative to EITC (Hoffman and Seidman).
• 1996 EITC decreased annual hours of work 0% to
4.0%. Most estimates between 0% and 1.6%
(Dickert, Houser, and Scholz).
• Hours of work increase on phase-in range and
decrease in flat and phase-out ranges (Hoffman and
Seidman; Dickert, Houser, and Scholz).

Single mothers
Dickert, Houser, and
Scholz (1995)
Eissa and Leibman
(1996)

Mixed, but probably
negative overall,
depends on current
earnings, which
determine EITC
range and resulting
labor supply
incentives.

Reduced form model
(Eissa and
Liebman) and
simulations
(Dickert, Houser,
and Scholz).

Negative or zero.
• 1986 EITC expansion had little or no effect on hours
of work (Eissa and Liebman).
• 1993 EITC expansion decreased hours of work
0.5% to 4.0%. Most estimates between 0.5% and
1.0% (Dickert, Houser, and Scholz).

(continued)
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Methods

All EITC recipients
Hoffman and
Seidman (1990)
Dickert, Houser, and
Scholz (1995)

Population group and
study

Expected effects

Methods

Findings

Married women
Hoffman and
Seidman (1990)
Eissa and Hoynes
(1998)

Mixed, but probably
negative overall,
since married
women may face
negative labor
supply incentives of
phase-out range.

Simulations (Hoffman
and Seidman;
Dickert, Houser,
and Scholz) and
reduced form labor
supply model
(Eissa and Hoynes).

Mostly negative, but depends on particular incentives.
• 1988 EITC decreased annual hours of work of wives
in EITC recipient families 3.6% (Hoffman and
Seidman).
• 1993 EITC expansion decreased annual hours of
work of married women with children 1.5% to
11.4%. Most estimates between 1.5% and 4.0%.
(Dickert, Houser, and Scholz).
• 1993 EITC expansion decreased average hours of
work 1% to 5%. Large positive effect (8–50%) for
workers on phase-in range small negative effect for
workers on flat range, possibly large negative
(2–20%) for workers on phase-out range (Eissa and
Hoynes).

Married men
Hoffman and
Seidman (1990)
Dickert, Houser, and
Scholz (1995)
Eissa and Hoynes
(1998)

Mixed, depends on
current earnings,
which determine
EITC range and
resulting labor
supply incentives.

Simulations (Hoffman
and Seidman;
Dickert, Houser,
and Scholz) and
reduced form labor
supply model
(Eissa and Hoynes).

Negative overall, but quantitatively small; positive
effects on phase-in range.
• 1988 EITC decreased average hours of work 1.6%
(Hoffman and Seidman).
• 1993 EITC expansion decreased annual hours of
work 0% to 3.2%. Most estimates between 1% and
2% (Dickert, Houser, and Scholz).
• 1993 EITC expansion decreased average hours of
work about 2%. Increase of 2 to 4% for workers on
phase-in, no effect for workers on flat range and a
decrease of 3% to 4% for workers on phase-out
(Eissa and Hoynes).
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Table 3.3 (continued)
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•

•

•

•

changes in wages and income than are decisions about labor
force participation. Virtually all estimated labor force participation effects are larger than hours of work effects.
The EITC has increased the labor force participation of population groups that face positive work incentives. For example,
all estimates indicate that the EITC has increased labor force
participation among single mothers. This was true for the relatively modest EITC expansion of the mid 1980s and especially
of the much more substantial expansion of the mid 1990s. The
participation effects are consistent along a number of dimensions (e.g., less educated vs. more educated, low wage vs. high
wage). Other groups who have faced positive incentives and
whose labor force participation has increased include married
men with children, for whom there is a small but positive effect,
and married women whose husbands have very low incomes,
for whom the estimates are much larger. While other factors
such as welfare reform and the strong economy are undoubtedly
important contributing factors, the EITC has had a major impact
on the sharp increase in the labor force participation of single
mothers and may well be the leading causal factor.
The EITC has decreased the labor force participation of groups
that face negative work incentives. Married women, many of
whom are operating along the phase-out range, are the most
conspicuous example of this. Estimated effects are not trivial,
probably on the order of 3 to 5 percentage points.
Estimates of hours of work effects among workers are relatively
small in absolute value, whether positive or negative. This appears to be the case for single mothers of the mid 1980s and
also for less-educated married men and married women in the
mid 1990s. Estimated effects are larger for married men and
women, presumably because more of them are located along the
phase-out range. A reasonable estimate for the mid 1990s is a
decrease in hours worked of about 2 to 4 percent among married
men and women. There are no comparable estimates for the
impact on single mothers in the 1990s.
While hours of work fall among EITC recipients as a whole,
they increase for workers along the phase-in range. Decreases
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in work hours are concentrated among workers along the phaseout range. The range of estimates of this negative effect is reasonably large and imprecise.
• Estimates from natural experiments tend to be consistently
slightly greater than (in absolute value) estimates from regression models, whether those models are reduced form or structural.
• There is only a single estimate of the total impact of the EITC
on total labor supply, including both changes in hours of work
among current workers and changes in labor force participation.
Dickert, Houser, and Scholz (1995) estimated that the 1996
EITC increased total labor supply, relative to the EITC in 1993,
by about 20 million hours due to an increase of 75 million hours
by previous nonparticipants, which offset a decrease of 55 million hours by current workers. This is a small net effect relative
to total labor input in the economy.

THE IMPACT OF THE EITC ON WAGE RATES
Since, as we have seen, the EITC may affect labor supply decisions, it may also affect market wage rates, which depend on the interaction of labor supply and labor demand. Given what we know about
the magnitude of the labor supply impacts, the effects are likely to be
modest at most. Nevertheless, it is worth reviewing the issue briefly
and seeing what the impacts could be and what they are likely to be.
Consider, for example, the labor market for the least skilled, lowest
wage workers. It is certainly possible that many of these workers will
be on the phase-in range of the EITC, in which they are receiving a
credit that ranges from 7.65 percent if they are childless to 40 percent
if they have two or more children. For these workers, as we discussed
above, there are conflicting income and substitution effects, although
the empirical evidence suggests that the net effect is likely to be small
but positive. In addition, both theory and the empirical evidence suggests that labor force participation will rise among previously nonemployed workers and that this effect will be reasonably large.
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What impact will this have on the labor market equilibrium? What
will happen to market wage rates for these less skilled workers? Figure
3.1 shows a representative very low wage labor market before and
after the introduction of the EITC (or, equivalently, before and after a
substantial increase in the EITC, as in the 1990s). The original equilibrium is at wage W0*, where demand curve D and supply curve S0 intersect. The wage on the vertical axis is the market wage, which is the
relevant wage for labor demand. We know that for workers on the
EITC phase-in range, however, the credit rate of the EITC is exactly
equivalent to a wage increase, and it is the net (after-tax and aftertransfer) wage that is relevant for labor supply decisions. Because any
market wage now corresponds to a higher net wage and because the
relationship between wages and hours worked is positive, the impact
of the EITC is to increase the supply of labor over market wage rates
that correspond to the phase-in range. At these low wage rates, more
labor is supplied at each market wage, so the supply curve shifts out to
S1.
Note that supply curve S1 has an unusual shape—it is not parallel
to S0, but steeper. This reflects the expected pattern of income and
substitution effects. The impact of the substitution effect derives from
the credit rate, which is constant within the phase-in range, but the
Figure 3.1 The Potential Impact of the EITC on Wages in the Very Low
Wage Labor Market

Wages
D

S1

S0

W0*
W1*

E0 * E1 *

Employment
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impact of the income effect, which derives from the actual amount of
EITC income, increases as earned income increases. Thus, at relatively
low wages, the positive substitution effect will probably dominate but,
at higher wages, the negative income effect becomes larger so that the
increase in supply is much smaller. When the substitution and income
effects are equal in magnitude, the two curves intersect. Eventually, at
wages high enough to place a worker on the EITC stationary range,
there is only an income effect, which reduces labor supply. At that
point, the new labor supply curve is above (or to the left of) the old
supply curve.
In the figure, there is a small increase in labor supply in the wage
vicinity of the old equilibrium wage, and that is probably the likeliest
result. Thus, when the EITC is introduced or increased, the equilibrium market wage falls to wage W1*, where demand curve D and supply curve S1 intersect. It is, therefore, certainly possible that the EITC
could, by increasing labor supply among low wage workers, reduce
their market wage rate. Even so, it is clear that the net wage is substantially increased.
Proceeding in exactly the same way, we expect, based both on
economic theory and the empirical evidence, the EITC to decrease
labor supply among workers on the stationary range and on the phaseout range. Thus, over these regions, the EITC would likely increase
equilibrium wages.
In fact, all of these impacts are likely to be quite modest for several
reasons. First, the changes in labor supply induced by the EITC are
relatively small; the labor force participation impacts on nonworkers
facing the phase-in range and on secondary workers on the phase-out
range, which are certainly not trivial, are notable exceptions. Second,
there is a relatively loose correspondence between the EITC range of a
worker and the particular labor market in which he or she participates.
For example, very low wage workers can be not only primary workers
in households on the EITC phase-in range, but they can also be secondary workers in EITC households on the EITC stationary or phase-out
range. In that case, the positive and negative labor supply impacts of
the different ranges might well cancel each other out. This mixed
impact also occurs because the EITC benefit schedules vary by the
number of children; as a result, a given earned income corresponds to
a different EITC region and thus different labor supply effects for dif-
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ferent workers. Finally, EITC workers are themselves not necessarily
the majority of any particular labor market. Many low and moderate
wage workers are not eligible for the EITC. For instance, teenagers or
secondary workers in middle-income families are ineligible, as are single adults with incomes greater than $10,700. The most likely result,
then, is that the EITC has, at most, a very small negative impact on
wages for low wage workers and a similarly small positive impact on
wages for workers with slightly higher wage rates.
Table 3.4 provides some empirical evidence on this, using the 1996
PSID data that was the basis for the description of the EITC population
in Chapter 2. In the table, workers are divided into wage brackets
that correspond roughly to ‘‘very low’’ (⬍ $6.00), ‘‘low to moderate’’
($6.00–$7.50), and ‘‘moderate’’ ($7.50–$10.00). The sample here includes all heads of households and their spouses; it does not include
other earners such as teenagers. For each wage bracket, the table shows
the proportion of workers in that wage bracket who are on the various
regions of the EITC or who are EITC-ineligible. The EITC range is
computed here based on the husband’s earnings alone for married couples and on family income for single households and for wives. This
method has the impact of increasing the number of low wage workers
who are placed on the phase-in and stationary range.
The table reveals that EITC-eligible workers are a minority in each
of these three labor markets. Recipients of the EITC comprise just 52
percent of the participants in the lowest wage market, about 33 percent
of the second bracket, and 30 percent of those earning $7.50 to $10.00
Table 3.4 The Percentage Distribution of Workers by EITC Range and
Market Wage Rate, 1996
Wage rate
EITC status
Phase-in
Stationary
Phase-out
EITC-ineligible
Total

⬍$6.00

$6.00–$7.50

$7.50–$10.00

24.5

5.2

2.2

6.5
17.0
52.0
100.0

5.8
23.0
66.0
100.0

1.8
25.4
70.6
100.0

SOURCE: Panel Study of Income Dynamics.
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per hour. Among EITC recipients, almost all phase-in households are
necessarily in the lowest wage bracket, but these lowest wage workers
are themselves distributed almost equally between the phase-in range
(about 51 percent) and the latter two ranges (49 percent). For the other
two EITC brackets, the correlation between wage bracket and EITC
range is much tighter, with 70 percent of workers in the second wage
bracket and 85 percent in the third bracket located along the phase-out
range.
It may be surprising to see that so many low wage workers are
EITC-ineligible. In the lowest wage group, almost all of the ineligibles
are demographically eligible but have incomes that exceed the EITC
maximum, despite their low wages. Almost all the head of households
who are ineligible have no children, so they were income-ineligible in
1996 if their annual earnings exceeded $9,500. In the case of low wage
wives, more than half had children, but most were income-ineligible
on the basis of their husband’s earnings. The average husband’s earnings for these income-ineligibles was over $36,000.

SUMMARY
In this chapter, we examined the impact of the EITC on the labor
market, including labor force participation, hours of work, and wage
rates. By the mid 1990s, the EITC had been transformed from a very
modest program into one that has a very substantial impact on individual incomes for many low and moderate income families. In the process, it altered the economic benefits of work for many individuals,
some positively and others negatively.
The research of the last decade has helped clarify the nature of
these effects. We now have particularly good information about the
impacts of the EITC on work. It is clear that the EITC has increased
labor force participation among workers who earn relatively low market wages and face the positive work incentives of the EITC phase-in
range. This group includes single mothers, including women making
a transition from welfare to work, and married women whose husbands
have very low incomes. There are negative labor force participation
impacts on married women as a whole, many of whom are operating
along the EITC phase-out range and thus face markedly more negative
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work incentives than in the past. Hours of work among current workers
are also affected, increasing for low wage workers and falling for workers with higher incomes. Hours of work effects, however, appear to be
small relative to participation effects. It is quite possible that the overall EITC effect on labor supply has been positive, as a consequence of
its substantial positive participation effect on the lowest wage workers.
It is certainly not impossible that the EITC could also affect market
wages. Any program that operates on a substantial scale, as the EITC
does, and that affects labor supply can have such an effect. In the case
of the EITC, though, it is likely that the impact on wage rates is quite
modest. In only a few cases are the estimated labor supply effects
among EITC recipients large enough to make an impact. Even in those
cases, most participants in low wage labor markets are EITC-ineligible,
so the labor supply impact of the EITC on the market wage is further
diluted.
The overall picture that emerges, then, is of a program that appears
to operate fundamentally well and that transfers substantial sums of
money to many low and moderate income families and does so with
far more positive impacts than negative. This is certainly true, as we
will show in Chapter 5, when compared with alternative transfer policies targeted at low wage workers and/or low income households.

Notes
1. For further discussion of the behavioral impact of the EITC, see Hotz and Scholz
(2000) and the papers collected in Meyer and Holtz-Eakin (2001).
2. Nonlabor income is income that an individual has at zero hours of work and
includes such things as transfer income and income from assets. In a family with
a clear primary earner and secondary earner, the income of the primary earner is
often treated as nonlabor income from the standpoint of the secondary earner.
This treatment is appropriate if decision making about work is sequential, but not
if it is simultaneous.
3. The traditional labor supply model is based on a two-way choice about time use
between market work and leisure. It is often useful in the analysis to reinterpret
leisure as housework or other productive household activities.
4. If w is the wage rate, p the price of consumption goods, V is nonlabor income,
and T is the total amount of time available, then feasible combinations of consumption goods (C) and leisure time (L) must satisfy pC  wL  wT  V. The
right-hand side of this equation is called full income—the maximum income an
individual could have if he/she worked all T hours. The left-hand side shows
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5.

6.
7.

8.

9.
10.
11.

spending on consumption goods (pC) and leisure (wL). The equation indicates
that total spending must equal full income.
As an example of this kind of logic, think about the cost of home-schooling a
child. Actual monetary costs may be modest relative to, say, private school tuition, but foregone earnings of the ‘‘teacher’’ are very substantial.
The marginal tax rate is the tax rate that applies to the last dollar of earned income.
The substitution effects described here is a Slutsky substitution effect in which an
individual’s income is held constant when prices change. An alternative and
more common substitution effect (Hicks substitution effect) holds an individual’s
income constant. The Slutsky substitution effect is much easier to describe without graphs. The analysis in Appendix B uses the Hicks substitution effect.
Liebman (1998) concluded, based on interviews he conducted as an IRS VITA
(Volunteer Income Tax Assistance) volunteer in 1994, that there was relatively
low awareness of the credit. He further noted, ‘‘While it is possible that recent
publicity and outreach efforts (as well as the increased size of the credit) have
increased awareness, interviews I conducted in 1996 with housing-project residents and recipients of Section 8 housing assistance show that while almost all
housing-subsidy recipients understand exactly the relationship between their income and their rent, the few who are working and say they receive the EITC have
no idea whether their tax refund would go up or down if their income increased.’’
This, of course, is not intended to be definitive information about the knowledge
of the EITC by potential recipients.
For a recent survey, see Blundell and MaCurdy (1999). An earlier useful discussion is Heckman (1993).
For a further discussion of natural experiments, see Rosenzweig and Wolpin
(2000) and Angrist and Krueger (1999).
If x1 and x2 are the outcomes for the treatment group and y1 and y2 are the corresponding outcomes for the control group at times 1 and 2, then the difference-indifference estimator is DID  (x2  x1)  ( y2  y1) which is the difference in
the changes. Equivalently, DID  (x2  y2)  (x1  y1), which is the change
in the differences. The DID estimator depends critically on the further assumption that any other effects that occur over the length of the experiment affect both
groups identically. This can be a problem if macroeconomic changes or other
policies affect the control and treatment groups differently.

4
The EITC and the Family
The ‘‘marriage tax’’ has been much in the news in the 1990s and
the early 2000s. A marriage tax exists whenever married couples end
up paying more in taxes than they would if they were single. It is a
natural feature of a tax system that is both progressive and treats a
married couple as a tax-paying unit. A marriage tax occurs primarily
in families where there are two earners that earn relatively similar
amounts; single-earner families often receive marriage benefits from
the tax system in the sense that they pay less tax than if they were
single. In a two-earner family, the earnings of one spouse are taxed at
rates that depend on the earnings of the other, so the progressive tax
rates push the couple into a higher tax bracket than either would face
as a single person. Adjustments in the tax code provide a separate,
more favorable tax schedule for married couples, but that does not
eliminate the marriage tax under all situations. Indeed, it is impossible
to design a tax code that is progressive, treats a married couple as the
tax-paying unit, and is marriage neutral.
Like the rest of the tax code, the EITC also imposes a marriage tax
on some married couples who find themselves receiving smaller EITC
benefits than if they were single. In addition, the EITC provides marriage bonuses to other married couples who receive higher EITC benefits than if they were single. As the program has become more
generous, these impacts have become quite substantial. Unlike the
positive income tax rate structure, the EITC in 2001 does not make any
distinction at all between married couples and single individuals in
terms of EITC rates and benefits. Because EITC benefits depend on
the number of children (in a nonlinear way and capped at two children)
and because benefits are phased out as income rises, single individuals
can either gain or lose quite substantial credit amounts by marriage,
depending on their particular family and earnings circumstances. Similarly, married couples may stand to gain or lose substantial amounts if
they were to separate or divorce. These effects, which can be quite
large under just the right circumstances, may potentially affect marriage decisions, but they may be deemed inappropriate and unfair even
if they don’t.
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During the 2000 presidential campaign, both Al Gore and George
W. Bush promised to eliminate the marriage tax. The Economic
Growth and Tax Relief Act of 2001, passed in June 2001, included a
set of provisions to reduce the marriage tax. The legislation addressed
the marriage penalty in both the tax code as a whole and in the EITC.
Effective in 2005 and fully phased in by 2008, the standard deduction
for married couples will be increased to twice that of a single-person
household and the upper income limit of the 15 percent tax bracket
will also be increased to twice that of a single-person household. The
EITC benefit schedule was also adjusted, with the creation of a separate
married-couple schedule, which begins in 2002 and becomes fully effective in 2007. This adjustment will also reduce the marriage tax.
In this chapter, we examine the EITC from the perspective of the
family. We first examine how the EITC marriage bonuses and penalties arise, using the EITC program as it existed in 2001 to construct a
set of illustrative examples. Since the EITC marriage penalty reform
of the 2001 tax cut legislation was not implemented until 2002, we do
not include it in our analyses. We do, however, simulate the impact of
the change by considering what impact it would have had, if it had
been in place in 2001. We then consider how large these marriage
bonuses and penalties are in practice, drawing on a set of studies that
use representative data rather than illustrative cases. Finally, we review
the evidence about whether marriage decisions themselves have been
sensitive to the penalties and bonuses created by the EITC.

MARRIAGE BONUSES AND PENALTIES
Marriage bonuses occur whenever the EITC benefits of a married
couple exceed the combined EITC benefits if each person were single.
The most obvious case is one in which a low income single individual
with earnings but without a qualifying child marries a low income (or
even better, no income) individual with a qualifying child (or, even
better, two qualifying children). In this case, the two original families
are eligible for, at most, a very small credit, while the new family is
eligible for a substantial EITC payment. Marriage penalties occur
when an EITC-eligible single individual marries another low income
individual who may also be EITC eligible. While their individual in-
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comes enable them to receive two possibly substantial EITC payments,
their joint incomes will place them well into or even beyond the phaseout range, while their new larger family size provides fewer or even no
advantages. Thus, they collectively will receive substantially reduced
EITC benefits. The extreme case occurs when both are eligible for the
maximum EITC benefits as single households.
Table 4.1 provides a set of examples that identify the sources and
magnitudes of EITC marriage bonuses and penalties, as of 2001.1 The
first row shows a case of EITC neutrality. If a single, low wage worker
with children marries a nonworker without children, there are no EITC
changes, precisely because the benefit formula is independent of marital status. The second row shows the EITC marriage bonus for the
case of a single, childless, full-time, year-round minimum wage earner
Table 4.1 Illustrative EITC Marriage Bonus or Penalty, 2001
Situation
(1) EITC eligible worker with children marries
childless non worker
(2) Childless minimum wage worker marries
non worker with two childrena
(3) Worker with $5,000 earnings and one child
marries worker with $5,000 earnings and one
child
(4) Childless minimum wage worker marries
minimum wage worker with two childrena
(5) Minimum wage worker with two children
marries minimum wage worker with two
childrena
(6) Worker with two children earning maximum
income on EITC plateau marries worker
with two children earning maximum income
on EITC plateaub
(7) Worker with two children earning $20,000
marries worker earning $50,000
a
b

Minimum wage worker @ $5.15/hour  2,000 hours.
EITC earnings maximum in 2001  $13,090.

EITC marriage bonus ()
or penalty () ($)
0
3,977

600
1,613

5,590

6,765
2,553
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($5.15 per hour  2000 hours) who marries a nonworker with two
children. Given the EITC benefit structure, the two single individuals
are eligible for $31 and $0, respectively, while as a married couple
with two children, their income places them in the plateau region where
they collect the maximum benefit of $4,008. Thus, they receive an
EITC marriage bonus of $3,977. The third row illustrates the case of
two low income workers, each with one child. They receive a much
smaller bonus than the previous example, and it arises from the difference between the credit rate and the maximum incomes on which the
credit can be earned for families with one and two children. Individually, each receives a credit of $1,700 (0.34  $5,000), while together
they are eligible for a credit of $4,000 (0.40  $10,000). The breakeven income in this kind of situation under 2001 EITC parameters is
$5,894.2 Beyond that, a marriage of equal earners each with one child
generates EITC penalties.
Rows 4 through 6 illustrate EITC marriage penalties. In example
4, the same childless minimum wage worker now marries a minimum
wage worker with two children. As two single tax-paying units, they
are eligible for payments of $31 and $4,008, respectively. Jointly, by
virtue of their higher income, they are eligible for only $2,426 ($2,426
 $4,008  0.2106  [$20,600  $13,090]), which yields a penalty
of $1,613. In case 5, if both individuals had two children, they would
each receive payments of $4,008 if they were single, but only $2,426
if married, for a total penalty of $5,590—more than 25 percent of their
earned income. For two single individuals, each with two children and
each earning an income exactly equal to the maximum income on the
plateau region of the EITC, the marriage penalty would reach its maximum of $6,765 (illustrated in row 6).3
Finally, EITC penalties can also exist among some moderately
high income families, as long as one of the partners has an EITCeligible income. Row 7 shows a case like this in which a worker with
two children and earnings of $20,000 marries a worker with an income
of $50,000. Individually, they receive an EITC of $2,553 and $0,
respectively. Together, their combined income of $70,000 greatly exceeds the EITC earnings cut-off level, and their combined benefit is
thus $0.
In general, bonuses exist among low income, single-earner families and penalties among most low to mid income, two-earner couples
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with children. Eissa and Hoynes (2000) showed that the EITC marriage penalty increases with the share of income contributed by the
second earner.
The examples in Table 4.1 are simply illustrative and do not, by
themselves, provide information about how important and widespread
either bonuses or penalties are. It is not clear, a priori, whether bonuses or penalties are more common; certainly, the cases illustrated in
the last two rows must be quite rare. The actual distribution of bonuses
and penalties depends on the distribution of households across wage
and demographic categories. To evaluate that, we need to turn to population data.
Determining the actual, as compared to illustrative, importance of
these EITC marriage bonuses and penalties is inherently complicated
because it requires observing or imputing an alternative marital status
for each household in order to compute and then compare its EITC
benefits in the two marital statuses. It is more complex yet if the bonuses and penalties affect marriage decisions. Suppose, for example,
that large bonuses encourage marriage and large penalties discourage
it. In that event, a sample of currently married couples will overrepresent households with large potential bonuses and underrepresent
households with potential penalties, precisely because the bonus and
penalties affect which households are married.
There are three major questions about the EITC marriage bonus
and penalty that are of particular interest. First, how many households
receive EITC bonuses and how many suffer EITC penalties? Second,
which households receive the benefits or bear the penalties? The distribution by income bracket is of special interest here. Third, what is
the aggregate dollar amount of bonuses and penalties? There is good
information on the second and third questions, but basic information
on the first question is unfortunately not very useful.
There are two major empirical approaches to measuring EITC marriage bonuses and penalties. One method is similar to what is done in
most studies of marriage tax effects. It begins with a sample of currently married couples, ‘‘divorces’’ them in order to create a counterfactual marital status, makes assumptions about custody of children
and other details in the divorced status, and then computes and compares taxes in the two marital statuses.4 The analysis is static in the
sense that it assumes no labor supply response to the change in marital
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status; for example, individual income is assumed to be unchanged
when marital status changes, just as in the illustrative examples in
Table 4.1. The other approach uses longitudinal data on individuals in
order to compare EITC benefits before and after a change in marital
status. In this case, bonuses and penalties are computed net of behavioral changes that accompany a change in marital status.
Ellwood (2000) used the latter approach, with data from the PSID
for marriages that occurred between 1983 and 1991. The EITC benefits in the first full year after marriage were computed, inclusive of any
changes in labor supply and fertility, and compared with EITC benefits
in the last full year prior to marriage. Therefore, the bonuses and
penalties he computed are potentially quite different from the static
examples illustrated in Table 4.1 and in the ‘‘divorce’’ approach mentioned above. For example, if a married couple has a child, their EITC
will increase under many circumstances, thus yielding both more situations of bonuses and also larger bonuses. Ellwood used the 1996 EITC
formula to compute before and after benefits.5 Because the marriages
occurred well prior to the sharp increase in EITC benefits, the sample
of marriages does not reflect and, thus, does not suffer from the potentially stronger marriage incentives created by the current EITC.
The standard ‘‘divorce’’ approach was adopted by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO 1997), Holtzblatt and Rebelein (1999,
2000), and Eissa and Hoynes (2000). The CBO study and the papers
by Holtzblatt and Rebelein share some common features. They used
data from the IRS Statistics of Income (SOI), a data source that is
derived directly from tax returns and is particularly detailed and accurate. The procedures they followed are well-suited for measuring the
total dollar bonuses and penalties of the EITC as well as their distribution but not for identifying the proportion of EITC recipient households
with bonuses and penalties.6 The studies first computed the impact of
all taxes that change with marital status except the EITC and then
computed the marginal impact of the EITC on whether a household
has a net marriage bonus or penalty and on the amount of the bonus or
penalty. This is perfectly appropriate for measuring the total dollar
impact of the EITC on bonuses and penalties. But, with this procedure,
a married couple receiving an EITC bonus or penalty is identified only
if the EITC changes its net marriage bonus or penalty status, given the
impact of all other taxes that change with marital status.
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For example, suppose a married couple has a net marriage penalty
of $1,000 without including the EITC and additionally loses $1,000 of
EITC benefits. The married couple’s net penalty/bonus status does not
change by incorporating the EITC, so it would not be identified as a
married couple suffering an EITC penalty. Neither would it be identified as a married couple experiencing an EITC bonus unless its EITC
bonus was greater than $1,000. As a result, the methods used in these
two studies will tend to underestimate the number of married couples
with either EITC bonuses or EITC penalties.
The methods do not, however, affect estimates of the total dollar
impact of EITC bonuses or penalties and, because the data are particularly good, these studies are very useful for that purpose. Eissa and
Hoynes also provided estimates of total bonuses and penalties but no
information about the proportion of married couples receiving bonuses
or suffering penalties.
The estimates from these three studies necessarily depend on assumptions about residence, custody of children, and many smaller issues, all of which may affect the EITC and other taxes that the married
couple would face if they were divorced. Eissa and Hoynes assumed
that the wife retains custody of the children and computed the EITC
on that basis. The CBO study assumed that divorcing parents with two
or more children will divide the children between their households,
thereby enabling both to have the qualifying children needed for more
substantial EITC benefits. This assumption will likely increase the
EITC receipt of divorcing households and thus ought to increase the
number of married couples for whom EITC marriage penalties are
computed and also the total dollar amount of penalties. The underlying
assumption that children are divided across households is questionable.
Holtzblatt and Rebelein is by far the most thorough study to date.
They emphasized four scenarios in all, but here we emphasize three of
them: one in which children are allocated to the higher income spouse,
one in which they are allocated to the lower income spouse, and a third
in which they are allocated so as to minimize taxes.7 The first case
will likely lead to fewer divorced households receiving EITC because
fewer divorced persons will have both sufficiently low earnings and
children. Because fewer divorced persons will be eligible for EITC
benefits, fewer married couples will be found to have EITC marriage
penalties. In the second case, there will be more divorced households
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receiving the EITC because now more families have both low earnings
and children. Thus, in this case, more married couples will be found
to have EITC marriage penalties. In the final case, because divorced
individuals receive the maximum EITC for which they could potentially be eligible, more married couples will be found to have EITC
marriage penalties.
Because all of the studies are based on a sample of currently married couples (or marrying couples in Ellwood’s study), the analyses
necessarily incorporate any impact of bonuses and/or penalties on marriage and divorce decisions as well as on labor supply decisions. If
there is any behavioral response to the potential bonuses and penalties,
these samples will tend to provide an overestimate of bonuses and an
underestimate of penalties.
The findings about EITC marriage penalties and bonuses from
these studies are presented in Table 4.2. None of the studies provide a
useful estimate of the proportion of married couples with a penalty or
bonus. Ellwood’s findings have an obvious upward bias toward finding
bonuses that arise from post-marriage changes in fertility and labor
supply. The CBO and Holtzblatt and Rebelein studies are biased
against finding any impact because their approach is marginal. We
emphasize these biases in the table by noting that the true estimates are
‘‘at most’’ or ‘‘at least’’ as the figures reported. Dollar estimates in
these two studies are not, however, affected by that bias and are, therefore, quite useful.
We can draw the following conclusions about EITC marriage penalties and bonuses.
• In practice, the EITC penalizes marriage much more often than
it rewards it. Ellwood found that at most 16 percent of married
couples received a penalty and at most 11 percent received a
bonus, with more than half of the bonuses due to post-marriage
changes that increased EITC benefits. Holtzblatt and Rebelein’s
marginal impacts imply that at least 4 percent to 12 percent of
married couples receive a penalty while at least 0.5 percent to
1.3 percent receive a bonus depending on the underlying assumptions.8 The CBO estimates suggest that at least 6 percent
of married couples receive penalties and at least 4 percent receive bonuses. Adjusting Ellwood’s figures by eliminating

Table 4.2 Estimated EITC Bonuses and Penalties
Study

Findings

Comment

Ellwood (2000)

Marriages from PSID that
occurred between 1983
and 1991.
Bonus and penalty
calculated using 1996
EITC.
Longitudinal before-after
comparison, inclusive
of impact of any
behavioral changes.

16% of marriages have EITC marriage penalty.
Average penalty  $1,505. Total penalty
approximately $12 billion.
No more than 11% of marriages receive
marriage bonus. Average bonus  $1,367.
Total bonus approximately $7.5 billion.

Method overstates bonuses
relative to static approach. In
more than half of marriages
with bonus, bonus is due to
birth of a child.
Sample reflects new marriages,
may not be representative
sample of marriages.

Holtzblatt and
Rebelein (1999,
2000)

IRS Statistics of Income
sample of tax returns of
married couples in
1995.
Bonus and penalty
calculated using 2000
EITC.
Compare EITC benefits
before and after
‘‘divorce’’ of married
couples under varying
assumptions about
custody of children.

Method 1: EITC benefit to higher income
spouse.
• At least 3.7% of married couples have EITC
penalty. Total penalty  $3.7 billion.
• At least 0.5% of married couples have EITC
bonus. Total bonus  $150 million.
• $50 million net bonus for married couples
with AGI ⬍$15,000. More than half of
penalty dollars for married couples with AGI
⬎$30,000.
Method 2: EITC benefit to lower income
spouse.
• At least 12% of married couples have EITC
penalty. Total penalty of $20.7 billion.
• At least 1.3% of married couples have EITC
bonus. Total bonus  $5.1 billion.

Sample of currently married
couples is problematic if
EITC bonuses and/or
penalties affect marriage
decisions.
Methodology identifies bonus
or penalty only if they change
taxpayer’s net bonus/penalty
status. This likely
underestimates number of
taxpayers with bonus/penalty.
Very accurate income data and
tax calculations.

(continued)
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Data and method

Table 4.2 (continued)
Data and method

Findings

Comment

• $3.4 billion net bonus for married couples
with AGI ⬍$15,000. $12.2 billion penalty for
married couples with AGI ⬎$50,000.
Method 3: Dependents allocated to minimize
taxes.
• At least 7.2% of married couples have EITC
penalty. Total penalty  $14.3 billion
• At least 0.4% of married couples have EITC
bonus. Total bonus  $60 million.
Congressional
Budget Office
(1997)

IRS Statistics of Income
sample of tax returns of
married couples in
1993.
Bonus and penalty
calculated using 1996
EITC and tax laws.
Compare EITC benefits
before and after
‘‘divorce’’ of married
couples.

At least 6% of married couples have EITC
penalty. Total penalty  $12 billion.
Total bonus  $0. Impossible to derive
proportion with bonus from published
tabulations.

Sample of currently married
couples is problematic if
EITC bonuses and/or
penalties affect marriage
decisions.
Methodology identifies bonuses
or penalties only if they
change taxpayer’s net bonus/
penalty status. This likely
underestimates number of
taxpayers with bonus/penalty.
Child allocation procedure
divides children between
divorced parents, allowing
both spouses to qualify for
EITC. This greatly increases
estimated EITC marriage
penalties and reduces EITC
marriage bonuses. Least
credible study.
(continued)
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Study

Eissa and Hoynes
(2000)

CPS sample of married
couples with children
for tax years
1984–1997.
Compare EITC benefits
before and after
‘‘divorce’’ of married
couples.

Average EITC penalty post-1994 is
approximately $500; average EITC penalty
1984–93 is less than $200.
1997 EITC provides bonuses for married
couples with family income ⬍$25,000,
penalties for married couples with family
income $25,000 to $50,000.
No information of proportion of couples with
penalty or bonus.

Sample of currently married
couples is problematic if
EITC bonuses and/or
penalties affect marriage
decisions.
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bonuses created by post-marriage behavioral changes (i.e., fertility) suggests that married couples with penalties outnumber
married couples with bonuses by at least a two-to-one margin
and probably more than that.
• Marriage penalties and bonuses can be large. Average penalties
among married couples who are penalized certainly exceed
$1,000 and may be as high as $1,500. Average bonuses for
married couples with bonuses are also large, though probably
somewhat smaller than average penalties.
• Marriage penalties increased as a result of the 1994 expansion
of the EITC program.
• Estimates of aggregate EITC marriage bonuses range from essentially zero in CBO and Holtzblatt and Rebelein (method 1)
to $5.5 billion to $7.5 billion in Holtzblatt and Rebelein (method
2) and Ellwood, respectively.9 The higher estimates are based
on stronger methods; the $5.5 billion in Holtzblatt and Rebelein
is probably the most credible.
• Estimates of aggregate EITC marriage penalties range from less
than $4 billion (Holtzblatt and Rebelein, method 1) to nearly
$21 billion (Holtzblatt and Rebelein, method 2).10 A $12 billion
penalty, estimated by both Ellwood and CBO, is the mode,
mean, and median. Since the two Holtzblatt and Rebelein procedures are based on strong, polar assumptions, $12 billion may
be a reasonable estimate.
• EITC marriage bonuses are concentrated among lower income
families (⬍ $20,000). A very high proportion of penalties—
certainly 50 percent or more—come from married couples with
AGI of $30,000 or more. Some estimates suggest that much of
the penalties come from families with AGI of $50,000 or more.
• Given the complexity of the tax code and the necessity to make
assumptions about counter-factual situations that affect taxes,
perfect answers are impossible when studying the impact of the
EITC on marriage bonuses and penalties. The research, especially that based on IRS income data, does a very credible job
of measuring the aggregate dollar impact of the EITC, but it
does not provide a reasonable estimate of the proportion of mar-
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ried couples with an EITC bonus or penalty. That information
would be particularly useful.

MARRIAGE PENALTY REFORM IN THE 2001 TAX ACT
The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Act of 2001 modified the
EITC benefit formula for married couples, creating a separate benefit
schedule for them for the first time. It did this by extending the beginning point of the phase-out range by $1,000 in 2002–2004, $2,000 in
2005–2007, and $3,000 in 2007 and thereafter.11 Figure 1.9 (p. 30)
shows what the impact of the fully phased-in benefits would be in terms
of the EITC in 2001 for a married-couple family with two children. To
make this adjustment, we start with the full $3,000 extension and put
it in approximate 2001 dollars, using 3 percent as the annual inflation
rate. With that adjustment, the $3,000 extension in 2007 is equivalent
to about a $2,500 extension in 2001.
The impact of this change is only on households with earnings
greater than $13,090, the income at which the phase-out range began
in 2001. Since the phase-out rate of 21.06 percent is unchanged, the
benefit schedule line shifts out parallel, beginning at the new phase-out
income of $15,590. Benefits are increased by $526.50 (equal to the
21.06% phase-out rate  $2,500) at all incomes between $15,590 and
$32,121 (the income at which all EITC benefits were lost under the old
schedule). The change in the schedule also provides a benefit between
$0 and $526.50 to households with income between $13,090 and
$15,590, and between $32,121 and $34,621.
This reform makes a modest dent in the marriage penalty of EITC
recipient households who would otherwise be on the phase-out range.
For households with two children, it reduces the marriage penalty by
the $526.50 additional EITC benefits. For married-couple households
with one child, the schedule change is worth $399.50 (0.1598 
$2,500). It provides no EITC marriage penalty relief for marriedcouple households with children and total family earnings of less than
$13,090.
In Chapter 8, when we discuss possible reforms of the EITC program, we show that the marriage penalty can be addressed in other
ways as well, including, for example, by adjusting the phase-out rate
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and adjusting the benefit formula for larger families. The proposal we
make provides substantially more marriage penalty relief than is offered in tax act of 2001.

DOES THE EITC AFFECT MARRIAGE?
These EITC bonuses and penalties could plausibly affect an individual’s decision about marriage and divorce. The standard economic
approach to marriage treats individuals as making a decision about
their marital status based on the comparison of the utility or well-being
they can expect if married and if single. That utility depends, in part,
on the income they would have in each situation. Thus, if the EITC
alters household income if married relative to household income if single—which, as we’ve seen, it often does—it may make marriage more
or less attractive relative to being single.
Just as in the case of labor supply, the impact of the EITC penalties
and bonuses on family structure can be examined in two ways, either
via some form of natural experiment comparing groups with larger or
smaller EITC marriage penalties/bonuses or by direct modeling of the
impact of economic incentives, including the changing structure of the
EITC on the probability of marriage. The effects could operate on
both marriage and divorce, so one could, just as is done in the AFDC
literature, examine either an individual’s current marital status or his/
her transitions into or out of marriage.
There is a rather limited amount of work in this area; it is quite
understudied relative to labor supply. The only work on EITC marriage effects within a natural experiment framework is by Ellwood
(2000), who examined changes in marital status between 1986 and
1998 for identifiable groups of women whose marriage penalty has
been changing relative to one another. To do this, he classified women
by the quartile of their predicted wage rate and then computed an expected or average marriage penalty in each quartile for a woman with
two children who married a childless man with median earnings.12 He
found that the marriage penalty fell over this time period by about 16
percent for women in the lowest wage quartile, although there is still,
on net, a marriage penalty. In contrast, the marriage penalty rose almost 40 percent for a woman in the second quartile and by 50 percent
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for a woman in the third quartile. For women in the top quartile, the
change is much smaller. These findings are generally consistent with
the pattern of EITC marriage bonuses and penalties shown in Table 4.2,
although the penalties computed by Ellwood incorporate the impact of
changes in not only the EITC program, but also taxes and transfers
(especially AFDC). Ultimately, Elwood compared changes in marriage behavior across quartiles of women on the basis of the changing
marriage penalties they face. He has also performed a comparable
analysis among cohabiting couples with children.
Eissa and Hoynes (2000) and Dickert-Conlin and Houser (2000)
presented and estimated economic models of marriage that incorporate
the effects of the EITC. The approaches are broadly similar, although
the details differ significantly. Eissa and Hoynes examined the probability that a woman is married as a function of, among other things, the
tax incentives she faces. For each currently married woman in their
sample, they computed the taxes she would face in her current marital
status (i.e., married) and the taxes she would face if she were, instead,
single. They did the same for each single woman in the sample, again
computing taxes in the current marital status (single) and if she were
married. Since a woman is either married or single at a point in time,
but not both, they must estimate the taxes she would have in the counterfactual marital status. For married women, they made fairly straightforward estimates, assuming, for example, that a woman retains
custody of children and does not alter her labor supply and earnings.
For single women, this estimation is more problematic, since they
must, in effect, assign a marriage partner (and thus marriage income)
to single women. They did this based on a woman’s own characteristics; the procedure is undoubtedly imperfect, but serviceable, and follows procedures used by other researchers in parallel analyses.13
Finally, Eissa and Hoynes incorporated the EITC penalty or bonus
as part of their tax calculations, estimated the impact of tax incentives
on marriage, and then simulated the impact of the EITC on marriage
as the product of the estimated effect of taxes on marital status and the
estimated EITC marriage bonus or penalty. They did not, however,
directly estimate the impact of the EITC. Instead, they assumed that
the EITC affects marital status in the same way as other taxes and
transfers.14

98 Helping Working Families: The Earned Income Tax Credit

Dickert-Conlin and Houser examined the probability of being a
single parent, rather than the probability of being married. Note that
these terms are not just complements—single women without children
are treated differently in the two approaches. Rather than estimate
taxes, including the EITC, in both single and married status like Eissa
and Hoynes, they used an exogenous measure of EITC benefits—the
maximum federal and state EITC for family with two children. They
did this for a perfectly sensible reason—to provide an exogenous measure of EITC benefits rather than a measure that depends on a household’s chosen labor supply, which we already know is likely to be
affected, at least moderately, by the EITC schedule. The result, however, is that their model doesn’t capture the stylized EITC bonus and
penalty cases—in fact, there are no penalties or bonuses at all in their
model, just EITC benefits that do not vary by marital status. The only
variation in EITC benefits is across individuals solely on the basis of
the state EITC for which they might be eligible and over time as the
EITC became more generous.15
The findings of this literature are summarized in Table 4.3. The
following general conclusions emerge.
• The negative effects of the EITC on marriage are probably
small, at most. No study found large effects, and most studies
estimated marriage effects that are not statistically different
from zero.
• Ellwood’s natural experiment found evidence inconsistent with
the hypothesis of a marriage effect. The proportion of women
married decreased most for women in the lowest wage quartile,
even though they had a relative decrease in their marriage tax.
Eissa and Hoynes found that tax penalties are a weak disincentive for marriage, while tax bonuses provide a weak incentive.
Their simulations imply that the EITC may have increased marriage rates among families with incomes less than $25,000,16
although their findings about the impact of the EITC are indirect. Dickert-Conlin and Houser estimated effects of the EITC
on marriage that are consistently statistically insignificant across
a series of specifications.
• Ellwood provided some very tentative evidence that EITC penalties and bonuses may have affected the cohabitation/marriage

Table 4.3 The Effect of the EITC on Marital Status
Study
Eissa and Hoynes
(1999)

Findings

Comment

CPS, 1984–97. Panel data
model of current
marital status for
women, ages 18–47.
Marital status modeled as
function of marriage
tax cost, including
EITC. Model includes
individual controls and
state and year fixed
effects.
EITC impact on marriage
is simulated; derived
from estimated effect of
taxes on marital status
and estimated EITC
marriage bonus or
penalty by income
bracket.

Tax cost has negative and statistically
significant effect on probability of marriage;
estimate is consistent across alternative
specifications. $1,000 increase in tax cost
reduces probability of marriage by 1.3
percentage points.
1997 EITC increases marriage rate by 1
percentage point (5%) for families with
income ⬍$15,000, reduces marriage rate
slightly for families with income ⬎$25,000.
Change in EITC, 1984–97, increased marriage
rate for families with income ⬍$25,000,
smaller decrease in marriage rate for families
with income $25,000–$50,000.

No direct estimation of EITC
impact on marriage. Model
assumes that a dollar of EITC
income affects behavior same
as a dollar of other tax and
transfer income. Fairly
simple statistical
specification. Useful, but not
definitive.

(continued)

The EITC and the Family 99

Data and method

Table 4.3 (continued)
Findings

Comment

Dickert-Conlin and
Houser (2000)

Survey of Income and
Program Participation
(SIPP); data for
1989–95. Sample of
women ages 18–50.
Examines probability of
being a single female
parent. EITC benefits
measured by maximum
federal and state EITC
for family with two
children. Model allows
AFDC benefits and
EITC benefits to have
separate effects on
marital status and also
includes state fixed
effects.

No net impact of EITC on probability of being
single parent for white women or black
women. This is consistent with either no
effect or offsetting positive and negative
effects.
No statistically significant effects for subgroups
who are more likely EITC recipients.

Treating EITC benefits as
exogenous eliminates the
marriage bonus and penalty
as usually understood. Model
imputes maximum EITC
benefits to all families,
irrespective of potential
family earnings.
State fixed-effect model leaves
very little variation to
identify EITC effect. This is
consistent with large
estimated standard errors.

Ellwood (2000)

PSID, 1986–96.
Natural experiment—
comparison of marriage
rates for women by
wage quartile over time
as a function of change
in marriage tax for
hypothetical woman
with two children
marrying childless man
with median earnings.
Includes all tax/transfer
changes, not just EITC.

No impact on marriage. Overall marriage tax
penalty fell for women in lowest wage
quartile relative to women in second and
third quartiles. Marriage rates fell, rather
than increased, for women in lowest wage
quartile relative to women in second and
third quartiles.
Possible impact on cohabitation. Tentative
evidence that marriage increased among
cohabiting couples who faced EITC
marriage benefits compared to cohabiting
couples who faced EITC penalties or
neutrality.

Natural experiment not very
precise. Estimated expected
marriage penalty for woman
by wage quartile may not be
very representative. Not very
compelling evidence.
Cohabitation findings are worth
further study and monitoring.
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decision. In general, the trend is not supportive of an impact.
Between the mid 1980s and late 1990s, cohabitation among couples for whom the EITC created a marriage bonus rose more
than among couples for whom the EITC created a marriage penalty. This trend sharply changed in 1998, however, when cohabitation rates continued to increase among the latter group but
fall among the former group.
• The weak estimated EITC effects on marriage are consistent
with the much larger literature on AFDC benefits, which also
typically find weak impacts on family structure.
• Research in this area is still very far from definitive. None of
the existing studies clearly captures the research problem. This
is a research area that could benefit from additional research,
especially research that focuses on the specific incentives faced
by particular segments on the population.
SUMMARY
The particular structure of the EITC program, coupled with the
substantial increase in benefit levels, now generates substantial marriage bonuses and penalties. While the benefit formula is technically
neutral with respect to marital status, the relatively high phase-out rate
and the cap on child-related benefits at two children mean that many
married couples bear significant marriage penalties. In extreme and,
admittedly, somewhat contrived circumstances, these penalties can exceed $5,000—a significant amount for families earning less than the
EITC maximum of about $32,000.
Studies of the actual impact of the EITC on marriage penalties are
less helpful than they might be. It is difficult to place a reliable dollar
figure on the net marriage bonuses and penalties, although it is clear
than penalties outweigh bonuses. At the moment, it does not appear
that marriage and divorce decisions are affected by the economic incentives created by the EITC bonuses and penalties, but this literature
is relatively new and not definitive.

Notes
1. See Holtzblatt and Rebelein (2000) for further discussion of marriage penalties
and bonuses.
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2. 0.34  $5,894  2  $4,008, which is the credit that would be received by a
family with two children and a joint income of $11,788. At higher individual
incomes, the combined single credits exceed the credit if married.
3. If single, each would receive the maximum year 2001 EITC of $4,008 for a total
of $8,016. If married, their EITC would equal $1,251  $4,008  0.2106 
($26,180  $13,090).
4. The alternative is to begin with a sample of single individuals and ‘‘marry’’ them,
but this requires a method for assigning spouses to single persons. Because that
is complex and arbitrary at best, most studies follow the ‘‘divorce’’ approach.
5. Ellwood ignored the impact of the EITC for workers without children. This
would likely cause him to overstate slightly the benefits to previously childless
workers who marry and have a child.
6. The primary purpose of these papers was clearly to measure total EITC dollar
impacts. Information on the proportion of married couples with bonuses or penalties can be derived from their tables, but this information is not emphasized in the
papers themselves.
7. They also presented a case involving the allocation of unearned income across
the individuals.
8. For methods 2 and 3, we rely on Holtzblatt and Rebelein (1999).
9. Aggregate estimates were not presented by Ellwood. We calculate them from the
figures reported in his paper, supplemented by estimates of the number of married
couples.
10. The figures presented here for Holtzblatt and Rebelein differ from the net impacts
presented in their papers. For example, Holtzblatt and Rebelein (2000) used
method 1 to derive a net change in marriage penalties due to the EITC of $3.1
billion; the $3.7 billion figure we report includes the $0.59 billion decline in net
marriage bonuses created by the EITC. Similarly, they reported a $9.9 billion net
penalty using method 2, to which we add the $10.9 billion decline in bonuses
shown in their table. Since a decline in bonuses is exactly equivalent to an increase in penalties, this is an appropriate adjustment. We treat the computation
of bonuses in a parallel way.
11. These changes are currently slated to be eliminated in 2011, although few observers expect this to happen.
12. The expected penalty is the weighted average of the penalties if a single woman
is working or not working, where the weights are the proportion of single women
in each (predicted) wage quartile who work. MP  pE  ME  (1  pE) 
MNE, where MP is the expected or average marriage penalty, pE is the probability
of employment and ME and MNE are the average marriage penalty/bonus for
women who are employed (E) and not employed (NE). Ellwood conceded that
this is not an ideal measure, but he argued that it is adequate.
13. This approach has been used in the literature on the effect of AFDC benefits on
family structure. See Hoffman and Duncan (1988) and Duncan and Hoffman
(1990) for examples.
14. This assumption may be correct, but we still know relatively little about how
individuals perceive the EITC.
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15. In general, many of their models appear to have insufficient variation in EITC
benefits to estimate its impact on marital status with any reasonable precision.
This is especially true when they estimate state fixed-effect models, since those
estimates rely on within-state variation in EITC benefits to identify the impact of
the EITC.
16. Eissa and Hoynes (1999) reported an EITC marriage bonus for families with
incomes through approximately $25,000. That income level seems extremely
high; it seems much more likely that families at that income, which is well on the
phase-out range, would have EITC marriage penalties or EITC marriage neutrality.

5
The EITC and Other
Antipoverty Programs
The 1990s saw major changes not only in the EITC but also in
much of the rest of the federal safety net. The traditional U.S. welfare
system was dramatically reformed and restructured in 1996. The primary cash transfer program for poor families since the mid-1930s,
AFDC was eliminated and replaced (effective July 1, 1997) by a program called Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, usually referred
to as TANF. While TANF is similar to AFDC in some ways, it imposed
meaningful work requirements as well as specific strict time limits for
receipt of assistance. Welfare rolls fell by over 50 percent between
1997 and early 2001, both as a result of the reform itself and the booming economy.
At approximately the time welfare reform began, the minimum
wage was increased from $4.25 per hour to $4.75 in 1996 and then to
$5.15 in 1997. Legislation to increase it to $6.15 per hour was passed
by the Senate in 2000, but it did not become law. While it is unlikely that the Bush Administration will support an increase in the minimum wage, legislative efforts to increase it are, nevertheless, likely.
Supporters of the minimum wage still often view it as primarily a
mechanism to increase the income of low wage workers, and thus it
often appears that the EITC and the minimum wage are policy substitutes.
In this chapter, we compare and contrast the EITC to these alternative policies, as well as to two other approaches, a negative income tax
(NIT) and a wage subsidy. We argue that the EITC is far superior to
the minimum wage both in terms of its targeting efficiency and its labor
market impacts. We also show that the EITC is fundamentally different
from the welfare system in terms of its reward structure and work incentives. The NIT actually has more in common with welfare than
with the EITC, while a wage subsidy program runs into severe implementation problems.
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THE MINIMUM WAGE
Minimum wage laws operate by substituting a mandated wage rate
for a market-determined wage rate. If labor demand curves are
downward-sloping and labor markets are reasonably competitive, as
most economists certainly believe they are, then a minimum wage that
is higher than the market equilibrium will reduce employment. This
very basic idea is shown in Figure 5.1, which represents a simplified
market for relatively unskilled workers, a group whose market wage in
the absence of a minimum wage is quite low. The market equilibrium
in the absence of a minimum wage is at wage w* and employment E*.
The minimum wage is shown as wm, with corresponding employment
Em.
With the minimum wage in place, employment declines from E*
to Em. Unemployment may also increase, although that depends on
the job search behavior of workers who are unable to find work.1 The
magnitude of the decline in employment from E* to Em depends on the
difference between wm and w* and on the slope of the demand curve.
When the minimum wage is relatively low, as it was in the 1980s and
early 1990s, its impact on employment is naturally quite small; the
expected impact on employment increases as the gap between the miniFigure 5.1 The Effect of a Minimum Wage on Employment in a
Competitive Labor Market

Wage
D

S

Wm
W*

Em

E*

Employment
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mum wage and the equilibrium wage increases. If the demand curve
were steeper (more inelastic), the employment drop would be smaller;
if it were flatter (more elastic) the decline would be greater. Only if
the demand curve is vertical (completely inelastic) is there no decline
in employment in a situation where wm ⬎ w*.
There are some alternative scenarios with more positive expected
labor market impacts. If labor markets are monopsonistic, meaning
that one employer completely dominates a particular labor market, then
a minimum wage can, if it is not too high, actually increase both wages
and employment. Virtually no economists, however, believe that many
low wage labor markets are currently monopsonistic. Efficiency wage
models in which higher wages elicit greater effort from workers are
another possibility2 although, again, there is no particularly compelling
reason to either expect efficiency wages to be important in the low
wage labor market. A recent survey of economists confirmed that in
excess of 80 percent agreed with the statement, ‘‘The imposition of
minimum wages reduces employment’’ (Alston, Kearl, and Vaughan
1992).
This predicted negative employment effect is clearly an important
drawback of the minimum wage as an income-transfer program. Workers who are employed at the minimum wage benefit from the higher
wage rate and may find their incomes increased, but those who cannot
find employment clearly lose income. The EITC, in contrast, does not
reduce employment or lower any worker’s net income, because it does
not interfere with labor market equilibrium. It does not reduce employment because it does not increase the market wage that firms must pay.
It may affect the market equilibrium via its impact on labor supply, but
the impact on the market wage will be very small and no worker will
face involuntary unemployment at the new equilibrium.
Despite the straightforward theoretical predictions about the effect
of a minimum wage on employment, empirical work has become unsettled in the past decade. Earlier estimates based on the time-series relationship between teenage employment rates and the value of the
minimum wage suggested a relatively small negative impact. The received wisdom was that a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage
would reduce employment approximately 1–3 percent (Brown 1988).
This result is consistent with the idea that demand curves are
downward-sloping but relatively inelastic. Deere, Murphy, and Welch
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(1995) found further support for a negative impact following the 1990
and 1991 increases in the federal minimum wage. They found that
employment rates consistently fell more in demographic groups in
which a higher proportion of workers were low wage workers affected
by the minimum wage increase. Other research, primarily based on
narrow natural experiments comparing specific states and/or industries,
has failed to find the expected negative effects and, in some cases, has
actually found a positive impact on employment. The most prominent
such finding comes from Card and Krueger’s (1994) analysis of the
impact of an increase in the state minimum wage in New Jersey on
employment in fast-food restaurants; other important contributions in
the same vein include Card (1992a, 1992b) and Katz and Krueger
(1992). Card and Krueger (1994) found that employment in New Jersey actually increased after the minimum wage increase, relative to a
control sample of fast-food restaurants in Pennsylvania. An analysis
of similar data by Neumark and Wascher (2000) found no such positive
effect, while yet a further reanalysis by Card and Krueger (2000) concluded that ‘‘the increase in New Jersey’s minimum wage probably had
no effect on total employment in New Jersey’s fast-food industry and
possibly had a small positive effect’’ (p. 1,419).
While the impact of the New Jersey minimum wage on employment in the fast-food industry will probably never be fully resolved,
we think that the weight of all the empirical evidence suggests that it
is most probable that a minimum wage that is above the prevailing
wage level in the low wage labor market decreases employment of lessskilled workers, as basic economic theory predicts. At the same time,
the quantitative impact of a moderate increase in the minimum wage
does not appear to be large.
No matter what the employment effects of a minimum wage are
relative to the EITC, there is reasonably broad consensus that the minimum wage is more poorly targeted at the population of low and moderate income families. The reason is quite straightforward. The EITC is
well targeted on these families, precisely because it uses total family
income as the income concept for the determination of benefits and
eventually phases out benefits as income increases. In contrast, the
minimum wage increases the wages of low wage workers, irrespective
of whether those individuals are attached to poor, moderate, or even
high income families. The prototypical cases in point are employed
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teenagers from relatively affluent families: while the teen’s wage rate
may be low, the family’s income is relatively high. Thus, to the extent
that individuals like these are heavily represented among employed
minimum wage workers, the minimum wage will have a weak equalizing effect on the distribution of income.
Some of the targeting differences between the two programs are
obvious in comparing the distribution of the characteristics of the two
recipient populations. Table 5.1 summarizes some of this information.
We saw earlier that roughly 19 million households receive benefits
from the EITC; approximately 4.4 million workers benefit from the
minimum wage. The minimum wage population is much younger than
the EITC recipient population (51 percent are less than age 24 versus
just 7 percent for the EITC) and much less likely to be the head or
spouse of a family. As a result, minimum wage workers are much
more likely to have a middle class family income or even higher. More
Table 5.1 Recipient Population Characteristics, EITC and
Minimum Wage
Percentage of EITC
population, 1996

Percentage of
minimum wage
population, 1997

Age
16–19
20–24
⬎25

1.0
6.3
92.7

30.4
20.6
49.0

Family status
Head or spouse
Child
Other relative
Not a family membera

86.5
0.0
0.0
13.5

42.0
35.1
4.9
18.0

Family income
⬍$12,500
$12,500–$25,000
$25,000–$50,000
⬎$50,000

34.8
45.3
19.2
0.7

24.7
22.7
28.9
23.7

Population characteristic

a
In the EITC program, these are single individuals with no children.
SOURCE: The EITC information comes from the PSID for 1996; the minimum wage
tabulations come from the 1997 CPS.
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than half of minimum wage recipients have a family income greater
than $25,000, including nearly a quarter with incomes greater than
$50,000. Only one-fifth of EITC recipients have a family income
greater than $25,000 and only a tiny fraction have family income
greater than $50,000.3
More direct evidence about the relative antipoverty efficiency of
the minimum wage and the EITC comes from studies by Burkhauser,
Couch, and Glenn (1996) and Neumark and Wascher (1999). Burkhauser, Couch, and Glenn compared the distributional effects of the
1990 and 1991 increases in the minimum wage (from $3.35 to $4.25)
with the increase in the EITC between 1989 and 1992. Their key
finding is summarized in Table 5.2, which is based on their analysis of
data from the 1990 CPS. Note that, for both the minimum wage and
the EITC, the benefits are for the marginal increase in the program over
this time period, so that, for example, the distribution of EITC benefits
are not those for the program as a whole. Also, they assumed that
there are no changes in employment for the minimum wage analysis or
in labor supply for the EITC.
The total benefits of the two changes were quite similar—$4.5 billion for the minimum wage and $4 billion for the EITC—but the EITC
benefits are far more concentrated on poor and near-poor families. The
EITC provided 42 percent of its benefits to families with an incometo-needs ratio of less than 1.25; the corresponding proportion for the
minimum wage was half as large (21 percent). In contrast, 60 percent
Table 5.2 Share of Total Benefits from Increase in the Minimum Wage
and in EITC by Family Income-to-Needs Ratio, 1989–1992
Income-to-needs ratio

Minimum wage (%)

EITC (%)

⬍1.00 (poor)
1.00–1.25
1.26–1.50

15.6
5.3
7.3

25.0
17.1
15.4

1.50–2.00
2.00–3.00
⬎3.00
Total benefits

11.7
22.2
37.9
$4.5 billion

22.8
14.4
3.6
$4 billion

SOURCE: Burkhauser, Couch, and Glenn (1996, tables 5 and 7).
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of the minimum wage benefits went to families with an income-toneeds ratio of greater than two and nearly 40 percent went to families
with a ratio of greater than three. Only 18 percent of EITC benefits
were received by families with an income-to-needs ratio that was
greater than two.
The reason for the great difference in the distribution of benefits is
precisely the point emphasized above: the EITC distributes benefits
according to household income, while the minimum wage provides
benefits on the basis of individual earnings, which are not necessarily
strongly correlated with low household income. Indeed, this low correlation was stressed by Burkhauser, Couch, and Glenn. They noted that,
in 1939, when the minimum wage was first established, 85 percent of
all low wage workers were attached to poor households; among persons
heading a household, 94 percent of low wage workers were poor. This
reflected the very low labor force participation of secondary earners,
including married women and teens. Over time, however, as the labor
force participation of these workers has increased steadily, the correlation between low wages and poverty status has steadily weakened.
Burkhauser, Couch, and Glen reported that, by 1989, only 22 percent
of all low wage workers and 37 percent of low wage heads of households were themselves a member of a poor family.4
Some additional information on the relative antipoverty effectiveness of the EITC and the minimum wage comes from Neumark and
Wascher (1999), who used national data on households from 1985 to
1994 to examine movements across the poverty line (in both directions)
and across other portions of the low income distribution. They focused
on household earned income relative to the poverty line, rather than, as
in the official poverty statistics, total household income (pre-tax, post
cash-transfer) relative to the poverty line. Fundamentally, they were
interested in whether household earnings increase, net of the labor supply effects of the EITC and/or the labor demand effects of the minimum wage. As they noted, this is a procedure that greatly favors the
minimum wage relative to the EITC, since the direct impact of a higher
minimum wage rate is included in earned income, while the income
transfer of the EITC is not included. Put differently, in their study, the
EITC can only increase earnings if it increases household labor supply,
while the minimum wage can increase earnings even if it reduces employment, as long as the reduction in employment does not fully offset
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the increase in the minimum wage itself. Their analysis incorporated
both federal and state EITC programs.
They found that the overall impact of the EITC on the earnedincome poverty rate is reasonably small, accounting for about one-third
of the transitions from below the poverty line to above it and having no
effect on movements from about the line to below it. They estimated a
stronger impact of the EITC on the probability that a poor family with
children and with no adult worker becomes non-poor. They attributed
this to an increase in the labor force participation of adult workers in
families that faced the incentives of the phase-in range, a potential
effect that we emphasized in our analysis of labor supply impacts.
When they directly compared the effects of the EITC and the minimum
wage on poverty transitions of families with children, they found that
the EITC has its largest positive impact among the poorest families and
among families just below the poverty line, while the minimum wage
has its biggest impact among families just below the poverty line.
Given the range of recent policy changes in the EITC and minimum
wage, their estimates suggest a much larger impact of the EITC.
In light of all of the evidence presented here, it is hard to construct
a strong argument, indeed almost any argument, favoring an increase
in the minimum wage over an increase in the EITC. The EITC avoids
the negative, although admittedly disputed, employment effects of the
minimum wage, and it targets its benefits to poor, low, and moderate
income households with far more precision than the minimum wage
does. The truth is that for the poorest of workers and households—
those who find themselves on the phase-in range of the EITC—the
EITC operates like an increase in the minimum wage without the potentially troubling increase in the wage price of labor. For such a
worker with two children, the effective minimum wage is not its statutory rate of $5.15, but rather $7.21, including the 40 percent credit
subsidy. The only argument in favor of the minimum wage is that it is
not a federal government expenditure because its costs are entirely
borne by firms and consumers. In a time period of large federal deficits, this might be an argument worth considering.
THE WELFARE SYSTEM
The welfare system refers to a series of federal and state programs
that provide cash assistance and in-kind benefits to low income fami-
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lies. For many years, the main cash assistance program for poor families was AFDC, which came to be widely known as just ‘‘welfare.’’
Eventually, AFDC itself was abolished as part of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 and TANF
was substituted in its place. TANF is essentially similar in structure to
AFDC, but it is not a legal entitlement as AFDC was, and it imposes
strict time limits on lifetime usage as well as such other requirements
as each state may choose to impose.5 Other major programs that are
part of the safety net and that are still in place include food stamps,
Medicaid, and public housing.
Almost all of these programs, especially and most importantly
TANF and food stamps, share a common benefit structure. Benefits
are at their maximum for households with no income of their own at
all and then are rapidly phased out as household income increases.
Currently, the phase-out rate (usually called a benefit reduction rate in
this context) is 67 percent for the first three months of work, increasing
to 100 percent thereafter. With a 67 percent phase-out rate, an individual’s net take-home wage is just one-third of its monetary value; with
a 100 percent phase-out, the net take-home wage is zero. The case is
actually worse than indicated just above because any welfare recipients
earning income would lose not only some portion of their TANF benefits, but also their food stamps at a phase-out rate of 30 percent and
possibly benefits from other programs as well.
The net result of the TANF schedule (and of AFDC before it) is to
provide very strong work disincentives to welfare recipients. Adults
receiving assistance from either AFDC or TANF find themselves in a
situation in which they have both a very sharply lower net wage rate
and more income than previously. This is precisely the situation that
confronts workers in the EITC along the phase-out range, except that
in the case of the EITC the impacts are larger (because the wage and
income magnitudes are larger) and they are focused on workers on the
margins of the labor market rather than with the somewhat higher incomes of the phase-out range. The result is that household income is
barely increased by work, unless it is at a wage well above that typically
available to welfare families. It is often simply not rational to work in
such a situation, and, indeed, very few AFDC/TANF recipients worked
regularly during the past few decades of the program.
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The philosophical difference between the two programs is enormous. EITC rewards work, at least through the phase-in and stationary
ranges, with a substantial wage subsidy. In contrast, TANF penalizes
work with a substantial wage tax that falls most heavily on the poorest
families. While the EITC does impose a wage tax in the phase-out
range, that tax is far smaller than in TANF, and it falls on workers who
already have at least a moderate income. Finally, it is important to
understand one more feature of the two programs. While EITC benefits have increased substantially in the 1990s, they are still, in general,
far short of benefits available under TANF in most states. The maximum EITC benefit in 2001 is just over $4,000 a year. The median
TANF plus food stamp benefit for a family of three in 1999 was over
$700 per month, or about $8,400 a year.
The sharp difference between the TANF and EITC benefit schedules is shown in Figure 5.2. The familiar EITC benefit structure
(phase-in, flat, phase-out) is shown for a family with two children;
TANF benefits are shown for a maximum benefit of $5,000 per year
and a phase-out rate of 67 percent, figures close to the median. Benefits for TANF are greatest at zero earnings, a point at which EITC
benefits are zero. TANF benefits begin to phase out immediately6 and
rapidly, while EITC benefits increase for the first $10,000 of earnings.
EITC benefits are at their greatest along the stationary range of the
Figure 5.2 Comparing Benefits—EITC and TANF
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program and then phase out, but at roughly one-fourth the rate of the
TANF program.
The EITC is an important part of welfare reform. It is now absolutely clear that the welfare system as we knew it for 60 years has come
to an end. Unrestricted cash assistance to able-bodied, low income
individuals and their families is no longer a viable policy option, and
there is little public support for that approach. As former welfare recipients are moved into the labor market, often with few skills and at
low market wages, the benefit schedule of the EITC has become an
increasingly important wage supplement. For this group in particular,
an increase in the minimum wage poses some genuine employment
risks.

OTHER APPROACHES
The Negative Income Tax
When welfare reform was first widely considered, more than three
decades ago, most proposals involved what came to be known as a
negative income tax, or NIT for short. As proposed, the NIT would
operate through the tax system to provide cash benefits to low income
households. An NIT system could be understood as a simple extension
of the conventional positive income tax system to incomes sufficiently
low that the ‘‘taxpayer’’ would receive cash from, rather than pay cash
to, the IRS. Such low income taxpayers would, in effect, pay ‘‘negative
taxes,’’ which accounted for the name of the proposal.
An NIT does share some important features with the EITC. Like
the EITC, the amount of benefits depends on income in an NIT program. And like the EITC, the NIT operated through the tax system
rather than through a welfare bureaucracy. So how does an EITC differ
from an NIT?
The benefit schedule of an NIT plan is essentially identical to that
of AFDC and TANF in that it provides maximum benefits to nonworking households and then rapidly reduces those benefits as household
income increases. Thus, the NIT does not contain the crucial phase-in
region that distinguishes the EITC from traditional welfare programs.
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The NIT is essentially a traditional welfare program except for its administration via the tax system.
Wage Subsidy
A wage subsidy program pays an individual a fraction of the gap
between his or her wage and some target wage. For example, an individual might receive a credit equal to 50 percent of the gap between
his wage and $9. If the individual’s wage were $6, the credit per hour
would be $1.50 (50 percent of the $3 gap); if the wage were $7, the
credit per hour would be $1.00 (50 percent of the $2 gap). More generally, the wage subsidy formula is S ⳱ ␣(WT ⳮ W), where WT is the
target wage and ␣ is the proportion of the wage gap that is covered.
The wage subsidy formula can be rewritten as S ⳱ G ⳮ ␣W, where G
⳱ ␣WT. In this form, a wage subsidy program bears some resemblance
to both welfare and an NIT in the sense that there is a guarantee that is
immediately phased out. Typically, however, a wage subsidy program
applies only to workers and is based on the hourly wage rate.
Along the phase-out range, the EITC shares the basic benefit structure of a wage subsidy program. Along that region, EITC benefits are
given by the formula C ⳱ Cm ⳮ po(Y ⳮ Yb), where Cm is the maximum
credit, po is the phase-out rate, Y is family income, and Yb is the beginning of the phase-out region. A comparison of the formulas for the
two programs identifies the important distinction. A wage subsidy is
based on an individual’s wage and ignores the earnings or other income
of other family members, whereas the EITC is based on a household’s
total income. If a wage subsidy applied to all low wage individuals, it
would be subject to the same criticism as the minimum wage law: its
benefits would be poorly targeted because low wage workers in middle
income families would benefit as well as low wage workers in poor
families. The targeting problem can be mitigated by limiting wage
subsidy eligibility to the principal earner (i.e., the individual who
earned the most money during the previous calendar quarter), but the
advantage of the EITC is that it handles the targeting problem simply
and automatically.
Under a wage subsidy, working more hours is always encouraged
because the subsidy per hour remains fixed regardless of how many
hours the person works. On the other hand, working harder or better
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in order to receive a higher wage is discouraged because the subsidy
per hour always decreases as the wage increases towards the target
wage. By contrast, in its phase-in range the EITC encourages an individual both to work more hours and to obtain a higher wage. Along
the phase-out range, the EITC has the same negative incentives as the
wage subsidy, although as a practical matter, the benefit reduction rate
is typically lower in the EITC than in any proposed wage subsidy programs.
Finally, there is a serious practical implementation problem with
any wage subsidy program. Because it is difficult to measure wages
and work hours independently, the wage subsidy program is subject to
manipulation. Suppose an employer and employee agree on annual
compensation of $18,000. Although the employee actually works
2,000 hours, implying a wage of $9, suppose the employer and employee agree to report a wage of $8 and hours of 2,250 ($8 ⳯ 2,250
⳱ $18,000). If the wage subsidy ‘‘target’’ is $9, the employee is not
entitled to any wage subsidy. But, by reporting a wage of $8, the
employee can obtain a subsidy. If the wage subsidy ‘‘fraction of the
gap’’ is 50%, then the employee would obtain a subsidy of $0.50 per
hour by reporting $8; by reporting 2,250 hours, the employee would
obtain a subsidy for the year of $1,125. Because it is difficult for
auditors to determine actual hours worked, especially in small firms,
many employers and employees might be tempted understate the wage
and overstate hours worked. Monitoring wages and hours is far more
difficult than monitoring their product—earnings. One important advantage of the EITC in this respect is precisely that it piggybacks on
the tax system in which accurate reporting of income is established and
where sanctions for inaccurate reporting are already in place.

SUMMARY
A survey of policy alternatives strongly supports the EITC and the
unique way it is structured. By any reasonable standard, it dominates
an increase in the minimum wage as a more effective and more efficient
way to transfer income to the target population and one that avoids the
potential negative impacts on employment. The same issues of target
inefficiency also plague wage subsidy programs, and these programs
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are further beset by reporting problems. The approach of traditional
welfare, whether in the form of AFDC, TANF, or the NIT has been
soundly rejected by the political sphere.
It is well worth emphasizing that the EITC is not a solution for all
low income households, and it is not a transfer policy panacea. Households who are poor because of lack of earnings due to health, lack of
skills, other impairments, or even macroeconomic distress are clearly
not in a position to benefit from the EITC. Some safety net is essential,
whether in the form of targeted programs such as Supplemental Security Income or broad programs such as food stamps.

Notes
1. Only workers without jobs who have made a specific effort to find work in the
past month are classified as unemployed. Most studies of the impact of the minimum wage have emphasized changes in employment not unemployment because
there is no ambiguity about predicted changes in employment.
2. See Yellen (1984) for a summary of efficiency wage models.
3. These high income families qualify for EITC because they have low earned income but substantial nontaxable income, probably transfer income of some kind.
4. For the purposes of this study, low wage workers are workers with a wage less
than 50 percent of the average private-sector wage. This is roughly the level of
the minimum wage, although there has been some variation over time in this ratio.
5. From the budgetary standpoint of the states, however, TANF is quite different
than AFDC. AFDC was a matching grant, meaning that the federal government
shared in program costs at some fixed rate. TANF is a block grant; states get a
lump sum but the federal government does not share in additional program costs.
There are also enormous differences between AFDC and TANF in terms of work
requirements and eligibility.
6. In practice, there is often a small ‘‘income disregard’’ so that benefits do not
actually phase out immediately.

6
The Efficiency Cost of the EITC
As we noted in Chapter 1 EITC recipients received a total of nearly
$30 billion in tax credits in the year 2000, which enabled the recipients
to increase their consumption and thus increase their well being. Of
course, this $30 billion came from total tax revenues and was thus paid
by households who were ineligible for the EITC, typically because
their income was too high. These families are worse off on account of
the EITC; their after-tax income is lower and, thus, their consumption
and well-being will fall. At first glance, it might seem that these taxpayers lose exactly as much as the recipients gain because the dollar
amount paid by taxpayers equals (ignoring a small administrative cost)
the dollar amount received by recipients, so that taxpayers must reduce
their consumption by the same amount that recipients can increase their
consumption.
Economists have long emphasized, however, that the dollars transferred or received only partially measure the change in economic wellbeing of taxpayers or recipients. Any tax/transfer program changes the
incentives on both taxpayers and recipients and, in so doing, causes
distortions of economic behavior. This is potentially true of the EITC
as well.
There are two possible ways these distortions could occur in the
EITC. First, as we saw in Chapter 3, the benefit structure of the EITC
creates substantial changes in the net (after-transfer) wage rate and in
family income via its phase-in and phase-out rates, thereby altering
labor supply incentives. For example, individuals in households whose
income and earnings (without the EITC) place them along the phaseout range of the EITC are simultaneously richer and face a lower aftertax wage rate. As we explained in Chapter 3, these incentives will
cause them to reduce the number of hours they work, thereby reducing
earnings and increasing the EITC they receive. Second, and equally
important, the higher taxes necessarily imposed on taxpayers to finance
the EITC will affect their net wage and income, potentially altering
their labor supply incentives. The resulting changes in labor supply
behavior in themselves affect economic well-being over and above the
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direct dollar magnitudes. The taxpayers may be worse off than the
dollar value of the taxes they pay.
Economists have devised methods of estimating the dollar value of
the behavioral changes to taxpayers and recipients. Economists refer
to these additional costs as the efficiency cost, deadweight loss, or ‘‘excess burden’’ of a tax; we use the term efficiency cost in this chapter.
When the dollar value of these behavioral changes is counted, it often
turns out that the total dollar loss to taxpayers from a tax/transfer program exceeds the total dollar gain to recipients. If the loss to taxpayers
exceeds the gain to recipients by 50 percent, economists say that the
efficiency cost of the tax/transfer program is 50 percent. If the efficiency cost is 50 percent, taxpayers lose $1.50 for each $1 of benefit to
recipients. For a graphical exposition of the efficiency cost of the
EITC, see Appendix C.
It is crucial to emphasize that the ‘‘efficiency cost’’ of the EITC
ignores the benefit that citizens derive from making EITC transfers to
recipients they regard as worthy of assistance because they work.
Many nonrecipient taxpayers, as citizens, clearly believe that the EITC
contributes to making a better, fairer society. If a citizen regards this
benefit as large, then that citizen should support an EITC expansion
even if it entails a large efficiency cost. For example, consider two
citizens with differing personal views of the benefit of expanding the
EITC. For citizen X, the benefit is small so that X would oppose an
expansion if the efficiency cost exceeds 50 percent (i.e., raising the
economic well-being of a recipient by $1.00 entails reducing the well
being of a taxpayer more than $1.50). By contrast, for citizen Y, the
benefit is large so that Y would support an expansion as long as the
efficiency cost is less than 400 percent (i.e., raising the well-being of a
recipient by $1.00 entails reducing the well-being of a taxpayer less
than $5.00). Thus, an estimate of the EITC efficiency cost is useful
information for each citizen’s decision making, but it does not determine what the decision should be.
Economists have shown that what matters for the efficiency cost of
a tax/transfer program is the ‘‘marginal tax rate’’ it imposes on individuals. Suppose an individual’s net income would increase $75 if he
earned another $100 in income. Then, the individual’s marginal tax
rate is 25 percent. Obviously, a taxpayer in a 25 percent income tax
bracket tax faces a marginal tax rate of 25 percent from the income
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tax, but it must also be recognized that a transfer recipient subject to a
benefit phase-out also faces a marginal tax rate. If the recipient’s transfer income would be cut $25 if the recipient earned another $100 of
income, then the recipient faces a marginal tax rate of 25 percent because his net income would increase only $75 if he earned another
$100. Thus, a tax/transfer program generally changes the marginal tax
rate faced by recipients as well as taxpayers, and the efficiency cost of
the tax/transfer program is affected by its impact on recipients as well
as taxpayers.
In measuring the efficiency cost of expanding a particular tax/
transfer program, it is crucial to consider the other tax and transfer
programs already in the economy as well as the initial level of the
program to be expanded. As a general proposition, economists have
shown that the efficiency cost of an increase in the marginal tax rate
facing an individual increases with the square of the tax rate. Thus, if
the EITC increases the marginal tax rate facing an individual by ⌬t
percentage points, the efficiency cost will be greater as the initial marginal tax rate rises. Thus, a study of the efficiency cost of an EITC
expansion should take account of its interaction with other tax and
transfer programs already in the economy.
Because the marginal tax rate is what matters for efficiency cost, it
is crucial to specify the exact details of the expansion of the EITC
and, in particular, how it will affect the marginal tax rates faced by
individuals. For example, the current phase-in rate for a family of four
is 40 percent, the phase-in range ends at $10,020 of earnings, the
phase-out begins at $13,090, the phase-out rate is 21.06 percent, and
the phase-out ends at $32,121. One way to expand the EITC would be
to raise the phase-in rate above 40 percent. Another way would be to
keep the phase-in rate of 40 percent but raise the endpoint of the phasein range above $10,020. If such changes were made, a choice must
then also be made concerning the EITC phase-out. If the beginning
and endpoint of the EITC phase-out range are to remain unchanged,
then the EITC phase-out rate must be raised. Alternatively, if the endpoint of the EITC phase-out range is raised enough, the phase-out rate
can be kept at 21.06 percent. If the endpoint is raised even further, the
phase-out rate can be cut below 21.06 percent. The exact details of an
EITC expansion would affect the efficiency cost of the expansion.

122

Helping Working Families: The Earned Income Tax Credit

There have been three important studies of the efficiency cost of
an EITC expansion, and the three studies reach strikingly different
estimates. Triest (1994) estimated the efficiency cost to be only 16
percent, so that for each $1 of benefit to recipients, taxpayers lose
$1.16. At the other extreme, Browning (1995) estimated the efficiency
cost to be 303 percent, so that for each $1 of benefit to recipients,
taxpayers lose $4.03. Finally Liebman (2001) provided an intermediate estimate (closer to Triest’s than to Browning’s), of 88 percent so
that, for each $1 of benefit to recipients, taxpayers lose $1.88. We
begin with Triest’s study and then consider relevant articles by Heckman (1993) and Moffitt and Wilhelm (2000). We then turn to Browning’s study and, finally, consider Liebman’s study.
Before presenting the details of our analysis, we will preview our
basic conclusion. Based on our review of the labor supply literature,
we believe that Triest’s assumption about labor supply elasticities is
much closer to the mark than Browning’s. The evidence presented in
Chapter 3 about the labor supply impacts of the EITC is also consistent
with the smaller elasticities that Triest used. If labor supply elasticities
were as large as those used by Browning, then the EITC would generate larger labor supply effects than are consistently observed. Liebman’s study utilized a plausible microsimulation model calibrated to
microdata from the 1999 CPS that carefully distinguishes the diverse
effects of the EITC on different recipients and potential recipients and
weights the diverse effects according to each type of recipient’s share
of the recipient population. In particular, Liebman properly emphasized, in contrast to Browning, the impact on previously nonworking
potential recipients who choose to go to work as a result of the EITC.
As a consequence, we conclude that the efficiency cost of an EITC
expansion, especially if it is done the way we recommend in Chapter
8, will be much less than Browning’s estimate and will probably be in
the range between the estimates of Liebman and Triest.

TRIEST’S STUDY OF AN EITC EXPANSION
Triest (1994) simulated an EITC expansion financed by an increase
in income tax rates. He used data for 1987 when the tax rates of the
U.S. income tax were 0 percent, 11 percent, 15 percent, 28 percent, 35
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percent, and 38.5 percent; the EITC phase-in rate was 14 percent for
the first $6,080 of earnings, for a maximum credit of $851; and, beginning at earnings of $6,920, the phase-out rate was 10 percent so the
credit was reduced to zero at an AGI of $15,432. He simulated an
EITC expansion financed by a 1-percentage-point increase in the 15
percent and 28 percent tax rates (to 16 percent and 29 percent). It is
important to note the key features of Triest’s EITC expansion: the
EITC phase-in and phase-out rates remained at 14 percent and 10 percent, but both ranges were increased.
Triest described his simulation methodology—and used the PSID
data set for 1987. He imputed a budget constraint for consumption and
leisure for every sample member, assumed a particular functional form
for labor supply which implied a functional form for the underlying
preferences, calibrated the labor supply functions, and simulated the
EITC expansion. He limited his sample to heads of households and
spouses between the ages of 20 and 60. In the budget constraint of
individuals he included food stamps, welfare (AFDC), income tax, the
employee (but not the employer) share of the payroll tax, and the EITC.
Heads and spouses are assumed to have desired hours that depend on
the wage, the marginal tax, and other income.1 For married couples, he
assumed sequential labor supply decision making, so that a husband
chooses his hours ignoring his wife’s hours, and a wife decides hours
assuming her husband’s hours are fixed.2 For nonworkers, he imputed
a wage based on a regression. He used the labor supply elasticities he
estimated econometrically in Triest (1990), where he found low labor
supply elasticities for males or females who are already working.
Table 6.1 shows Triest’s simulation results. The four lowest income deciles (below an income of $14,183) receive an increase in
transfers, whereas the six highest pay higher taxes. The lowest decile
works a bit more, while all the other deciles work a bit less. The ‘‘mean
equivalent gain’’ is the lump-sum transfer that would result in the same
change in well-being as the reform simulated. Note that the mean
equivalent gain has a pattern similar to the tax column, but the amounts
are not identical because each transfer must also compensate for the
distortion in behavior. When the mean equivalent gain is expressed as
a percentage of after-tax-and-transfer income (last column), the percentage gain is over 4 percent for the two lowest deciles, 2 percent for
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Table 6.1 The Efficiency Cost of an EITC Expansion
Decile

Change in taxes
($)

Change in
hours worked

Equivalent gain
($)

Percent

1

ⳮ340

1.8

351

4.6

2

ⳮ693

ⳮ0.6

673

4.8

3

ⳮ405

ⳮ4.3

354

1.9

4

ⳮ104

ⳮ6.0

50

0.2

5

114

ⳮ4.4

ⳮ140

ⳮ0.5

6

188

ⳮ4.8

ⳮ212

ⳮ0.7

7

241

ⳮ4.0

ⳮ264

ⳮ0.8

8

282

ⳮ2.8

ⳮ307

ⳮ0.8

9

338

ⳮ1.7

ⳮ355

ⳮ0.8

10

377

ⳮ0.7

ⳮ377

ⳮ0.5

All

0

ⳮ2.8

ⳮ23

ⳮ0.1

Efficiency cost
Increase in
phase-in range

16%
$7,321

SOURCE: Triest (1994) Table 5a.

the third, 0 percent for the fourth, and the loss is less than 1 percent
for each of the six highest deciles.
The efficiency cost is the percentage by which the losses to taxpayers exceed the gains to recipients. Here, it equals the sum of the mean
equivalent losses over the deciles that lose, divided by the mean equivalent gains over the deciles that gain, minus 1 (expressed as a percentage). The efficiency cost of the EITC expansion represented in this
table is only 16 percent. Thus, the welfare losses of the higher income
deciles are just 16 percent greater than the welfare gains of the lower
income deciles.
Triest noted that the efficiency cost would be larger if only the top
marginal tax rates (35 percent and 38.5 percent) were raised to finance
the EITC expansion, but pointed out that technical problems reduce his
confidence in these higher estimates. Triest also considered three other
labor-supply parameter sets and computed the efficiency cost for each
set. The efficiency costs for these simulations are 4 percent, 44 percent, and 118 percent. Finally, Triest substituted a demogrant for the
EITC, to achieve redistribution, once again using his preferred labor-
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supply elasticity (from Triest 1990), and once again raising the 15 percent and 28 percent tax rates by a percentage point. He found an
efficiency cost of 27 percent, somewhat higher than the 16 percent he
found for the EITC, but much lower than Browning and Johnson’s
(1984) efficiency cost estimate of 249 percent for a demogrant. Thus,
the reason Triest found a low efficiency cost is not because he analyzed
an EITC rather than a demogrant; he found a low efficiency cost for
both.
Triest concluded that:
In this paper I have investigated the efficiency cost of several possible progressivity-increasing tax reforms. Based on the labor
supply parameters I consider to be most reasonable, it appears
possible to devise progressivity-increasing tax reforms that have a
quite small degree of ‘‘leakage’’ in redistributing after-tax economic welfare from upper-income to lower-income families. The
efficiency cost of using an expansion of the earned income
credit—financed by 1-percentage-point increases in the 15 percent
and 28 percent federal marginal tax rates—to transfer $1 of economic welfare from upper-income families to lower-income families is only $0.16. (p. 167–168)

Labor supply estimates are crucial for Triest’s results. His preferred parameter set is based on his 1990 econometric study which
found low wage and income elasticities for males and working females.
The male uncompensated wage elasticity ranges from 0.03 for the lowest income decile to 0.10 for the highest, and the male income elasticity
is 0.00 for all deciles. Because the income elasticity is 0.00, the compensated wage elasticity equals the uncompensated wage elasticity, so
the male compensated wage elasticity also ranges from 0.03 for the
lowest income decile to 0.10 for the highest; thus, the average male
compensated wage elasticity is 0.07. The estimates for females used
data only on those with positive hours of work. The female uncompensated wage elasticity ranges from 0.16 for the second lowest income
decile to 0.33 for the highest, and the female income elasticity ranges
from ⳮ0.02 to ⳮ0.07. Thus, the female compensated wage elasticity
ranges from approximately 0.18 for the lowest income decile to approximately 0.40 for the highest,3 and the average female compensated
wage elasticity is approximately 0.29. Since male workers outnumber
female workers, Treist gave a two-thirds weight to males and a one-
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third weight to females and calculated the average compensated wage
elasticity as approximately 0.14. Later, we will see that Browning
assumed an average compensated wage elasticity that is roughly twice
as large (0.30).
Triest’s labor supply estimates contrast with Hausman (1981) who
estimated a large negative income effect for married men and a zero
uncompensated wage effect, implying a large positive compensated
(substitution) effect. Because the efficiency cost depends on the magnitude of the substitution effect, Hausman’s result implies a large efficiency cost from income taxation. Triest argued that more recent work
on the response of male labor supply to income taxation has generally
found very small income and substitution effects. In his own econometric work (Triest 1990), where he estimated a specification very similar to that of Hausman (1981), he found an income elasticity of zero
(in contrast to Hausman’s large negative income elasticity) therefore
implying a very small substitution effect. Triest further argued that
MaCurdy, Green, and Paarsch (1990) also found that male labor supply
is largely unresponsive to economic incentives and that Burtless (1987)
reported low responsiveness in income maintenance experiments.
Summarizing both econometric and income maintenance experiment
studies, Triest concluded:
Overall, the bulk of the evidence on male labor supply suggests
that there are only minor incentive effects. Although it is important to take any incentive effects into account in analyzing possible tax- or transfer-program changes, one needs to view with some
skepticism any efficiency cost calculations that are based on large
male labor supply elasticities. (p. 141)

Triest said that, although female labor supply has been thought to
be more elastic, this view has changed somewhat recently. In Triest’s
view, Mroz (1987) persuasively critiqued the techniques used in earlier
female labor supply studies and, using better technique, found that economic factors such as wage rates, taxes, and nonlabor incomes have
only a small impact on the labor supply behavior of already-working
married women. Triest emphasized that Mroz’s results are consistent
with the view that economic factors may have a large impact on the
decision to participate in the labor force. Triest estimated a model of
female labor supply and found low responsiveness for already-working
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women.4 He said that the participation decision is more sensitive to
economic incentives than is hours of work (given participation) because of the existence of fixed costs associated with working. He assumed that women face fixed monetary costs of working which vary
with family size and the number of young children, and he expressed
his belief that his incorporation of fixed costs into the simulation results
in a realistic model of the participation decision, even in scenarios with
low assumed wage and income elasticities for already-working women.
Burtless (1987) reported low responsiveness of female labor supply in
income maintenance experiments. Triest concluded:
Overall, recent work on female labor supply has called into question the assumption that women’s hours of work are highly responsive to economic incentives. In simulating the efficiency cost
of progressivity, using low to moderate wage and income elasticities seems most reasonable. (p. 142–143)

Other Labor Supply Estimates
Triest’s use of low labor supply elasticities for EITC recipients
who already work received support from Heckman’s (1993) review of
empirical work. Heckman said that it is crucial to distinguish between
a person’s decision about whether to participate in the labor force (to
work or not to work) and the person’s decision, once working, about
how many hours to work. He wrote:
These distinctions are empirically important. Participation (or
employment) decisions generally manifest greater responsiveness
to wage and income variation than do hours-of-work equations
for workers. The 1960’s characterization of married-female labor
supply as much more wage- and income-elastic than male labor
supply arose, in part, because participation elasticities for women
were being compared with hours-of-work elasticities for men. (p.
117)

Heckman reported that several studies show that, given participation, both males and females show very little responsiveness of hours
worked to wages or income. He said Mroz’s (1987) influential study
found small elasticities for married women, close to those found for
males by MaCurdy, Green, and Paarsch (1990). A major lesson of the
past 20 years is that the strongest empirical effects of wages and nonla-
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bor income on labor supply are to be found on the decision of whether
to work at all.
Heckman also provided support for Triest’s use of low elasticities
for the more affluent taxpayers who will finance any EITC expansion.
Recall that Triest took issue with Hausman’s (1981) finding of a large
negative income elasticity and a large positive substitution effect for
male taxpayers, and so did Heckman. He noted that Kosters (1967),
Mroz (1987), and MaCurdy, Green, and Paarsch (1990) all found low
labor supply elasticities:
In the period between Kosters (1967) and MaCurdy et al. (1990),
economists were entertained by the spectacle of anomalously
large estimates of income effects and compensated substitution
effects for male hours of work produced from functional-formdependent estimation schemes designed to estimate the effect of
taxes on labor supply (see the survey by Jerry Hausman [1985])
. . . These schemes have now fallen into disrepute. The econometric procedures used to produce the estimates were econometrically and economically inconsistent in part because they did not
properly correct for missing wage data for nonworkers (see Heckman, 1983). Competent analysts have been unable to replicate the
earlier findings even using the same data (see MaCurdy et al.
1990). When these models are re-estimated using more robust
schemes, weak wage and income effects of taxes are found for
males in numerous countries. (p. 118)

Further support for Triest’s low elasticity for affluent taxpayers is
provided by Moffitt and Wilhelm (2000):
A long-standing issue in the effects of taxation on individual behavior concerns whether labor supply, most commonly measured
by hours of work, responds to taxation. We have examined
whether high income men—the rich—so respond. High-income
taxpayers are often thought to have more opportunities to respond
to tax law changes and to have a greater incentive to do so because
of their high marginal tax rates. Our analysis of changes in the
hours of work of such men between 1983 and 1989, in response
to the marginal tax rate reductions legislated in the 1986 Tax Reform Act, finds essentially no evidence of any such response. (p.
221)

Finally, empirical studies of the labor supply impact of the EITC
usually find relatively small effects on hours worked (e.g., Eissa and
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Liebman 1996). Most of the studies do not estimate income and substitution effects or labor supply elasticities; the natural experiment approach adopted by most researchers provides an estimate of net
program impact, rather than the underlying behavioral parameters.
Nevertheless, the small estimated effects are clearly consistent with
relatively low labor supply hours elasticities. If elasticities were larger,
then the substantial EITC increases in the 1990s would undoubtedly
have generated much larger impacts than have been observed.

BROWNING’S STUDY OF AN EITC EXPANSION
Edgar Browning (1995) also analyzed the efficiency cost of an
EITC expansion. He assumed the expansion is accomplished by raising the phase-in rate and the phase-out rate but holding constant the
endpoint of the phase-in range and the beginning and endpoint of the
phase-out range. By contrast, Triest assumed that the expansion is
accomplished by raising the endpoints of the phase-in and phase-out
ranges but holding constant the phase-in and phase-out rates. We will
return to the significance of this difference at the end of this section.
Browning emphasized that most EITC recipients are on the phaseout range. Citing Hoffman and Seidman (1990), he said that only
about one-fourth of recipients are in the phase-in range. Citing Scholz
(1994), he estimated that only 5 percent of the earnings of EITC recipients are from households in the phase-in range. Because of this, the
EITC is similar to welfare or a negative income tax for most recipients:
it confronts them with a phase-out rate—a positive marginal tax rate.
In Chapter 2, we showed that approximately two-thirds of EITC recipient households in 1996 had incomes that placed them on the phase-out
region of the EITC.
To estimate the impact of the EITC on individuals in the phaseout range, Browning needed an elasticity that applies to hours—the
adjustment of hours for someone already working—not labor force
participation. Recall that Heckman’s interpretation of the empirical
literature is that the hours elasticity is near zero for both males and
females, in contrast to the participation elasticity, which is positive.
But, Browning did not distinguish between these two elasticities when
he surveyed the empirical literature:
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As will become apparent, it is the magnitude of the compensated
wage elasticity that is crucial. In previous work, I have used a
value of 0.3 for an economy-wide average value for this elasticity,
intended to represent a weighted-average value for different demographic groups. (p. 30)

He reported that, in Pencavel’s (1986) survey of empirical research
for men (30 estimates), the average value of the compensated wage
elasticity for men is 0.12; and, in Killingsworth and Heckman’s (1986)
survey for women (70 estimates after dropping the five highest and five
lowest), the average value of the compensated wage elasticity for
women is 0.75. The weighted average of these two averages for men
and women (with a one-third weight for women, approximately equal
to their share of total earnings) is 0.33. He concluded (p. 30) that, ‘‘In
view of this literature, a value of 0.3 for the average compensated wage
elasticity seems reasonable.’’
Thus, Browning took an average elasticity from studies that include participation as well as hours elasticities. Heckman’s paper implied that Browning therefore used an elasticity that is too large for
analysis of the adjustment of hours on the phase-out range.
Browning estimated that the EITC actually reduces the disposable
income of families in the upper end of the phase-out range; their reduction in gross earnings is greater than the credit they receive:5
The striking implication of these estimates is that families over a
wide range of incomes will have lower disposable money incomes
as a result of the EITC . . . This suggests there is a real possibility
that the EITC will reduce the disposable money incomes of a majority of families in the phase-out range . . . These results depend
critically on how much the EITC causes earnings to decline . . .
The results are very sensitive to the assumed value of the compensated wage elasticity . . . Halving or doubling of that elasticity
would significantly alter the results. (p. 32)

Browning acknowledged that the well-being of recipients depends
not only on the impact of the EITC on disposable income but also on
leisure. He said there are two equivalent measures of the impact on
recipients’ well-being: 1) the increase in their disposable income plus
the dollar value of the increase in their leisure and 2) the budgetary
cost minus the loss to recipients from distorting their labor supply in
response to the phase-out rate. Applying his elasticity to the second
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measure, he estimated that each additional $1.00 of budgetary cost
results in a distortion cost to recipients of $0.54 and, hence, a net benefit to the recipient of only $0.46. He commented that, since he estimated that recipients’ disposable income on average is nearly
unchanged (because their reduction in gross earnings offsets their
EITC credit), this net benefit is entirely due to an increase in their
leisure.
Browning then inferred the efficiency cost of an EITC expansion:
It should also be noted that a figure of 46 cents for the marginal
benefit per dollar of budgetary cost does not mean that the cost to
taxpayers of providing a transfer worth 46 cents to recipients is
one dollar. To acquire the funds to finance the transfers, the government must increase taxes on upper income families, and these
taxes have distorting effects also, implying that the true cost on
taxpayers is greater than the amount of revenue involved . . . I
have elsewhere (Browning, 1987) estimated the marginal welfare
cost (again, evaluating labor supply effects alone) of raising additional tax revenue through the federal income tax to be in the
range of 45.8 to 85.2 percent of the marginal dollar of revenue.
(These estimates were developed using the same compensated
labor supply elasticity, 0.3, employed here.) Using the higher of
these figures [footnote: These estimates of marginal welfare cost
for the federal income tax were developed on the assumption of a
proportional increase in marginal tax rates for all taxpayers. In
the case of the EITC, only those taxpayers with incomes above
$27,000 can finance the net benefits provided by the EITC, and
this implies a more progressive change in the federal income tax,
and hence, a higher marginal welfare cost. For that reason, I use
the higher figure estimated in my earlier paper], this implies that
it costs upper income taxpayers $1.85 to provide a transfer worth
$0.46 to EITC recipients, or about $4.03 per one dollar of benefit.
(p. 36)

Hence, Browning’s estimate of the efficiency cost was 303 percent.
This is even higher than the Browning and Johnson (1984) efficiency
cost estimate of 249 percent for a demogrant ($3.49 loss to taxpayers
per dollar of benefit to recipients). Browning showed how the estimate
varies with the compensated wage elasticity. If the elasticity is 0.15
(instead of 0.3), the net benefit per dollar of budgetary cost is $0.58
(instead of $0.46); if it is 0.45, the net benefit per dollar is $0.38.
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Browning’s figure of $0.85 as the efficiency cost per dollar of tax revenue for high income taxpayers is based on the elasticity of 0.3. Suppose that with half the elasticity there is half the efficiency cost, $0.42.
Then, it costs upper income taxpayers $1.42 to provide a transfer worth
$0.58, or about $2.45 per dollar of benefit. This estimate is still much
higher than Triest’s $1.16 per dollar of benefit. Thus, Browning’s lowest efficiency cost estimate is 145 percent whereas Triest’s estimated
efficiency cost is only 16 percent.
Browning emphasized that one reason the efficiency cost of an
EITC expansion is this high is the initial level of taxes and transfers in
the economy. Browning included the entire payroll tax (employer plus
employee) and state taxes in his combined initial marginal tax rate,
thereby generating a combined marginal tax rate of 65.1 percent for a
family of four in the EITC phase-out range with food stamps (which
has a phase-out rate of 24 percent) but no income taxes, or 59.6 percent
for a family of four in the EITC phase-out range without food stamps
but facing federal and state income taxes.
Browning directly addressed Triest’s study:
In sharp contrast to the findings in this paper, Triest finds that
an expansion in the EITC has a very small efficiency cost. There
appear to be at least three reasons for this difference. First, Triest
uses labor supply elasticities that are significantly lower than I
employ, at least in his preferred simulations. In his base case, the
weighted-average compensated wage elasticity is about 0.11.
Second, his estimates of preexisting marginal tax rates are
lower than mine. For the bottom four deciles of the income distribution, the average marginal tax rate before the simulated expansion in the EITC is about 25 percent. This low figure results, at
least in part, from his failure to include the employer portion of
the social security payroll tax, state income taxes, or sales and
excise taxes in his estimates of marginal tax rates. Of course, the
smaller the initial marginal tax rate, the smaller is the marginal
welfare cost of increasing it.
The third major difference in the Triest study is the way he
simulates an expansion in the EITC. Because this raises an important general issue, it is worthwhile examining in some detail.
Triest envisions expanding the range of incomes over which unchanged phase-in and phase-out marginal tax rates apply . . . Note
that the additional redistribution accomplished by this change in
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the EITC is likely to have low welfare costs, at least disregarding
the taxes that finance it. (p. 39–40)

Figure 6.1, derived from Browning, shows the difference between
Browning’s and Triest’s EITC expansions. The initial EITC schedule
is 0ABY3. Browning’s expansion yields 0CDY3. Triest’s expansion
yields 0FY4. Browning suggested that Triest’s expansion is likely to
have a smaller efficiency cost, but that Browning’s expansion is more
likely to be enacted.
It is not obvious, however, which method of expansion should have
a larger aggregate efficiency cost. Because Browning has a higher
phase-out rate than Triest, Triest has a lower efficiency cost for persons
between Y2 and Y3 . Between Y3 and Y4, however, Triest has a higher
efficiency cost because Browning has phased out the EITC by Y3 while
Triest is still phasing it out until Y4. Also, Browning has a lower
efficiency cost for persons between 0 and Y1 because his higher phasein rate offsets more of the positive marginal tax rate from welfare, food
stamps, and regular taxes.
Browning contended that his EITC expansion is more likely to be
enacted for two reasons. First, historically, expansions have in fact
Figure 6.1 Triest’s vs. Browning’s EITC Expansion
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raised both phase-in and phase-out rates. Second, his expansion is
better targeted: it raises the incomes of the lowest earners while Triest’s
does not.
Browning summarized his differences with Triest:
There are four major factors that interact to determine the efficiency cost of redistribution. Three of these are the level of initial
marginal tax rates, the compensated wage elasticity of labor supply, and the type of policy change being evaluated [footnote: The
fourth is the initial inequality in labor earnings: the more equally
distributed are labor earnings, the higher is the marginal welfare
cost of redistribution. Since lifetime incomes are more equally
distributed than annual incomes, efficiency costs are higher when
evaluated from a long-run perspective.] Triest has made assumptions regarding all three of these factors that differ from mine and
lead to lower marginal welfare costs. I think the assumptions I
use are better, but the important point is to understand that these
assumptions are critical in determining the welfare effects of redistributive policies. (p. 41)

Finally, Browning said even his high efficiency cost estimate understates the efficiency cost of an EITC expansion because he confined
his analysis to the distortion in labor supply. Additional efficiency cost
will be generated from distortion in saving, human capital investment,
diversion of income into nontaxable forms (other than leisure), administrative and compliance costs, and possible effects on marital and fertility decisions.
LIEBMAN’S STUDY OF THE EITC
Liebman (2001) gave a clear explanation of efficiency cost of
transfer programs in his introduction:
A fundamental issue for any transfer program is whether it increases the well-being of its recipients by enough to outweigh the
reduction in well-being that it causes for the higher-income taxpayers from whom the revenue for the program is raised. In general, the cost of providing one dollar’s worth of utility gain to a
transfer recipient can be substantially more than a dollar. This
disparity occurs for two reasons. First, raising the revenue for the
program involves deadweight loss; therefore, taxpayers lose more
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than a dollar’s worth of utility for every dollar raised. Second,
because the program alters the incentives facing recipients, the
value of the transfer to recipients is less than if the same transfer
were paid as a lump sum; therefore, beneficiaries gain less than a
dollar’s worth of utility for every dollar they receive. These two
sources of leakage imply that society may have to value a dollar
given to a transfer recipient at several times the value of a dollar
in the hands of the typical taxpayer in order to justify using distortionary tax and transfer systems to redistribute income. (p. 196)

Liebman then contended that there are some special complications
for applying this reasoning to the EITC:
While this basic logic applies to the EITC, the design of the EITC
provides several exceptions to these general principles that makes
it interesting to study. First, it is not always the case that a dollar
spent on the EITC produces less than a dollar’s worth of utility
gain to beneficiaries. Because the credit is available only to workers, the EITC offsets some of the distortions created by the rest of
the welfare and tax systems, and taxpayers who leave welfare to
claim the EITC can increase their well-being at the same time as
government expenditures decline. Therefore, for some beneficiaries, the cost of providing a dollar’s worth of utility is actually
less than a dollar. Moreover, for some two-earner couples and for
some EITC recipients receiving the maximum credit, the EITC is
effectively a lump-sum transfer that does not produce any deadweight loss. (p. 197)

The impact therefore depends on how many households are in each
situation in relation to the EITC. Liebman used a microsimulation
model calibrated to microdata from the 1999 CPS to incorporate this
quantitative information. From his simulations he drew these conclusions:
The research underlying this chapter has two basic results. First,
in contrast with the findings of Browning (1995), I find that the
overall efficiency cost of transferring income through the EITC is
fairly low. While Browning found that it cost $4.03 to provide
one dollar’s worth of utility gain to recipients in the phase-out
region and almost $2.00 to provide one dollar’s worth of utility to
recipients in the phase-in and constant region, I find that it typically costs less than $2.00. An important reason for my lower
results is that I take into account the impact of the EITC on the
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labor force participation of single parents. Recent research suggests that the EITC causes a large number of welfare recipients to
enter the labor force. When the savings from reduced welfare
spending are taken into account, the EITC appears to be a much
more efficient way to accomplish income redistribution than when
they are ignored. In addition, a significant portion of the labor
supply responsiveness of married couples is likely to be due to
secondary earners leaving the labor force. My simulations indicate that much of this responsiveness is due to the income effect
of the EITC rather than the substitution effect. Therefore, for
these households, the EITC is effectively a lump-sum transfer. (p.
197)

Liebman carefully distinguished the diverse effect of the EITC on
different types of recipients:
There are five basic scenarios that illustrate the ways in which the
labor supply behavior of an unmarried taxpayer could be affected
by the introduction of an Earned Income Tax Credit. First, a taxpayer might have had earnings greater than the EITC breakeven
point if there were no EITC, but reduces his or her earnings in
order to receive the EITC. Second, a taxpayer might have had
income in the EITC phase-out region even in the absence of the
EITC, but because both the income and substitution effects of the
EITC encourage the taxpayer to reduce her earnings, he or she
moves to a lower level of earnings. Third, a taxpayer with earnings in the constant region might reduce his or her earnings due
to the negative income effect from the EITC. Fourth, a taxpayer
with earnings in the phase-in range might alter her earnings in
either direction since the positive substitution effect and the negative income effect make the net impact on labor supply ambiguous. Finally, a taxpayer who would not have had any annual
earnings in the absence of the EITC might decide to participate
because the EITC increases the average return to working. Such
a taxpayer could enter the labor force at any level of earnings
eligible for the EITC. In all of these cases the taxpayers receiving
the EITC have higher utility than they did before the EITC was
introduced. (p. 198)

It is this last category, the person who is induced by the EITC to
enter the labor force, that plays an important role in reducing Liebman’s estimate of the efficiency cost well below Browning’s, as Liebman emphasized in his conclusion:
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The results indicate that the efficiency cost of transferring income
through the EITC is substantially lower than previous studies have
found. It costs upper income taxpayers only $1.88 to provide a
transfer worth $1.00 to EITC recipients. The main reason for the
difference among head of household filers, is that this study takes
into account the positive impact of the EITC on labor force participation of single parents and the savings on welfare spending that
this labor supply response brings about. Among married filers, it
appears that a substantial amount of the labor supply response to
the EITC is likely to be due to secondary earnings leaving the
labor force. The simulations indicate that this responsiveness is
primarily due to the income rather than the substitution effects of
the credit and therefore that the EITC is effectively a lump-sum
transfer for these households. (p. 226)

CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Triest’s (1994), Browning’s (1995), and Liebman’s (2001) studies
of the efficiency cost of an EITC expansion are extremely useful.
Browning is helpful in clearly delineating how he and Triest reach such
strikingly different results. Based on our review of the labor supply
literature in Chapter 3, we believe that Triest’s assumption of a low
labor supply response by recipients on the phase-out range and by taxpayers who will finance the expansion is much closer to the mark than
Browning’s, and this alone would tend to bring the efficiency cost
much closer to Triest’s 16 percent than to Browning’s 303 percent. In
Chapter 8, in contrast to Browning’s expansion which raised the
phase-out rate, and even Triest’s which held it constant, we propose an
EITC expansion that reduces the phase-out rate. This difference would
also reduce the efficiency cost of the EITC. Finally, Liebman’s study
emphasized, in contrast to Browning’s, the positive impact on labor
force participation of the EITC: as its originators hoped, empirical evidence indicates that the EITC induces a significant number of single
parents to enter the labor force and work. This is an important reason
why Liebman found an efficiency cost of only 88 percent, in contrast
to Browning’s 303 percent.
It is important to reiterate the basic point we made at the beginning
of this chapter concerning the role of an estimate of the EITC effi-
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ciency cost in a citizen’s decision making. An estimate of the EITC
efficiency cost is useful information, but it does not determine what the
decision should be. For example, consider a citizen who believes the
EITC has a very high benefit for society, and is willing to support an
expansion as long its effiiciency cost is less than 400 percent (each
$1.00 gain to recipients reduces the consumption of taxpayers less than
$5.00). Such a citizen should support an EITC expansion even if
Browning’s estimate of 303 percent is correct. At the other extreme,
consider a citizen who has a modest regard for the benefit of the EITC
for society, and would oppose an expansion even if its efficiency cost
is 0 percent (each $1.00 gain to recipients reduces the consumption of
taxpayers $1.00). Such a citizen should oppose an EITC expansion
even if Triest’s estimate of 16 percent is correct. This said, clearly
more citizens should and will support an EITC expansion if they believe its efficiency cost is low. Provided the EITC expansion is done
as we recommend in Chapter 8, it seems likely in our judgment that
the efficiency cost of an EITC expansion will in fact be relatively
low—much closer to Triest’s estimate than to Browning’s, and probably close to Liebman’s estimate of 88 percent.

Notes
1. More specifically, desired hours h ⳱ ␥ Ⳮ ␣w Ⳮ ␤y, where w is the net wage
and y is virtual income. The net wage equals the wage minus the combined
marginal tax rate due to tax and transfer programs to which the person is subject;
virtual income is the vertical intercept that results if the relevant segment of the
individual’s budget line is extended to the axis.
2. A husband’s earnings are excluded from a wife’s virtual income to avoid double
counting.
3. The relationship between a person’s uncompensated wage elasticity ⑀ and compensated wage elasticity ⑀c is given by ⑀u ⳱ ⑀␣ Ⳮ (E Ⳮ Y), where  is the
income elasticity, E is labor earnings, and Y is nonlabor income. If we assume
that a wife gets to use half her husband’s earnings, then her Y is half her husband’s
earnings; if that wife’s earnings are roughly half her husband’s, then her E/Y
equals 1, so that ⑀u ⳱ ⑀c Ⳮ .
4. Triest provided some detail on his estimate of female labor supply, ‘‘Including
data on nonparticipants in the estimation resulted in uncompensated wage elasticities (evaluated at the sample means of women with positive hours of work) of
approximately 0.9, and virtual income elasticities of about ⳮ0.3 . . . When I
estimated the same specification but used only data on women with positive hours
of work (with an appropriate statistical adjustment), the uncompensated wage
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elasticity fell to approximately 0.27 and the virtual income elasticity fell to about
ⳮ0.16. This decrease in the magnitude of the wage and income elasticities when
one moves from a censored (including observations with zero hours of work) to
a truncated (excluding such observations) specification is consistent with Mroz’s
(1987) work. Mroz similarly finds that wage and income elasticities drop in
magnitude when switching from a censored to a truncated tobit specification (in
a model without taxes). Moreover, he finds that the elasticities drop by an even
larger amount when one switches from a truncated tobit specification to a more
general self-selection correction. Mroz is able to reject both the censored and
truncated tobit specifications in favor of the more general specification. This
implies that even the relatively small elasticities I estimated using the truncated
specification may be too high. However, it is important to recall that Mroz’s
results apply only to working women.’’ (p. 142)
5. Browning assumed an income elasticity of ⳮ0.20. He said his results are not
very sensitive to his assumption about the income elasticity.

7
EITC Compliance Issues
During the 1990s, a controversy developed over the EITC ‘‘error
rate.’’ According to several IRS studies, roughly 25 percent of EITC
payments were technically in error—that is, roughly 25 percent of
EITC payments did not comply with at least one of the EITC technical
requirements under a strict and precise interpretation of EITC provisions concerning the definition of a ‘‘qualifying child,’’ the rules for
filing status, and the AGI tiebreaker rule for determining eligibility.
What inferences should be drawn from the 25 percent EITC error rate,
and what are the appropriate responses?
In this chapter we review the details of the EITC error rate problem. Before plunging into these details, which are complex but hopefully interesting, we want to state our main conclusions. First, the
literature suggests that a substantial part of the EITC error rate is due
to the confusion of recipients concerning the complex provisions and
rules of the EITC. No evidence has been provided to demonstrate that
a substantial part of the error rate is due to intentional fraud. Second,
most technically ‘‘erroneous’’ EITC payments go to households with a
head who works but earns modest income. Third, there is no evidence
that the EITC error rate exceeds the error rate resulting from other
provisions of the personal and corporate income tax. Fourth, promising efforts are being made to reduce the error rate by simplifying some
of the complex and confusing EITC provisions.

THE EITC ERROR RATE
Ventry (2000) provided a brief history of the EITC error rate. The
problem burst onto the political radar screen with the 1990 release of
the IRS’s Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) study
of the 1985 tax year. This study discovered an EITC ‘‘over-claim
rate’’—defined as the dollar amount claimed in error divided by the
total dollar amount claimed—of 39.1 percent. A follow-up TCMP
study of the 1988 tax year, released in 1992, detected an over-claim
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rate of 35.4 percent. In 1994 and 1995, the IRS conducted two more
studies of EITC noncompliance for the years 1993 and 1994, finding
an over-claim rate of 26.1 percent for 1993 and 25.8 percent for 1994.
Although not all dollars claimed were actually paid by the IRS, most
claimed dollars were in fact paid. Needless to say, these studies attracted attention in Congress and provoked a reaction.
As a consequence, an effort to reduce noncompliance was started
in 1990 and it gradually escalated in intensity over the ensuing decade.
In 1990, the Treasury recognized that many EITC over-claims were
due to errors about qualifying child criteria and filing status, and it
therefore presented a proposal to Congress (which was subsequently
enacted) that simplified the qualifying child criteria and filing status
and made it easier for the IRS to verify EITC eligibility based on information reporting. The IRS was given the authority to match names
and taxpayer identification numbers (TINs) on tax returns to individual
Social Security numbers (SSNs), initially exempting but eventually including SSNs of qualifying children under the age of one. Using its
administrative authority, the IRS began to reject electronic returns with
missing, invalid, or in some cases duplicate SSNs. The welfare reform
act of 1996 provided the IRS with authority to treat the failure to provide a valid SSN as a mathematical or clerical error. Using the math
error procedures, the IRS can deny or reduce the credit before a refund
is paid. The IRS was given the power to impose penalties on persons
who abused the EITC. The Taxpayer Relief Act (TRA) of 1997 imposed a due diligence requirement for paid preparers. It gave the IRS
authority to recover excess refund payments or unpaid taxes by garnishing a percentage of unemployment and means-tested benefits, and
it contained provisions that disqualified abusive filers for various
lengths of time depending on the infraction.
Liebman (2000) discussed several sources of error that might well
have resulted from confusion among persons claiming the EITC. The
TCMP studies of the 1985 and 1988 tax years found that an important
source of error was failure to meet the ‘‘support test,’’ a test that was
eliminated for the EITC by Congress in 1990 because it was judged
confusing and inappropriate. Prior to 1990, the taxpayer had to provide
at least half of the total financial support for the child to be eligible for
the EITC, where total support included financial assistance from all
sources including government transfer payments such as food stamps
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and welfare. This support test must still be met to claim a dependent
exemption under the federal personal income tax, but consider the case
of a single parent working part time whose children live with her yearround. This parent might well claim the EITC without realizing that,
if she received government transfer payments (food stamps, welfare,
etc.) greater than her own earnings, she failed the EITC support test
and was ineligible for the EITC. The support test was eliminated for
the EITC in 1990 and was replaced with a residency test and an AGI
tiebreaker.
These two tests are also subject to confusion. Under the residency
test, the child must live with the taxpayer at least half the year. If a
child spends substantial time residing with each of two separated parents (as is often the case), each parent may be inclined to believe that
child resides with him or her ‘‘roughly half’’ the time; hence, each files
for the EITC. Of course, if a parent claims a child who seldom resides
with him, the error is probably intentional. Under the AGI tiebreaker
rule, if a child can potentially be claimed by two taxpayers who reside
together (e.g., the child’s parent and grandparent), only the person with
the higher AGI is eligible to take the credit. It seems likely that many
parents would assume, incorrectly, that they can automatically claim
the credit.
McCubbin (2000) provided further details on the EITC compliance
problem. She noted that the IRS has not conducted a comprehensive
study of taxpayer compliance since 1988, postponing indefinitely a
TCMP study planned for tax year 1994 in order to avoid budgetary
cost and imposing a burden on taxpayers who are studied. However,
the IRS’s Criminal Investigations Division (CID) performed a more
limited study (IRS 1997) of the tax returns of about 2000 randomly
selected taxpayers who filed EITC claims for the tax year 1994. She
noted that the EITC errors identified in that study include both intentional noncompliance and unintentional reporting mistakes, and the
two types of errors are not readily distinguishable in the data. The
study found an over-claim rate of 25.8 percent, but these error rates are
for amounts claimed rather than amounts paid. Moreover, the Treasury
Department estimated that IRS enforcement procedures in effect during the 1995 filing season would have reduced the error rate about 2
percentage points and, if the new enforcement procedures first in effect
during the 1997 filing season had been in effect in 1995, the error rate
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would have been reduced another 3 percentage points. Thus, the error
rate for amounts paid would have been about 20 percent.
McCubbin explained the confusion that arises because a child may
entitle a parent to the EITC but not a dependent exemption or to a
dependent exemption but not the EITC. Consider a single working
parent who must figure out whether she can claim a child for the EITC
and whether she can claim a child as a dependent for the personal
exemption. With the EITC, there is a residency test but no support
test—the child must live with the taxpayer for at least half the year, but
the taxpayer need not provide half of the total financial support of the
child. The EITC qualifying child need not be the taxpayer’s dependent. To claim the EITC, however, the taxpayer must have the highest
AGI of all taxpayers who may claim the child. By contrast, to claim
the dependent exemption, the taxpayer must generally provide over
half of the support for the child. A welfare recipient who provides less
than half of the total support (including welfare) of the child may not
claim a dependent exemption for the child but may still claim the
EITC. On the other hand, a noncustodial parent may be allowed to
claim a dependent exemption for a child that he or she supports, but a
noncustodial parent may not claim the EITC.
Not surprisingly, over half of the total amount over-claimed was
due to an error concerning the qualifying child criteria involving either
the residency or AGI tiebreaker requirement. Of these, the most important was an error concerning the residency requirement; the audit ascertained that the child lived with the taxpayer less than half the year. If
a parent claims a child who hardly ever resides with him, this error is
no doubt intentional. But, if a child frequently sleeps over at his residence, the father may assume, incorrectly, that he satisfies the residency requirement. Also important was an error concerning the AGI
tiebreaker; the audit ascertained that the child should have been
claimed by someone else with a higher AGI (in some cases, the taxpayer’s parent; in other cases, the child’s father to whom the taxpayer is
not married).
Another important source of error for the 1994 tax year was filing
status. Nearly one-third of the total amount over-claimed was due to
the misreporting of filing status; married people filed as heads of
households and, as a consequence, received larger EITC credits. Consider the situation of a mother still technically married but whose hus-

EITC Compliance Issues 145

band has long since left. She might think she can file as a head of
household and claim the EITC. It seems likely that confusion may be
the source of much of this filing status error.
Although some have asserted that the EITC has a high error rate
because it is refundable, the CID data refute this assertion. The EITC
over-claim rate among EITC claimants with no income tax or selfemployment tax liability (before taking the EITC into account), who
would have received the entire EITC in the form of a refund, was 12.7
percent. The over-claim rate among EITC claimants with some income
or self-employment tax liability, who therefore would have received
less than the entire EITC as a refund, was 37.7 percent. Surprisingly,
the error rate for claimants receiving the entire EITC as a refund was,
for some reason, much smaller than the error rate for all other EITC
claimants.
Some have speculated that the availability of ‘‘refund anticipation
loans’’ may raise the error rate, but this also seems doubtful. The overclaim rate among filers who applied for loans (26.6 percent) is similar
to the rate among filers who did not (24.0 percent).
According to McCubbin (2000), the error rate is also not affected
by whether the taxpayer uses a tax preparer: ‘‘The CID data show
virtually no difference in the error rates of taxpayers who used paid
preparers and those who prepared their own returns.’’
One possible source of intentional error in the 1994 tax year was a
loophole that has since been plugged. In 1994 the taxpayer had to
provide a taxpayer ID number, typically the SSN, for each child
claimed except children under the age of one. This exception opened
the possibility of listing children said to be under age one without
fearing that the IRS would cross-check SSNs.
Some have speculated that the EITC would cause persons with low
earnings on the phase-in range to overstate their earnings in order to
obtain a larger credit and persons with higher earnings on the phaseout range to understate their earnings in order to obtain a larger credit.
Interestingly, the CID study found that income underreporting to limit
the phase out of the credit was not a large source of error, and income
overreporting in the phase-in range in order to raise the credit was
extremely rare.
McCubbin reviewed the efforts begun in the second half of the
1990s to reduce the EITC error rate. The welfare reform act of 1996
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required all EITC claimants to provide valid SSNs for themselves and
all of their children; prior to the tax year 1996, SSNs were not required
for children under age one, and taxpayers who could not obtain an SSN
because they were undocumented workers could still claim the EITC.
The 1996 act enabled the IRS to treat the failure to provide a valid SSN
as a ‘‘mathematical or clerical error,’’ by which the IRS can deny or
reduce the credit before any tax refund is paid and without auditing the
tax return.
The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 established new penalties for taxpayers claiming the EITC improperly. If a taxpayer makes an EITC
error that is determined to be the result of ‘‘negligence or intentional
disregard’’ of the EITC provisions, the taxpayer cannot claim the EITC
for the next 2 years; if the error is the result of ‘‘fraud,’’ the taxpayer
cannot claim the EITC for the next 10 years. If a taxpayer’s credit is
disallowed or reduced (except due to a mathematical or clerical error),
the taxpayer must undergo ‘‘recertification’’ by providing additional
information to the IRS the next time the taxpayer attempts to claim an
EITC benefit.
The 1997 act contained new penalties for tax preparers filing EITC
claims improperly. The CID data showed that there were big differences in the error rate by the type of paid preparer, with error rates
much lower among returns prepared by lawyers, CPAs, enrolled agents,
or large national tax preparation organizations. This result gave rise to
the paid preparer due diligence requirements in the 1997 act. To avoid
a penalty, a preparer with an EITC error must show he utilized ‘‘due
diligence’’ by documenting that he obtained certain information from
the taxpayer before filing the EITC claim. Because the burden of proof
of due diligence is placed on the preparer, and because the IRS can
impose fines without an audit, the provision makes it cheaper for the
IRS to penalize preparers. The provision informs preparers about the
EITC eligibility criteria by specifying precisely what information is
necessary to evaluate a taxpayer’s claim.
The 1997 act gave the IRS new sources of information that should
be useful. The IRS will have access to the Federal Case Registry of
Child Support Orders, which should enable the IRS to identify noncustodial parents who generally fail the EITC residency test. The Social
Security Administration will be required to obtain the SSNs of parents
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who apply for a SSN for a child; this information will help the IRS
identify persons likely to fail the EITC relationship test.
The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 provided more funding for EITC
compliance efforts. The IRS has used these funds to develop new
forms and regulations; change the computer programs to automatically
deny the EITC to taxpayers with SSN problems; update or develop
databases; improve the clarity of EITC forms, notices, and publications; increase the availability of taxpayer assistance; and audit more
EITC returns. The IRS estimates that, for every dollar spent on these
efforts in 1998 and 1999, roughly 10 dollars were saved for the EITC
program.
Is the error rate by taxpayers claiming the EITC higher than the
error rate by taxpayers not claiming the EITC? McCubbin commented:
The errors made by EITC claimants (including misreporting filing
status, misreporting family and household characteristics, and
under-reporting income) can also be made by taxpayers who do
not claim the EITC. Without comparable data on taxpayers who
do not claim the EITC, it is impossible to fully understand the
extent to which EITC overclaims are the result of the EITC itself,
and the extent to which they are part of a more general compliance
problem. The absence of broader compliance data also makes it
difficult to evaluate the importance of the EITC compliance problem relative to other tax compliance problems, and to efficiently
allocate IRS enforcement resources.

Greenstein and Shapiro (1998) of the Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities made five basic points in their evaluation of the EITC compliance problem. First, the error rate, though still high, is significantly
less than a decade ago. Second, most of the errors were due to confusion rather than intention. Third, the fact that the EITC is refundable
is not the source of its relatively high error rate. Fourth, some other
provisions of the tax code have higher error rates. Fifth, and most
importantly, new compliance measures that have been enacted in the
past few years should reduce the error rate in coming years. Consider
each point in turn.
Greenstein and Shapiro noted that the error rate in the 1980s was
about 35 percent according to IRS studies. But, the IRS study of tax
year 1994 released in April 1997 (IRS 1997) estimated that 20.7 percent of EITC benefits were paid in error (the over-claim rate was 25.8
percent), thereby indicating a significant decline in the error rate.
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Moreover, the true error rate was probably less than 20.7 for the
following reason. According to the study, nearly one-fifth of the errors
occurred when a parent claimed a child for EITC purposes but, according to the AGI tiebreaker rule, another relative in the household (such
as a grandparent) should have claimed the child instead. The loss to
the Treasury in these cases is the amount by which the EITC amount
paid to the parent exceeds the amount that should have been paid to
the grandparent. The IRS study, however, did not collect the data
needed to determine the amount the grandparent should have received
in such cases and improperly classified the entire amount paid to the
parent in these cases as being in error.
It seems likely that the errors were often unintentional. The IRS
study found relatively few EITC errors to have resulted from actions
by families to hide incomes. Instead, most EITC errors were related to
the living arrangements of families and the complex rules the tax code
establishes with regard to family relationships, tax filing status, and the
tax treatment of children in divorced, separated, and multi-generational
families and families where the caretaker is someone other than the
parent.
Greenstein and Shapiro stated that refundability is not the source
of the EITC’s relatively high error rate:
The study contains one other significant finding—it indicates
EITC errors are not due primarily to the EITC’s refundable nature.
The study found the error rate among working families that have
incomes too low to have a pre-EITC income tax liability (and
consequently receive their full EITC payment in the form of a
refund check) was only one-third as high as the error rate among
families that do have an income tax liability before the EITC is
applied. (p. 10)

Some other provisions of the tax code have higher error rates:
Data from the Internal Revenue Service and the General Accounting Office also show that a number of other provisions of the tax
code have higher error rates than the EITC does and lose larger
amounts of revenue. The errors in these other provisions, however, have not been the subject of much legislative scrutiny. (p. 2)

They also provided further details on the error rates of these other
provisions:
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The EITC error rate exceeds the average error rate for the income
tax as a whole, which is approximately 15 percent. Many elements of the income tax, however, have higher error rates than the
EITC does. For example, the Internal Revenue Service has reported that 29 percent to 30 percent of business income is not
reported on tax returns. The IRS also estimates that sole proprietors who formally operate businesses other than farms fail to report 31 percent to 32 percent of their business income. Similarly,
some 31 percent to 32 percent of farm income and 27 percent
to 28 percent of income from the sales of business property go
unreported.

Data from the GAO and the IRS indicate that EITC losses account
for less than 5 percent of the total losses in the individual and corporate
income tax. The focus on EITC errors seems disproportionate to its
share of the total losses due to errors.
Finally, they emphasized that compliance measures enacted after
1994 should reduce the EITC error rate. For example, filers have been
required to provide SSNs of all children, regardless of age, since 1997.
And, only since 1997 has the IRS been able to deny claims based on
doubt about the validity of SSNs and thereby shift the burden of proof
to the filer to show that the SSN is valid.
It is also only since 1997 that the IRS has used the Federal Child
Support Case Registry database, established by the Welfare Reform
Act of 1996. Once this database is fully developed, the IRS should be
able to use it to ascertain whether a parent is noncustodial and therefore
ineligible for the EITC credit. And, since 1998, a parent seeking a SSN
for a child must also provide the SSN of the child’s parents as well.
The 1997 budget act authorized funds for EITC compliance. The
compliance effort has the following elements. First, the IRS will stop
returns with missing or invalid SSNs. Second, more EITC returns will
be inspected. Third, the IRS has sent out warnings to filers who
claimed a child for the EITC when that same child was claimed by
another filer.
Finally, we turn to the most recent IRS examination of the EITC
error rate, the IRS Study released in September 2000 (U.S. Treasury
2000a) of EITC noncompliance in the tax year 1997. The study found
an over-claim rate of 30.6 percent, several points higher than the study
of the tax year 1994 (25.8 percent), and an overpayment rate of 25.6
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percent, also several points higher than the study of the tax year 1994
(20.7 percent). The study begins with this executive summary: ‘‘Of
the estimated $30.3 billion in EITC claims made by taxpayers who
filed returns in 1998 for Tax Year 1997, it is estimated that $7.8 billion
(25.6 percent) should not have been paid.’’
The main sources of the errors were the familiar ones: claiming a
child who was not a qualifying child, claiming a qualifying child who
was also the qualifying child of someone else with a higher AGI, and
filing as single or head of household when the correct filing status was
married-filing-separately. The study does not necessarily mean that
the pre-1997 efforts had no effect because it is quite possible that the
error rate would have been even higher without these efforts. Whatever
the effectiveness of the pre-1997 efforts, however, an EITC overpayment error rate of about 25 percent remains.
As the IRS report itself emphasizes, important new compliance
measures have been implemented since the 1997 tax year. Consequently, it is still too early to tell whether these new compliance measures will prove effective in cutting the error rate significantly.

NEW INITIATIVES TO REDUCE THE EITC ERROR RATE
The Treasury (U.S. Treasury 2000b) responded to the report in two
ways. First, it pointed out that measures have been implemented since
the 1997 tax year. Second, it proposed a set of new compliance initiatives.
Since 1997, the following four measures have begun to be implemented.
• The development of new data to detect errors. Beginning in
2001, the IRS will use a new data set that combines the Federal
Case Registry of Child Support Orders (which has information
on child custody arrangements), social security records, and tax
records.
• Establishment of new procedures to prevent erroneous refunds.
The IRS has expanded its use of ‘‘mathematical error’’ procedures so that it can deny certain types of questionable EITC
claims during processing, thereby avoiding the need for an
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audit; for example, the IRS now uses its mathematical error authority to deny EITC claims if their children do not meet the
credit’s age qualifications, they do not reside with their children,
they are under 25 or over 64, or they were denied the credit in a
previous year and did not follow recertification requirements
enacted in 1997.
• Paid preparer initiative. The IRS now tries to reach tax return
preparers who have recently prepared at least 100 EITC returns,
providing direct instruction from IRS agents and informing
them of their new due diligence responsibilities.
• Simplifying the tax return. Since 1999, the tax return now contains a clever simple step-by-step test of EITC eligibility, under
which the taxpayer is shown a picture of a stop sign whenever
she answers a question that rules out EITC eligibility.
The Treasury proposed new compliance initiatives in September
2000. These will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 8. Here we
simply list the eight Treasury proposals: 1) immediately notify taxpayers who appear to be nonqualifying parents, 2) improve compliance
among paid preparers, 3) expand the use of IRS authority to deny questionable claims, 4) enhance the use of the dependent database, 5) simplify the rule for married but separated taxpayers, 6) simplify the AGI
tiebreaker rule for parents in low income households, 7) simplify the
definition of earned income, and 8) simplify the definition of dependent
child.
As part of its comprehensive three-volume study on tax code simplification, the Joint Committee on Taxation (2001) recommended
adopting a uniform definition of ‘‘qualifying child’’ for determining
eligibility for the EITC, the dependency exemption, the CTC, the dependent care credit, and head of household filing status. It also urged
changing the EITC tie-breaker rule to make sure that a parent can claim
the child (even if a grandparent in the same residence has a higher
income).
Finally, the tax act of 2001 adopted several measures to reduce the
EITC error rate. It modified the tie-breaker rule and simplified the
definition of ‘‘qualifying child.’’ It authorized the IRS, beginning in
2004, to use math error authority to deny the EITC if the Federal Case
Registry of Child Support Orders indicates that the taxpayer is the
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noncustodial parent of the child. It replaced ‘‘modified’’ AGI with AGI
and excluded nontaxable employee compensation from the definition
of earned income (for EITC purposes).

CONCLUSIONS
Several IRS studies have detected an EITC ‘‘error rate’’ of about
25 percent—that is, roughly 25 percent of EITC payments did not comply with at least one of the technical requirements under a strict interpretation of EITC provisions concerning the definition of a qualifying
child, the rules for filing status, and the AGI tiebreaker rule for determining eligibility.
Based on the analyses reported in this chapter, we arrive at four
main conclusions concerning the EITC error rate. First, it seems likely
that the EITC error rate is due mainly to the confusion of recipients
concerning the complex provisions and rules of the EITC and that only
a small fraction of the error rate is the result of intentional fraud. Second, most recipients of technically ‘‘erroneous’’ EITC payments are
parents who work but earn modest income. Third, the EITC error
rate may be comparable to the error rate resulting from other complex
provisions of the personal and corporate income tax. Fourth, promising efforts are under way to reduce the error rate by simplifying some
of the complex and confusing EITC provisions. In Chapter 8 we will
recommend additional measures to reduce the EITC error rate.

8
Reforming the EITC
In this chapter, we propose a reform of the EITC that preserves its
successful features but addresses the major concerns that have been
identified throughout this book. Our reform is simple, focused, and
feasible. It aims at addressing three weaknesses of the 2001 EITC
program—work disincentives along the phase-out range, the marriage
penalty, and the still below-poverty line income of families with three
children. The reform consists of three elements: reducing the phaseout rate, providing a more generous schedule for married couples, and
providing an additional credit for a third child. Because the weaknesses are interrelated, these three changes can contribute to improving
all of the problems.
We analyze what would have happened if our reform had been
implemented in the year 2001. We provide estimates of the cost and
impact of our proposal using data from the PSID. The tax act of 2001
did not reform the EITC program for the year 2001 (although it did
change the child tax credit for 2001, and we have incorporated this
change into our analysis). The act did, however, adopt a more generous
schedule for married couples beginning in the year 2002. After quantifying what would have happened in 2001 had our reform been fully
implemented in that year, we compare our reform with other proposals
and then with the reform adopted in the 2001 tax act providing a more
generous schedule for married couples beginning in 2002. Finally, we
present recommendations to improve compliance.

A PROPOSED REFORM OF THE EITC
Problems in the 2001 EITC Program
On balance, it is clear that the EITC is a highly effective program
that meets its primary objectives well. Nevertheless, there are some
problems that have been identified and ought to be addressed; these
problems can, we will show, be addressed relatively easily.
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First, although the EITC provides positive work incentives for
many households, especially those on the phase-in range, it may discourage individuals in households that have reached the phase-out
range from working additional hours. Even more important, it may
decrease labor force participation altogether among secondary workers
in some of these households. The empirical evidence on this shows a
consistent negative impact of moderate size. We believe this warrants
reform that reduces the phase-out rate.
Second, and related to this, is concern about the efficiency cost
created by the EITC. Any income-transfer program, including the
EITC, causes some distortion in the behavior of taxpayers and recipients, resulting in an ‘‘efficiency cost’’ so that the recipients gain less
than the taxpayers lose. Although we think that the efficiency cost is
small in light of the labor supply literature, a reform that might reduce
even this small efficiency cost is, nevertheless, worthwhile.
Third, we believe that as a matter of fairness and as a matter of
economic opportunity, it is important to reduce the marginal tax rate
faced by low and moderate income households. Currently, in the range
where the EITC phase-out overlaps with the income tax, the combined
marginal tax rate is 31.06 percent (where the income tax rate is 10
percent) and 36.06 percent (where the income tax rate is 15 percent).
Even if there were no response of labor supply and no efficiency cost
from this marginal tax rate, we believe it is unfair to place these individuals in a situation where they do not gain more than $64 to $69
from earning another hundred dollars. It curtails their opportunity to
advance themselves by additional effort and earnings.
Fourth, because the 2001 EITC has the same schedule regardless
of marital status, the 2001 EITC imposes substantial financial penalties
on many marriages, and it may also discourage some unmarried persons from getting married (as a consequence of the tax act of 2001,
there is a more generous schedule for married couples beginning in
2002). Research clearly shows that these marriage penalties apply to
many families and that they are often large. There is relatively little
information about whether these penalties actually reduce marriage
rates although, to date, no study has found anything but small impacts.
But, once again, even if the reduction turns out to be small, we believe
it is unfair to impose such large marriage penalties.
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Fifth, despite the expansions of the EITC in the 1990s, the EITC
still does not assure that a family of four (two parents, two children)
with one full-time, year-round, low wage worker will reach the official
poverty threshold. We believe that ought to be a goal of the EITC.
Finally, the EITC does not currently provide any additional credit
for a third child. Because the EITC is restricted to working families, it
is our view that some additional EITC assistance for a third child is
warranted for such families.
It is important to understand that these problems are not independent. Solving one problem contributes to solving the others. The
relatively high phase-out rate that provides a work disincentive for
households on the phase-out range of the EITC is also responsible for
much of the efficiency cost of the program and, in addition, it indirectly
contributes to the marriage penalty and the continuing poverty status
of a family of four. A reduction in the phase-out rate will address all
of those problems. Similarly, an adjustment that reduces the marriage
penalty directly will also help lift a family of four out of poverty. An
additional credit for families with three or more children not only helps
reduce poverty among these families, but it also alleviates the marriage
penalty associated with marriage among single parents with children.
Thus, this interaction among the EITC problems that we have identified
enables us to address them through a reform that is relatively simple.
A Specific Proposal to Reform the EITC
We propose the following three changes in the EITC program:
• Reduce the current EITC phase-out rate for a family with two
or more children from 21.06 percent to 15.98 percent (the current phase-out rate for a family with one child), a reduction of
5.08 percentage points. This reduction raises the reward to additional work for persons on the phase-out range, reduces the efficiency cost and the marriage penalty, and helps lift larger
families above the poverty line by allowing them to retain a
larger proportion of their EITC while they are still below the
poverty income level. Because the EITC phases out more
slowly, the EITC maximum income increases and more families
receive an EITC benefit.
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• Establish a more generous EITC schedule for married couples.
We propose to do this by keeping the same phase-in rate but
giving married couples a larger phase-in income range than single heads of households. The use of different tax schedules for
married couples and heads of households is well established
under the federal personal income tax. We propose to increase
the income at which the phase-in range ends by $2,000 for a
married couple with children and by $1,000 for a married couple
with no children. This change further alleviates the marriage
penalty of the EITC and also helps lift larger families above the
poverty line. It also raises the EITC phase-out income so that
more families receive an EITC benefit. The tax act of 2001
adopted a more generous schedule for married couples beginning in 2002. We will compare our schedule with the one
adopted in the act later.
• Provide a more generous rate schedule for families with three or
more children. Specifically, we propose to increase the phase-in
rate for a family with three or more children from its current
value of 40 percent to 42 percent and raise the income at which
the phase-in range ends for these families. With this reform, the
phase-in rates increase with the number of children from 34
percent to 40 percent to 42 percent, so the increment for the
third child (2 percent), is one-third of the increment for the second child (6 percent). Symmetrically, the increase in the phasein range for the third child ($960) is one-third of the increase
for the second child ($2,880) so that the phase-in range for a
married couple with one child ends at $9,140; with two children,
at $12,020 ($2,880 more); and with three children, at $12,980
($960 more). This raises the EITC phase-out income so that
more families receive an EITC benefit.
These three changes—a reduction in the phase-out rate for larger
families, an increase in the credit for married couples, and a more
generous schedule for families with three or more children—are sufficient to address all of the major problem areas of the 2001 EITC. They
do not eliminate these problems, but they do make substantial progress
in that direction.
Table 8.1 presents the current 2001 EITC schedule in its top block
and the EITC as if our reform had been fully implemented in 2001 in

Table 8.1 Current and Proposed EITC Benefit Schedule, 2001

Family and marital status

Phase-in rate
(%)

Income at which
phase-in ends
($)

Maximum
credit ($)

Income at which
phase-out begins ($)

Phase-out
rate (%)

Income at which
phase-out ends ($)

Current EITC Schedule (2001)
No children

7.65

4,760

364

5,950

One child
Two or more children

7.65

10,710

34.0

7,140

2,428

13,090

15.98

28,281

40.0

10,020

4,008

13,090

21.06

32,121

Proposed EITC Schedule (2001)
7.65

4,760

364

5,950

7.65

10,710

Married

7.65

5,760

441

5,950

7.65

11,710

One child
Single

34.0

7,140

2,428

13,090

15.98

28,281

Married

34.0

9,140

3,108

13,090

15.98

32,537

Two children
Single

40.0

10,020

4,008

13,090

15.98

38,171

Married

40.0

12,020

4,808

13,090

15.98

43,178

42.0

10,980

4,612

13,090

15.98

41,949

42.0

12,980

5,452

13,090

15.98

47,205

Three or more children
Single
Married

NOTE: Entries in bold are changes from current schedule.

Reforming the EITC 157

No children
Single
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the bottom block. The bold entries in the bottom block indicate
changes from the corresponding numbers in the top block. It is evident
that our reform raises the EITC phase-out income for most families
and therefore increases the number of families that will receive an
EITC benefit. As discussed below, we estimate that our reform would
raise the cost of the EITC program by $13.9 billion in 2001 (from
$30.6 billion to $44.5 billion), or by 45 percent.
Our comparison of the current 2001 EITC program and our proposed reform is based on the numerical parameters of the EITC program and the tax system for the year 2001. Throughout this
comparison, we use the word ‘‘current’’ to refer to the 2001 EITC program. When we compare our reform with the current EITC, the comparison is for the year 2001.
Our proposed reforms for married-couple families are illustrated in
Figures 8.1A–D, which show EITC benefits by family income under
the 2001 EITC program and under our proposal (if it had been implemented in 2001). These figures show that, for each family size, our
Figure 8.1 Current and Proposed EITC Benefits for 2001
A. Married Couple, No Children
$500

$400

EITC

Proposed
$300

$200

2001
$100

$0
$0

$5,000

$10,000

Earnings

$15,000
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B. Married Couple, One Child
$4,000

$3,000

EITC

Proposed
$2,000
2001
$1,000

$0
$0

$10,000

$20,000

$30,000

$40,000

Earnings
reform provides a larger benefit for all families on the current EITC
flat and phase-out ranges and a new benefit for all families with an
income between the current EITC phase-out income and our new
higher EITC phase-out income. Thus, our reform raises the EITC benefit for all families with income above the current EITC phase-in range
but below our new EITC phase-out income (which exceeds the current
EITC phase-out income). It is important to emphasize the obvious
point that families between the old and the new, higher, phase-out income levels benefit from our reform, because we will see below that
our reform raises the marginal tax rate faced by these families, and this
fact may mislead some readers into thinking that our reform hurts these
families.
For families on the phase-in range, our reform provides the same
EITC benefit as the current EITC if the family has two children or less
but a larger benefit if the family has three or more children. As indicated in Table 8.1, our benefit is 42.0 percent of earnings for families
with three or more children instead of the current 40.0 percent Our
reform and the current EITC coincide over the current EITC phase-in
range for those with one, two, or no children. In the case of a married
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C. Married Couple, Two Children
$6,000
$5,000

EITC

$4,000
Proposed
$3,000

2001

$2,000
$1,000
$0
$0

$10,000

$20,000

$30,000

$40,000

$50,000

Earnings
couple with 3 or more children our benefit is intended to appear slightly
larger in the phase-in range.
We now present a set of figures to clarify how our reform affects a
married couple with two children. In Chapter 1, five figures (1.2–1.6)
were presented to illustrate the features of the current EITC for such a
family; here, we present five corresponding figures (8.2–8.6) to contrast our proposed EITC with the current EITC for a family of four.
This family of four with two children is affected by the first two components of our reform, the reduction in the phase-out rate and the more
generous schedule for married couples. The third component of our
reform, the more generous schedule for a family with three or more
children, obviously has no effect on a family with two children.
Figure 8.2 shows a simplified version of the proposed EITC and
the current EITC that makes it easier for nonspecialists to remember
the key magnitudes. Each schedule is simplified by using round numbers and percentages and by omitting the flat range connecting the
phase-in and phase-out ranges. The phase-in rate is 40 percent in both
schedules. The phase-in range is extended to $12,000 for the proposed
EITC (versus $10,000 for the current EITC), so the maximum EITC
benefit is $4,800 for the proposed EITC (versus $4,000 for the current
EITC). The phase-out rate is 16 percent for the proposed EITC (versus
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D. Married Couple, Three or More Children
$6,000
$5,000

EITC

$4,000

Proposed

$3,000

2001

$2,000
$1,000
$0
$0

$10,000

$20,000

$30,000

$40,000

$50,000

Earnings

Figure 8.2 Simplified Proposed and Current EITC Schedules, Family of
Four with Two Children
Credit
$4,800
$4,000

40%

20%

16%

$10,000 $12,000

$30,000

Earnings
Note: Simplified proposed schedule in bold.

$42,000
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20 percent for the current EITC), so the proposed EITC phases out at
$42,000 (versus $30,000 for the current EITC). It is clear from Figure
8.2 that our proposal improves the well-being of all families with two
children with incomes between $10,000 and $42,000 (for families with
earnings less than $10,000, our proposal provides the same benefit—40
percent of earnings). All families with income between $10,000 and
$42,000 receive a larger EITC payment under our proposal than under
the current EITC schedule.
Figure 8.3 shows the proposed EITC and the current EITC with
the exact numbers for 2001. The phase-in rate is 40 percent under both
schedules, but the phase-in ends at $12,020 for the proposed EITC
(versus $10,020 for the current EITC) so the maximum credit is $4,808
(versus $4,008 for the current EITC). The phase-out begins at $13,090
under both schedules, but the phase-out rate is 15.98 percent for the
proposed EITC (versus 21.06 for the current EITC). Because the maximum credit is $4,808, it takes $30,088 of additional income (because
$4,808/0.1598  $30,088) to completely phase out the credit. Thus,
when income reaches $43,178, the credit is zero ( $13,090  $30,088
 $43,178).
It is clear from Figure 8.3 that our proposal improves the wellbeing of all families with incomes between $10,020 and $43,178 (for
Figure 8.3 Proposed and Current EITC Schedules, Family of Four with
Two Children (2001)
Credit
0

$4,808
0

$4,008

40%

21.06%

$10,020
$13,090
$12,020

Note: Simplified proposed schedule in bold.

15.98%

$32,121

Earnings

$43,178
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families with earnings less than $10,020, our proposal provides the
same benefit—40 percent of earnings—as the current EITC schedule).
All families between $10,020 and $43,178 receive a larger EITC payment under our proposal than under the current EITC schedule. Consider, for example, families with incomes between $32,121 (the income
at which the credit phases out to $0 under the current EITC schedule)
and $43,178 (the income at which the credit phases out to $0 under our
proposed reform). These families are clearly better off: they receive
an EITC payment under our proposal but receive none under the current EITC schedule. It is important to emphasize that these particular
families gain from our reform because we will see below that our proposal raises the marginal tax rate these families face (by 15.98 percentage points), and this fact may mislead some readers into thinking that
these families are hurt by our reform.
For 2001, the current EITC and proposed EITC schedules are as
follows (where C is the credit, E is labor earnings, and Y is income
from both labor and capital), with bold type indicating a difference
from the corresponding number in the current EITC:
Current EITC (2001)
C0.40E
C$4,008
C$4,0080.2106(Y$13,090)
C0

if E ⱕ $10,020.
if $10,020 ⱕ E and Y ⱕ $13,090.
if $10,020 ⱕ E and $13,090 ⱕ Y ⱕ $32,121.
if Y ⱖ $32,121.

Proposed EITC (2001)
C0.40E
C$4,808
C$4,8080.1598(Y$13,090)
C0

if E ⱕ $12,020.
if $12,020 ⱕ E and Y ⱕ $13,090.
if $10,020 ⱕ E and $13,090 ⱕ Y ⱕ $43,178.
if Y ⱖ $43,178.

Figure 8.4 shows the marginal tax rates generated solely by our
proposed EITC and, for comparison, by the current EITC. In the
phase-in range, the EITC recipient faces a negative marginal tax rate
equal to 40 percent (or equivalently, a marginal subsidy rate of 40
percent), the same as the current EITC. In the phase-out range, the
marginal tax rate is 15.98 percent (versus 21.06 percent for the current
EITC). Thus, in the phase-out range up to the current EITC phase-out
income ($32,121), our proposed EITC reduces the marginal tax rate by
5.08 percentage points (21.06 – 15.98). However, from $32,121 to
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Figure 8.4 Proposed and Current EITC Marginal Tax Rates, Family of
Four with Two Children (2001)

Marginal Tax Rate

21.06

15.98%
0%

0%

$13,090
$10,020

$12,020

$32,121

$43,178

Earnings

−40%

Note: Simplified proposed schedule in bold.

$43,178, our proposed EITC imposes a higher marginal tax rate (15.98
versus 0 percent), even though these families are helped by our reform
because they receive an EITC for the first time.
What Our EITC Reform Accomplishes
Our EITC reform addresses each of the problem areas that we have
identified in the current EITC.
Labor Supply
The labor supply impacts of our reform are, in fact, complex and
depend on exactly where along the EITC schedule a household is currently located, whether we are examining the impact on hours of work
or on labor force participation, and whether we focus on primary or
secondary workers. Any reform, like ours, that changes both phase-in
and phase-out rates for some recipients may generate both income and/
or substitution effects that, in theory, yield an indeterminate effect.
We have relied on the key findings of the empirical literature on
the labor supply effects of the EITC (see Chapter 3) in designing this
reform. That literature suggests that labor force participation decisions
are far more responsive to changes in the EITC than are changes in
hours of work among current workers. This finding is consistent across
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studies and, indeed, is consistent with the non-EITC literature on labor
supply impacts. On that basis, we expect our reform to have the following effects on labor supply.
• The lower phase-out rate for larger families is likely to improve
work incentives for primary workers in families currently located along the EITC phase-out range. We expect a substantial
positive impact on the labor force participation of second earners in married-couple families. Since the reform also increases
the credit that most of these families will receive, it actually
generates conflicting income and substitution effects that leave
the labor supply impact in doubt. The empirical literature, however, strongly supports the hypothesis that labor supply effects
will be positive.
• Work incentives will also be improved for current nonworkers
in married-couple families who are currently on the phase-in or
stationary range. Under our reform, these workers will face
either a higher phase-in rate (families with three or more children) or a higher phase-in income level (all married couples).
In either case, the returns to work will be improved.
• Work incentives will be negative for workers in families who
are made newly eligible by the extension of the income at which
the EITC phases out. For married couples with two children,
these are households with incomes between $32,121 and
$43,178. Workers in households like these will face precisely
the combination of negative income and substitution effects of
a standard means-tested transfer program. They will have a
lower net wage (courtesy of the phase-out rate) and a higher
income at their current hours of work (courtesy of the credit
itself).
Efficiency Cost
Recall that in Chapter 6 on the efficiency cost of an EITC expansion, we noted the difference between the EITC expansion analyzed by
Browning (1995) and the EITC expansion analyzed by Triest (1994).
Browning’s expansion raised the phase-out rate whereas Triest’s kept
the phase-out rate constant. Our expansion reduces the phase-out rate.
For those currently on the EITC phase-out range, this reduction in the
phase-out rate tends to achieve a lower efficiency cost than do the
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changes introduced by Browning and Triest. On the other hand, our
expansion tends to raise the efficiency cost for those above the current
EITC phase-out range but who now are eligible for the EITC.
Fairness and Economic Opportunity
Even if there were no response of labor supply and no reduction in
the efficiency cost, our reform enables most low income workers to
gain more than they currently do whenever they earn an additional
$100. Thus, our reform promotes economic opportunity.
Marriage Penalty
Our reform also provides substantial relief to married-couple families who currently bear a large EITC marriage penalty. As discussed
more fully in Chapter 4, there are some situations of EITC marriage
bonuses, typically involving a childless low income wage earner who
marries a nonworker with children. There are far more situations of
EITC penalties, however, involving marriages between two wage earners; if both earners have children, the penalties can be exceptionally
large. The results from Table 4.1 are repeated here in Table 8.2 in the
column entitled ‘‘Current law.’’ As shown, there is a large bonus in the
first situation, a small bonus in the second, and penalties that range up
to $6,765 in the last four situations. The column entitled ‘‘Proposed’’
shows the EITC penalty or bonus these families would receive under
our proposed reform. The changes reflect the impact of all of the
proposed changes, including the lower phase-out rate, the more generous schedule for married couples, and the new schedule for families
with three or more children.
It is evident from the table that our proposal significantly reduces
the EITC marriage penalty. Although our reform does not eliminate
the penalty, it reduces it by $1,200 to $2,100 for families in rows 3–5.
This amounts to three-quarters of the penalty for the family in row 3
and about one-third for the other two families. Virtually all married
couples would benefit from our proposal, especially those with two or
more children. Note that the high income family in the last row would
get no marriage tax relief from our proposal.
Reducing Poverty in Larger Families
Consider a family with two children where one of the two parents
works 40 hours a week for 50 weeks a year at an hourly wage of $6.50,
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Table 8.2 EITC Marriage Bonus or Penalty Under the Current and
Proposed EITC Benefit Schedules
EITC Marriage bonus () or penalty
() ($)
Situation
Childless full-time minimum wage
worker marries nonworker with two
children

Current law
(2001)

Proposed

Net change

3,977

4,089

112

Worker with $5,000 earnings and one
child marries worker with $5,000
earnings and one child

600

600

0

Childless full-time minimum wage
worker marries full-time minimum
wage worker with two children

1,613

431

1,182

Full-time minimum wage worker with
two children marries full-time
minimum wage worker with two
children

5,590

3,764

1,826

Worker with two children earning EITC
maximum marries worker with two
children earning EITC maximum

6,765

4,756

2,009

Worker with two children earning
$20,000 marries worker earning
$50,000

2,553

2,553

0

NOTES: Minimum wage worker @ $5.15/hour  2,000 hours.
EITC earnings maximum in 2001  $13,090.

thereby earning $13,000.1 Under the current EITC schedule, this family
would fall on the plateau region of the EITC and thus receive the maximum earned income credit, $4,008, raising its income to $17,008. As
we explained in Chapter 2, the income from the EITC does not affect
this family’s official poverty status, because the official definition of
poverty is based on pre-tax income and the EITC is considered a tax
rebate. Even if we include the income from the EITC in the family’s
income (as the Census Bureau does for some alternative definitions of
poverty), however, this family would still be considered poor. In 2001,
official poverty threshold for a family of four was about $17,776,2 so
the family would be $768 under the poverty threshold.
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If, however, the end of the phase-in range is raised $2,000 to
$12,020 (with the same 40 percent phase-in rate), the family’s credit
would be $800 higher, for a total of $4,808. This would increase the
family’s income to $17,808, just exceeding the poverty threshold of
$17,776. This is exactly the adjustment that we already instituted when
we introduced a more generous schedule for married couples. Hence,
that adjustment has removed the family from poverty as well as reduced the marriage penalty.
Our reform substantially aids all low-income married couple families with children. For example, a married couple with one child and
one wage earner working at the federal minimum wage ($5.15 per hour
in 2001) for 2,000 hours would have an earned income of $10,300 and
would currently receive a credit of $2,428. The poverty threshold for
this family is $13,874, leaving it $1,146 short. In our proposal, this
family would benefit from a higher applicable phase-in range and
would receive a credit of $3,108, an increase of $680. This increase
nearly removes this family from poverty. If the worker can earn $5.40
per hour for 2,000 hours or work 2,100 hours at the minimum wage,
the EITC increase in our proposal will be enough to lift the family out
of poverty.
For families with three or more children, our reform offers a $1,444
increase in the maximum credit. Because the poverty standard for a
families of five is nearly $21,000, such a family with a single lowwage earner will still be well below the poverty level, even with the
larger EITC benefit. Even full-time work above the minimum wage at
$6.50 an hour plus the maximum EITC would still leave this family
$2,550 below the poverty line.
Simulating the Impact of the Proposed EITC
In Table 8.3, we show our estimates of the impact of our reform
proposal for the EITC in 2001. As before, our estimates are based on
nationally representative data on households from the PSID. That data
(analyzed in Chapter 2) is for 1996; here, we have simply rescaled it to
2001 dollars using the CPI. The EITC program in 2001 is identical in
real terms to the EITC in 1996; income thresholds for the three parts
of the EITC schedule have been adjusted for inflation, but the phase-in
and phase-out rates are identical. Thus, our estimates for the current
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Table 8.3 Estimated Impact of the Proposed EITC Reform
Current EITC (2001)
Percent of households eligible
Total creditsa
Average credit per EITC household

Proposed EITC (2001)

13.1%

16.0%

$30.6 billion

$44.5 billion

$1,496

$1,773

Total credits,a poor households

$13.9 billion

$16.2 billion

Total credits,a near-poor
householdsb

$9.8 billion

$13.9 billion

Average credit, poor households

$1,639

$1,901

Average credit, near-poor
householdsb

$1,860

$2,540

EITC households by income-needs
ratio
⬍1.0

41.3%

34.0%

1.0–1.5

25.8%

21.8%

1.5–2.0

21.0%

23.7%

⬎2.0

11.8%

20.5%

EITC dollars by household incomeneeds ratio
⬍1.0

a
b

45.3%

36.4%

1.0–1.5

32.1%

31.2%

1.5–2.0

15.4%

22.3%

⬎2.0

7.2%

10.1%

All total dollar figures are calibrated based on IRS estimates for 2001.
Near-poor households have total income between poverty line and 150 percent of
poverty line.

2001 EITC program are identical to the 1996 estimates we presented
in Chapter 2. When we compute the impact of our reform proposal,
we proceed just as we did in that chapter, by computing the EITC
benefits a household would be eligible for, given its earnings, income,
age, number of children, and family structure.
The estimates of the reform proposal we present are dependent on
several assumptions. First, we do not incorporate behavioral responses
either via labor supply or marriage. Existing estimates, which are
drawn primarily from natural experiment analyses, do not allow us to
estimate the impact of reforms other than the ones analyzed in the
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experiment. We have already indicated the general direction of likely
labor supply responses. Below, we quantify the changes in the marginal tax rates that EITC recipients would face as a result of the reform
and offer some general ideas about how our estimates might differ,
given plausible labor supply responses.
Second, we again assume that all eligible households receive EITC
benefits and that no ineligible households do. Given our data, there is
no other way to proceed. We deviate from this practice in one respect,
however, primarily for ease of interpretation. Whenever we cite figures
related to total program expenditures or for total credits accruing to a
particular group, we have used the official estimate for 2001 as a baseline (U.S. Committee on Ways and Means 2000) and calibrated estimates as a multiple of that. Our own estimates of expenditures are
somewhat lower than these because our estimate of the recipient population, which is limited to eligible households, is smaller than the IRS
estimate and our estimate of the average credit received by recipients
is also somewhat lower. Readers may well wish to interpret the costs
of the reform in relative, not absolute terms. We think our estimates
are certainly in the ballpark and are highly useful, especially on a comparative basis. At the same time, we do not wish to attribute an inappropriate level of precision to them.
Table 8.3 shows our estimates of the current EITC and the corresponding estimates for our proposal. As seen in the first row, our
proposed EITC reforms would increase the number of EITC recipients
from 13.1 percent to 16.0 percent of the population (about a 22 percent
increase). It would increase the total cost of the EITC program from
$30.6 billion to $44.5 billion, or $13.9 billion, an increase of 45 percent. The average credit for recipient families would increase from
$1,496 to nearly $1,773, an increase of 18.5 percent.
The impact of our reform on different income-needs groups is
complex. On the one hand, total spending on poor and near-poor families would increase substantially. Total EITC credits for poor families
would increase from $13.9 billion to $16.2 billion and the average
credit would increase from $1,639 to $1,901 (16 percent). Near-poor
families (no more than 50 percent above the poverty line) would gain
even more—$4.1 billion in total and $680 on average. At the same
time, the share of EITC recipients who are poor or near-poor falls as
does the share of EITC dollars going to these families. This is a conse-
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quence of the lower phase-out rates that are essential to reduce marriage penalties and improve work incentives along the phase-out range.
The lower phase-out rate enables families with somewhat higher incomes to receive benefits. Note, however, that while the representation
of households with an income-needs ratio (family income divided by
the official poverty standard) greater than two increases by almost 9
percentage points (from 11.8 percent to 20.5 percent), their share of
EITC benefits increases by less than 3 percentage points (7.2 percent
to 10.1 percent).
As Table 8.1 and Figures 8.1A–D make clear, any reform that involves higher credits and/or lower phase-out rates necessarily extends
the income range for eligibility, thereby drawing into the recipient pool
families with higher incomes. Additional analyses, not included in
Table 8.3, shed light on the new recipients and the marginal expenditures of our reform. We estimate that these new recipients will comprise 18 percent of the new EITC population. Because of the way we
have designed the reforms, more than half of these households have
two children and another 30 percent have three or more. About onethird have an income-needs ratio between 1.5 and 2.0 and another 55
percent have an income-needs ratio between 2 and 3. Nearly 90 percent
of those newly eligible are married.
The marginal expenditures are much more focused on the poor
and especially the near-poor. In all, the new recipient households—18
percent of the total recipient population—get only 8.2 percent of total
spending and about one-quarter of new spending. The rest of the additional spending is received by current recipients as higher credits.
Nearly half of the additional expenditures goes to poor and near-poor
households and only one-sixth goes to households with an incomeneeds ratio greater than 2.0. Ninety percent of new spending goes to
families with two or more children.
Marginal Tax Rates
Table 8.4 examines the changes in marginal tax rates that our reform will create. The numerical values of our proposed EITC (given
in Table 8.1) imply that an EITC-recipient household, depending on its
size and earnings, will experience one of eight possible changes in its
marginal tax rate due to our reform. The eight possible changes are
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Table 8.4 Changes in EITC Marginal Tax Rate Due to EITC Reform
Change in EITC marginal
tax rate (%)

Percent of EITC recipient
population

0
5.08
15.98
2.0
42
40
7.65
34

45.9
29.1
17.8
5.5
0.9
0.4
0.4
0.1

listed in the left column of Table 8.4. The corresponding entry in the
right column shows our estimate, using PSID data, of the percentage
of recipient households that will experience that particular change in
its marginal tax rate. By ‘‘recipient households’’ we mean all households that will receive an EITC benefit under our proposed EITC. One
possible ‘‘change,’’ shown in row 1, is 0 percent, or no change; we
estimate that 45.9 percent of recipient households will experience no
change. Other than no change, the two changes affecting the largest
number of recipients are shown in row 2 (affecting 29.1 percent of
recipients) and row 3 (affecting 17.8 percent). The other changes affect only a small percentage of recipients.
Row 2 shows that 29.1 percent of households experience a reduction of 5.08 percentage points in their marginal tax rate. These are
households on the current phase-out range with two or more children
who used to face a phase-out rate of 21.06 percent but who will now
face a phase-out rate of only 15.98 percent. This cut of 5.08 percentage
points in the marginal tax rate for nearly a third of EITC recipients is
an important accomplishment of our proposed reform.
Row 3 shows that the next largest group of recipients (17.8 percent) experiences an increase of 15.98 percentage points in their marginal tax rate. These are households with income too high to receive
any benefit under the current EITC but not too high to receive some
benefit under our proposed EITC. Under our reform, they are on the
phase-out range and face a 15.98 percent marginal tax rate. An increase in the marginal tax rate for some workers is an inevitable feature
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of any reform that increases benefits and/or decreases phase-out rates.
As we noted above, there may be negative labor supply consequences
of this, although the research literature suggests that impacts on hours
of work will be relatively small.
If there are labor supply responses, they will change a family’s
earned income and thus its credit. On the basis of the full pattern of
income and substitution effects and the existing empirical literature,
we can make some informed guesses about what is likely to happen
and how it will affect program costs. Labor supply will probably increase for workers in larger families currently on the phase-out range.
This increase will reduce the credit they receive because family earnings will increase. Labor supply will also probably increase for current
nonworkers in married-couple families who are currently on the phasein or stationary range because they will face either a higher phase-in
rate or a higher phase-in income level. For these workers, the increase
in labor supply will likely increase their credit. Finally, labor supply
may fall for the newly eligible workers who face higher marginal tax
rates as well as higher family income. That change will reduce family
income and thus increase the credit that they will be eligible to receive.
It is difficult to predict whether total EITC program costs will increase
or decrease as a result of these labor supply responses. Our best estimate is that costs might increase slightly relative to the static estimates
shown in Table 8.3.
Reform Variations
It is useful to isolate particular components of our EITC reform in
order to assess the contribution of each component. We do this by
beginning with the full reform and then removing a single component,
leaving the rest of our reform package in place. The changes we examine are summarized in Table 8.5. In row 1 of the table, we remove only
the reduction in the phase-out rate for families with two or more children. In row 2, we remove only the more generous schedule for married couples, retaining all other provisions. Finally, in row 3, we
remove only the additional credit for a third child. The exact details of
these variations on our reform are given in Appendix D.
Table 8.6 compares our full reform (column 1) with the three variations (columns 2–4). As the first row shows, the reduction in the
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EITC reform alternative

Phase-in rate

Income at which phasein range ends

Maximum credit

Phase-out rate

1) Full reform plan without
reduction in phase-out rate
for families with two or more
children

Same

Same

Same

Retain at current rate
of 21.06% for
families with two
or more children

2) Full reform plan without
separate married-couple
benefit schedule

Same

Retain at current level
(No increment for
married couples)

Reduced for
married couples

Same

3) Full reform plan without
third child benefit

Retain at current
level (no
increment for
third child)

Same

Reduced for
families with
three or more
children

Same
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Table 8.5 Comparison of Three Alternative EITC Reform Plans

Table 8.6 Estimated Impact of Full Proposed EITC Reform and Three Alternatives

Percent of households eligible
Total credits

a

Average credit per EITC
household

Full reform

Without reduction in
phase-out rate

Without separate
married-couple
schedule

Without third child
benefit

16.0%

14.4%

14.5%

15.7%

$44.5 billion

$38.1 billion

$37.6 billion

$41.7 billion

$1,773

$1,705

$1,657

$1,699

Total credits,a poor households

$16.2 billion

$15.8 billion

$15.1 billion

$15.4 billion

Total credits,a near-poor
householdsb

$13.9 billion

$12.5 billion

$11.9 billion

$13.0 billion

EITC households by incomeneeds ratio
⬍1.0

37.8%

37.3%

34.7%

21.8%

24.1%

23.4%

22.2%

1.5–2.0

23.7%

24.0%

24.4%

23.8%

⬎2.0

20.5%

14.0%

14.9%

19.3%

EITC dollars by household
income-needs ratio
⬍1.0

a
b

36.4%

41.5%

40.1%

36.8%

1.0–1.5

31.2%

32.8%

31.7%

31.4%

1.5–2.0

22.3%

18.3%

19.9%

21.9%

⬎2.0

10.1%

7.3%

8.3%

9.9%

All total dollar figures are calibrated based on IRS estimate for 2001.
Near-poor households have total income between poverty line and 150 percent of poverty line.
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34.0%

1.0–1.5
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phase-out rate and the separate married-couple schedule are each responsible for about half of the 3-percentage-point increase in the proportion of households who would be eligible for the EITC. The third
child benefit adds just 0.3 percentage point. Total expenditures follow
the same pattern, with the third child benefit responsible for just $2.8
billion (one-fifth of the total increase) and the other two reforms each
accounting for $6.5 billion.
The full reform provides more than $30 billion in total credits to
poor and near-poor households. The three alternatives range from $1.5
billion to $3 billion less. The separate married-couple schedule is particularly effective at channeling additional income to both poor and
near-poor households. Finally, the distribution of households and
EITC dollars by household income-needs ratio varies considerably
across the plans. With all three reforms in place, the EITC population
shifts toward slightly better-off households relative to the three alternatives. This is especially clear in the proportion of households with
income more than twice the poverty line; these households comprise
one-fifth of EITC recipients in our proposal and less than 15 percent in
two of the others. Again, we emphasize that this is a natural consequence of the higher benefits we propose for married couples in conjunction with the lower phase-out rate for larger families. But, as the
last row shows, the difference across alternatives in the share of dollars
to the better-off families is much more modest. The reduction in the
phase-out rate has the largest impact in increasing the share these families receive.

OUR PROPOSED EITC, THE CHILD TAX CREDIT, AND
THE INCOME TAX
Under our proposed EITC, a working family of four with two children receives an EITC if its income is less than $43,178. If the family’s
earnings are above $10,000, it also receives a child tax credit (CTC).
At the same time, if its earnings are above $19,200, it faces an income
tax rate of 10 percent until its income reaches $31,200, at which point
the tax rate jumps to 15 percent; this schedule determines its tax-before-credits (TBC), that is, its tax before deducting the two credits.
The household’s net payment to the government therefore equals TBC
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 CTC  EITC. If this amount is negative, it means the household
receives a net payment from the government equal to EITC  CTC 
TBC. Thus, the family’s net receipt from or payment to the government, and the combined marginal tax rate it faces, depends on the
interaction of the EITC, CTC, and TBC. In this section we analyze
this interaction.
Figure 8.5 shows our proposed EITC, the CTC, and the TBC for a
household with a husband, wife, and two children in 2001 and with no
other sources of income other than earned income. It also shows the
sum of the two credits EITC  CTC. The EITC schedule is the same
as in Figure 8.3.
The TBC is zero until $19,200 because of the standard deduction,
$7,600, and four personal exemptions ($2,900 each) totaling $11,600
($7,600  $11,600  $19,200). The tax act of 2001 set a tax rate of
10 percent on the first $12,000 of taxable income ($12,000 of income
above $19,200); when income reaches $31,200, the tax rate jumps to
15 percent.
The tax act of 2001 made the CTC refundable, so there are now
two important refundable tax credits implemented through the federal
personal income tax: the EITC and the CTC. The CTC equals 10
percent of the excess of earnings over $10,000, plus the amount needed
Figure 8.5 Proposed EITC, CTC, and TBC Schedules, Family of Four
with Two Children (2001)
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Figure 8.5: Proposed EITC, CTC, and TBC Schedules, Family of
Four with Two Children (2001)
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to cancel the TBC (CTC  0.10  [earnings  $10,000]  TBC),
up to a limit of $1,200 (2  $600 per child). As shown in Figure 8.5,
the CTC begins at earnings of $10,000 and phases in at a 10 percent
rate until earnings reach $19,200 (where the TBC schedule begins with
the new first-bracket rate of 10 percent) and the CTC reaches $920.
The phase-in rate then jumps to 20 percent (the additional 10 percent
is due to the 10 percent needed to cancel the new first-bracket tax rate
under the TBC) until income reaches $20,600 and the CTC reaches
$1,200 (because the CTC  0.10  [earnings  $10,000]  TBC 
0.10  [$20,600  $10,000]  0.10  [$20,600  $19,200] 
$1,060  $140  $1,200). Thereafter, the CTC remains constant at
$1,200 until the family’s income is very high, after which it phases out
(not shown in the figure).
The EITC  CTC schedule is also shown in Figure 8.5. From $0
to $10,000 (where the CTC begins), it coincides with the EITC schedule with a phase-in rate of 40 percent. Over the range from $10,000 to
$12,020, it has a phase-in rate of 50 percent (40  10). From $12,020
to $13,090 (where the EITC phase-out begins), its phase-in rate is 10
percent, due entirely to the CTC (because the EITC is constant over
this range). At $13,090, EITC  CTC is at its maximum value of
$5,117 (an EITC of $4,808 and a CTC of $309). From $13,090 to
$19,200, the EITC  CTC phase-down rate is 5.98 percent (15.98 
10); from $19,200 to $20,600, its phase-in rate is 4.02 percent (20 
15.98); from $20,600 to $43,178 (where the EITC phases out to zero),
its phase-out rate is 15.98 percent (15.98  0); at $43,178, EITC 
CTC reaches $1,200 and then remains constant (until a high income),
after which it phases out (not shown).
If EITC  CTC is greater than TBC, the household receives a net
payment from the government. This is the case until income reaches
$37,378.3 Thus, a household must earn more than $37,378 before its
TBC exceeds EITC  CTC.
Figure 8.6 shows the marginal tax rate facing the family as a consequence of the interaction of the EITC, CTC, and TBC. From $0 to
$10,000, the marginal tax rate equals 40 percent (due to the EITC
alone); from $10,000 to $12,020, 50 percent (due to the EITC and
CTC phase-in rates of 40 percent and 10 percent); from $12,020 to
$13,090, 10 percent (due to the CTC alone); from $13,090 to
$19,200, 5.98 percent (because the EITC phases out at 15.98 percent
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Figure 8.6 Marginal Tax Rates, Family of Four with Two Children
(2001)
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but the CTC phases in at 10 percent); from $19,200 to $20,600, 5.98
percent (the income tax rate is 10 percent and the EITC phase-out rate
is 15.98 percent, but the CTC phase-in rate is 20 percent, so 10 
15.98  20  5.98); from $20,600 to $31,200, 25.98 percent (the
income tax rate is 10 percent, the EITC phase-out rate is 15.98, and the
CTC is constant); from $31,200 to $43,178, 30.98 percent (the EITC
phase-out rate of 15.98 percent plus the income tax rate of 15 percent);
and above $43,178, 15 percent (due to the income tax alone).
In Figure 8.6, at $31,200 the marginal tax rate jumps 5 percentage
points, from 25.98 percent to 30.98 percent, because the income tax
rate jumps from 10 percent to 15 percent. The marginal tax rate remains 30.98 percent until the EITC phases out to zero at $43,178;
thereafter, the marginal tax rate drops to equal the income tax rate of
15 percent. We therefore make the following proposal:
Postpone the jump in the income tax rate until the EITC fully
phases out—that is, extend the first-bracket of the income tax to
the income at which the EITC phases out, provided the revenue
loss is made up by raising high-bracket income tax rates appropriately.

Instead of increasing the income tax rate from 10 percent to 15
percent at $31,200, as under the 2001 tax schedules, extend the first
bracket of the TBC schedule to $43,178. The first-bracket rate of 10
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percent, instead of applying to the first $12,000 of taxable income (taxable income equals income minus $19,200), would apply to the first
$23,978 of taxable income ($43,178  $19,200  $23,978). The
effect of this proposal is shown in Figures 8.7 and 8.8. In Figure 8.7,
the TBC line keeps its slope of 10 percent until $43,178 (instead of
jumping to 15 percent at $31,200, as it does in Figure 8.5). As a
result, EITC  CTC would be greater than TBC until income reaches
$38,567.4 In Figure 8.8, the marginal tax rate would remain 25.98 percent from $20,600 to $43,178 (instead of jumping to 30.98 at $31,200
and remaining at this value until $43,178).
The aim of our proposal is to reduce the marginal tax rate on, and
improve the well-being of, households between $31,200 and $43,178.
We oppose losing income tax revenue by cutting income taxes for
households above $43,178. To avoid such a revenue loss, higher
bracket rates must be simultaneously raised in order to maintain total
income tax revenue. An essential component of our proposal is the
raising of these higher bracket rates. Of course, this implies that those
in higher brackets will bear a higher tax burden and higher marginal tax
rates than they do currently. In our view, this loss is worth incurring to
improve the well-being of, and hold down the marginal tax rate on,
households between $31,200 and $43,178.
Figure 8.7 Proposed EITC, CTC, and Proposed TBC, Family of Four
with Two Children (2001)
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Figure 8.8 Proposed Marginal Tax Rate, Family of Four with Two
Children (2001)
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SHOULD THE EITC AND THE CHILD TAX CREDIT BE
COMBINED?
The CTC, originally enacted in 1997, became refundable with the
tax act of 2001. Does it make sense to have two refundable credits, the
EITC and the CTC, or would it be better to combine the two credits
into a single refundable credit? To answer this question, it is useful to
review the history of the CTC.
Prior to the tax act of 2001, the CTC allowed households to reduce
their taxes by $500 per child, but not below zero (except for families
with three or more children meeting certain complex criteria) so that
the CTC, in contrast to the EITC, did not result in a net payment from
the government to the household. Before the 2001 tax act, the TBC
schedule began with a 15 percent tax rate at $19,200, and because the
CTC was nonrefundable, it in effect phased in at the same 15 percent
rate beginning at $19,200, thereby exactly canceling the TBC until the
CTC reached $1,000, at which point it remained constant.
The 2001 act cut the income tax rate to 10 percent on the first
$12,000 of taxable income, raised the CTC to $600 per child in 2001
(over the next few years it will be raised to $1,000 per child), and made
it partially refundable: a household earning more than $10,000 can
claim a refundable child credit equal to 10 percent of its earnings above
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$10,000, plus the TBC, up to a limit of $1,200 (2  $600). For example, consider a family of four with two children, with $19,200 in earnings. Because it can claim a standard deduction of $7,600 and four
personal exemptions totaling $11,600, it has exactly zero taxable income, so its TBC is zero. But, under the 2001 act, it can claim a CTC
equal to 10 percent of $9,200 ($19,200  $10,000), or $920, so it
would receive a net payment from the government of $920 for the CTC
plus $2,721 for the EITC,5 or a total of $3,641. The CTC is called
‘‘partially refundable’’ because, if it were fully refundable, this household would receive a net payment of $1,200 ($600 per child) instead of
only $920.
As it stood at the beginning of 2001 prior to the tax act, the CTC
was projected to have a total cost in 2001 of $19.9 billion (U.S. Committee on Ways and Means 2000, p. 782), roughly two-thirds of the
estimated cost of the EITC ($30.7 billion). Of course, all EITC benefits
went to families with income below the end of the EITC phase-out
range ($32,121 for a family of four), whereas CTC benefits went to
most families but excluded low income families who did not reach the
income tax threshold ($19,200 for a family of four) and high income
families (the CTC phase-out began at $110,000 of income).
Given the conservative and Republican support during the 2000
election campaign for expanding the CTC, in early 2001 several advocates of assistance to low income working families decided to push for
making the CTC partially refundable, rather than pushing solely for
EITC expansion. For example, Sawhill and Thomas (2001), while also
advocating an EITC expansion, wrote:
CTC Expansion and Refundability. We adopt President Bush’s
proposal to double the Child Tax Credit by providing families
with $1,000— rather than $500— per child. We also make the
credit partially refundable for families who do not earn enough to
owe taxes, but whose annual earnings are at least high enough to
correspond with full-time, minimum-wage work. We take fulltime employment to be defined as working 30 hours a week, 50
weeks a year. At an hourly wage rate of $5.15, this works out to
be a little less than $8,000 annually. We therefore use a phase-in
threshold of $8,000. Beginning at this threshold, we phase in
benefits at a rate of 15% of earnings until they reach a maximum
of $1,000 per child. Thus, a two-child family earning $19,000 a
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year receives a credit of $1,650 [.15  ($19,000  $8,000)].
This particular structure was chosen because it encourages fulltime work, helps to offset the high marginal tax rates associated
with the loss of means-tested benefits in this income range, and
merges smoothly with the bottom rate of the income tax system.
(p. 5)

The tax act of 2001 followed their design but with modifications.
First, the phase-in threshold is $10,000 (instead of $8,000). Second,
the phase-in rate for 2001 is 10 percent (it will be raised to 15 percent
beginning in 2005). Third, the maximum credit for 2001 is $600 per
child, $1,200 for a family with two children (this maximum will be
raised in 2005 and will eventually reach $1,000 per child in 2010).
Fourth, the CTC equals 10 percent of income above $10,000, plus the
TBC (up to a limit of $1,200).
In early 2001, it was not obvious that it would be politically possible to make the CTC partially refundable. Nonrefundability was a
central reason many conservatives and Republicans supported enacting
the CTC in 1997 and expanding it in 2001.6 With an evenly divided
Senate, however, the final negotiations over the tax bill required conservatives and the Bush Administration to compromise in order to obtain the necessary support of moderates to pass their tax cut. And
several moderates (for example, Senator Snowe of Maine, a moderate
Republican) strongly supported making the CTC partially refundable.
Having recounted this history of the CTC, we now ask: should the
EITC and the CTC be combined? Our first point is that there is no
urgency because the EITC and the CTC interact reasonably. Look
back at Figures 1.5 and 1.6. In Figure 1.5, the EITC  CTC schedule
has a reasonable shape: the initial phase-in rate is 40 percent, then 10
percent (except for a tiny invisible range from $10,000 to $10,020
where it is 50 percent); the initial phase-out range is 11.06 percent,
then 21.06 percent (except for a short range, from $19,200 to $20,600
where it is 1.06 percent). In Figure 1.6, the marginal tax rate resulting
from the EITC, the CTC, and the TBC, is also reasonable.
Now look at Figures 8.7 and 8.8, which result from our proposed
EITC, our proposed extension of the 10 percent income tax range until
the EITC phases out to zero, and the current CTC. The range where
both are phasing in is no longer tiny so, from $10,000 to $12,020, the
combined phase-in rate is 50 percent. Admittedly, there is no good
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reason to jump the combined phase-in rate from 40 percent to 50 percent at $10,000, but it is not clear that the jump is harmful. Similarly,
there is no good reason for the change at $19,200, where a phase-out
rate of 5.98 percent suddenly becomes a phase-in rate of 4.02 percent
until income reaches $20,600. The change probably does little harm,
however. Thus, despite these aesthetic imperfections between $10,000
and $12,020, and between $19,200 and $20,600, the EITC  CTC
schedule is reasonable in Figure 8.7, and so is the marginal tax rate
schedule in Figure 8.8. Thus, there is no urgency for combining the
two credits: they are interacting reasonably.
Given the recent political history of the two credits, advocates of
assistance to low income working families (‘‘targeted assistance’’) may
prefer to have the two credits remain separate. Although conservatives
were primary originators of the EITC in the 1970s (as we saw in Chapter 1), and many conservatives today remain supportive, some have
become opponents of any further EITC expansion. By contrast, conservatives today are strong supporters of CTC expansion.
It has been argued that combining the CTC and the EITC would
reduce tax complexity, but there is some simplicity that derives from
the fact that middle and high income families know they should ignore
the EITC but pay attention to the CTC. Of course, for the sake of
households eligible for both, every effort should be made to harmonize
the definition of qualifying child.
Advocates of targeted assistance should always prefer an EITC
expansion to a CTC expansion because the EITC is much more efficient: the EITC spends all its revenue on families below its phase-out
income, whereas the CTC spends a large portion of its revenue on
families above the EITC phase-out income. But, if there is to be a CTC
expansion, advocates of targeted assistance should work politically to
maintain the partial refundability of the CTC that was achieved in the
2001 tax act so that low income families derive some benefit. For
example, under the 2001 tax act, the CTC is scheduled to gradually
increase from $600 per child to $1,000 per child. If this expansion
occurs, then partial refundability will secure some benefit for low income families.
We therefore focus on the efficient method of increasing assistance
to low income working families—an expansion of the EITC—taking
the CTC as separate and given, but supporting its partial refundability.
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SHOULD THE EITC, THE CTC, AND THE DEPENDENT
EXEMPTION BE COMBINED?
There are three important elements in the federal income tax that
affect the tax treatment of families with children: the dependent exemption, the CTC, and the EITC. The EITC targets its benefit to low
income working families, whereas the other two do not. The simplest
and most transparent way to assist low income working families is to
expand the EITC, and this is what we have proposed. There is an
alternative approach, however, that is less direct and less transparent:
integrate the EITC, CTC, and dependent exemption in a way that ends
up channeling more money to low income working families. In this
section we consider this alternative approach.
Cherry and Sawicky (2000, 2001) proposed a refundable ‘‘simplified family credit’’ (SFC) to replace the EITC, CTC, and dependent
exemption. Like the EITC, a household must have labor earnings to
receive the credit. The phase-in rate is 50 percent, and the phase-in
range, hence the maximum benefit, increases with the number of children. The threshold for the beginning of the phase-down range also
increases with the number of children. The phase-down rate is 5 percent. The credit phases down but not out. For example (using figures
for 1999), for a family with two children, the credit would reach a
maximum of $4,500 when the family’s earnings reach $9,000 (the
phase-in rate is 50 percent). The phase-down would begin at $15,000
and end at $53,000, when the credit would reach $2,600 (the phasedown rate is 5 percent); it would remain constant at $2,600 for further
increases in income. More generally, they phase down the credit until
the credit equals $1,300 times the number of children.
How does this proposal compare with ours? We maintain the current phase-in rates of 34 percent for a family with one child and 40
percent for a family with two children, but we propose raising the
phase-in rate to 42 percent for a family with three or more children.
They set a phase-in rate of 50 percent regardless of family size. Our
maximum benefit is similar to theirs for families up to three children,
but they raise the benefit with each additional child whereas we do not.
Our phase-out rate is 15.98 percent, and we completely phase out the
credit at $43,178 (in 2001) for a married couple with two children
(though there is a benefit from the dependent exemption). Their phase-
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down rate is only 5 percent and their phase-down ends (at an income
of $53,000 for a family with two children) when the credit reaches
$2,600.
The most striking feature of their plan is the low phase-down rate
of 5 percent, implying a marginal tax rate of only 5 percent. We could
do the same thing with the EITC alone, however. Without touching
the dependent exemption or CTC, we could phase-down the EITC at a
rate of 5 percent instead of 15.98 percent. Of course, then our EITC
would phase out at a much higher income, thereby providing benefits to
many middle and even moderately high income families. The obvious
problem with doing this is that it would enormously multiply the budgetary cost of the EITC. To raise the money to pay for credits to all
these additional families, tax rates must be raised substantially. Thus,
the good news for marginal tax rates would be the lower phase-down
rate; the bad news would be the higher tax rate needed to pay the much
higher budgetary cost.
To take a simple example, suppose tax rates are raised solely on
households with an income above the end of the new high phase-down
range. Then households on the phase-down range would have a lower
marginal tax rate, but all households above the end of the phase-down
range would have a higher marginal tax rate. Moreover, if more money
is being transferred to households below the end of the new high phasedown range, the additional money must obviously come from households above the end of the range. Although we are sympathetic to this
rearrangement of marginal tax rates and of income, we doubt that it is
politically feasible. In our judgment, our proposed EITC expansion,
which entails a 45 percent increase in the cost of the EITC program, is
sufficiently politically challenging.
Ellwood and Liebman (2001) considered several proposals involving the interaction of the EITC, CTC, and dependent exemption. They
explained their motivation as follows:
The combination of the highly targeted and refundable Earned
Income Tax Credit (EITC) and the non-refundable credits and exemptions creates a situation where the tax benefits from children
are much higher for low and high income parents than for middle
income parents. Middle income parents, who earn too much to
qualify for much EITC and too little to gain much benefit from
the other tax-linked benefits might be said to face a kind of ‘‘mid-
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dle-class parent penalty’’ relative to their poorer and richer counterparts. This middle class parent penalty not only raises issues
of fairness; it also generates marginal tax rates and marriage penalties for moderate income families that are as high or higher than
those facing more well to do taxpayers. (p. 2)

They considered several options for reducing the ‘‘middle class
parent penalty’’ by providing greater support for middle income families. They described their most ambitious option as follows:
The simplest and most complete way to end the middle class
parent penalty would be to eliminate the exemption and child tax
credit, and simply not allow the EITC to phase out at all until
family income reaches $110,000 and then phase it down to $1000
per child. (p. 29)

This option is very similar to Cherry and Sawicky’s Simplified
Family Credit (SFC), but phases down at a much higher income than
the SFC. Unfortunately, Ellwood and Liebman estimated the cost of
this plan to be $53.0 billion. By contrast, the cost of our proposed
EITC expansion is only $13.9 billion, so their proposal’s cost is nearly
four times greater than ours. Their plan would therefore require a
significant increase in marginal tax rates on high income households
and a substantial transfer of income from these households to the middle income families they want to help. As we said in our review of
Cherry and Sawicky’s plan, we are sympathetic to this rearranging of
marginal tax rates and income, but we doubt that it is politically feasible at this time. Finally, they offer a less ambitious plan for half the
cost ($27.5 billion), but still double the cost of our plan ($13.9 billion).
To summarize: there is no magic available. The more ambitious a
plan is in transferring income to low and moderate income working
families, the greater is its budgetary cost and, hence, the greater is its
increase in marginal tax rates on the affluent and the greater is the
redistribution of income from the affluent. We are sympathetic with
plans more ambitious than ours, but we believe ours is sufficiently
ambitious (involving a 45 percent increase in the cost of the EITC
program) to make a significant improvement. Because our proposed
reform does not involve terminating either the dependent exemption or
the CTC, and because it is not as ambitious about redistributing income, we believe it may have a better chance politically.
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COMPARISON WITH OTHER EITC REFORM PROPOSALS
Others have also proposed modifying the EITC parameters.
Choosing among modifications involves trade-offs so there is no unambiguously superior EITC parameter reform, including our own. Each
is more attractive in some respects and less attractive in others. To
illuminate the trade-offs, it will suffice to compare our proposal (presented in Table 8.1) to two others: 1) the Clinton Administration plan
(U.S. Treasury 2000c) and 2) the Sawhill/Thomas plan.
The Clinton Administration offered an EITC proposal for the year
2000 as part of its budget proposal (essentially the same proposal was
made during the 2000 presidential campaign by the Democratic candidates for president and vice president, Gore and Lieberman, in their
campaign blueprint, Prosperity for America’s Families, p. 104–105).
The Clinton plan has the same three objectives as ours: reducing the
phase-out rate, reducing the marriage penalty, and providing additional
assistance for a third child.
Here is the description of the proposal in the Clinton budget document:
For taxpayers with three or more children, the credit rate would
increase from 40 percent to 45 percent . . . For married couples,
the beginning point of the EITC phase-out range would be increased by $1,450 in 2000 and 2001 . . . All of these dollar
amounts would be indexed in subsequent years. The EITC phaseout rate would be reduced from 21.06 percent to 19.06 percent for
taxpayers with two or more children. (p. 12–13)

Let us consider their provisions in turn. Like ours, the Clinton
plan provides additional assistance for a third child. It raised the phasein rate from 40 to 45 percent, whereas we raise it only to 42 percent.
We also increase the phase-in range by $2,000, from $10,020 to
$12,020, while it does not increase the phase-in range. Thus, under
the Clinton proposal, the maximum credit for a family with three or
more children would increase (in 2001) from $4,008 (40 percent of
$10,020) to $4,509 (45 percent of $10,020), or by $501; under our
plan, the maximum credit for a family with three or more children
increases from $4,008 to $5,048 (42 percent of $12,020), or by $1,040.
The Clinton plan provides 5 percentage points of additional incentive
to work up to $10,020, ours only 2 percentage points, but ours keeps
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the 2 percentage points going until $12,020, whereas the Clinton plan
does not.
Like ours, the Clinton plan reduces the marriage penalty by making
the EITC more generous for married couples than for single persons.
It does this by raising the starting point for the phasing out the EITC
for married couples (by $1,450) but not for single persons. We do it
by raising the endpoint of the phase-in range for married couples (by
$2,000) but not for single persons. The Clinton plan reduces the marriage penalty on couples with earnings above the starting point of the
EITC phase-out range. Ours reduces the marriage penalty on couples
with earnings above the current endpoint of the EITC phase-in range.
The magnitude of the marriage penalty reductions differ depending on
the earnings of the couple.
Like ours, the Clinton plan reduces the phase-out rate. It reduces
it 2 percentage points. We reduce it 5.08 percentage points (from 21.06
percent to 15.98 percent). Since our phase-out rate is lower, ours implies larger EITC benefits for more people on a more extended EITC
phase-out range, and therefore a larger budgetary cost.
Next we turn to a proposal offered in early 2001 by two researchers
at the Brookings Institution, Isabel Sawhill and Adam Thomas. They
wrote:
EITC Plateau Extension. We make two changes to the
Earned Income Tax Credit benefits for families with children.
First, we begin phasing out EITC benefits $3,000 ‘‘later’’ than is
the case under current law. Thus, while benefits currently begin
to be phased out at an income level of $13,090 for families with
children, we do not begin the phase-out until a family reaches
$16,090 in income. Second, we raise these phase-out thresholds
by an additional $5,000 for two-parent families with children. (p.
5)

Like ours, their proposal clearly addresses one of our three objectives: reducing the marriage penalty. They do it by beginning the EITC
phase-out later for married couples than for single persons. We do it
by extending the phase-in range for married couples but not single
persons. Their plan reduces the marriage penalty only for couples
earning more than the phase-out threshold for a single person ($16,090
under their proposal). Ours reduces the marriage penalty for couples
earning more than the phase-in limit for single persons ($10,020).
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Unlike ours, their proposal does not reduce the phase-out rate. It
does, however, make the phase-out begin at a higher income so that
families above the old phase-out threshold and below the new threshold
enjoy a large reduction in their marginal tax rate. Thus, their plan
achieves a large reduction in the marginal tax rate below the new
phase-out threshold but no reduction above it, whereas ours achieves a
reduction in the marginal tax rate for all families with two or more
children above the old phase-out threshold. Unlike ours, their proposal
does not condition additional assistance on a third child; they postpone
the phase-out threshold by $3,000 for families with children regardless
of the number of children. Thus, their proposal assists families equally,
whereas ours adjusts assistance according to family size.
To summarize, our reform has much in common with other plans
that also propose modifying the EITC parameters in order to reduce
the marginal tax rate, reduce the marriage penalty, and provide more
assistance especially to larger families. There are a variety of ways to
adjust the EITC parameters to try to achieve these objectives, and each
set of adjustments does better in some respects and not as well in
others.

THE EITC REFORM ADOPTED IN THE 2001 TAX ACT
The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Act of 2001 included a modification of the EITC benefit formula for married couples, intended to
reduce the EITC marriage tax. When fully effective in 2008, the income at which the phase-out of EITC benefits begins will be increased
by $3,000, after which it will be adjusted for inflation each year.7 Figure 8.9 shows how this change, when fully phased in, compares both
to the EITC in 2001 and the reforms we have proposed for a marriedcouple family with two children. To put the 2008 change into 2001
dollars, we assume an annual inflation rate of 3 percent between now
and 2008. With that, the $3,000 income extension of the beginning of
the phase-out range in 2008 is equivalent to about a $2,500 extension
in 2001.
As the figure shows, the impact of this change is only on households with earnings greater than $13,090, the income at which the
phase-out range began in 2001. Since the phase-out rate of 21.06 per-
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Figure 8.9 Comparison of Current, Modified, and Proposed EITC,
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cent is unchanged, the benefit schedule line shifts out parallel, beginning at the new phase-out income of $15,590. Benefits are increased
by $526.50 (equal to the 21.06 percent phase-out rate  $2,500) at all
incomes between $15,590 and $32,121 (the income at which all EITC
benefits were lost under the old schedule). The change in the schedule
also provides smaller benefits to newly eligible households with income between $32,092 and $34,592 and to married couples with one
child.8 Married-couple households with total earnings that place them
on the current phase-in or stationary range of the EITC receive no
additional benefits under this provision.
The impact for the EITC of the married household schedule change
in the 2001 tax act is quite modest compared to what we propose.
Using the same procedures that we used in constructing Table 8.2, we
can simulate what the EITC program would look like had the 2008
married household schedule change been in place in 2001. We estimate
that the change would increase the proportion of eligible households
from the current 13.1 percent to 13.8 percent; our proposal increases it
to 16.0 percent. It would raise the average EITC by less than 4 percent
($55), compared with an increase of 18.5 percent ($277) in our proposal. Total annual EITC spending would rise by just $3 billion, com-
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pared with $14 billion in our proposal. Less than $0.5 billion of
additional credits would go to poor families and only $1.2 billion to
near-poor families. In our proposal, these families would gain a total
of $6.4 billion additional credits—four times as much.
In terms of the marriage penalty of the EITC, the 2001 tax act
provides much less relief than our proposal. As shown in Table 8.2,
our proposal offered marriage penalty relief for the illustrative cases of
from nearly $1,200 to over $2,000. The 2001 tax act provides relief
equal to $526.50 for all of these cases—roughly one-half to onequarter of the relief provided in our proposal. Across the full sample
of married-couple households currently eligible for the EITC, the 2001
tax act would provide an average EITC increase of $325, compared
with $950 in ours.
The reason the marriage penalty reduction is so much greater in
our proposal than in the tax act of 2001 is that, as we explained earlier,
all of the changes we propose affect the marriage penalty. Thus, the
reduction in the phase-out rate from 21.06 percent to 15.98 percent
makes a very important contribution to the reduction in the marriage
penalty. Additionally, our proposal is more generous because it extends the phase-in range for married couples, thereby increasing the
maximum credit that can be received, and it provides additional benefits to larger families. Our proposal helps additional married-couple
families—those on the 2001 stationary range with family earnings between $10,020 and $13,090 and also those with earnings above the
new end of the phase-out range.
We conclude that the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Act of 2001
makes a modest contribution to ameliorating the marriage penalty in
the EITC, but very substantial marriage penalties would remain and
much more could be done. We believe that the our proposal is still
valuable despite the reform adopted in the 2001 act.

IMPROVING EITC COMPLIANCE
The EITC has an ‘‘error rate’’ of roughly 25 percent—that is, about
25 percent of EITC payments do not conform to a strict interpretation
of its complex provisions for eligibility. As we stated in Chapter 7, the
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literature suggests that a substantial part of the EITC error rate is due
to the confusion of recipients concerning the complex provisions and
rules of the EITC. No evidence has been provided to demonstrate that
a substantial part of the error rate is due to intentional fraud. The
confusion, in turn, is caused by the complexity of the provisions concerning ‘‘qualifying child’’ and filing status. In this section we describe
recommendations that have been made by the U.S. Treasury for reducing this complexity in order to reduce the EITC error rate. We also
offer a suggestion that would clarify the EITC on the 1040 tax return.
Reducing the Error Rate
During the past decade, some essential steps were taken to improve
EITC compliance, such as requiring social security numbers for all
children and parents claiming the EITC. Since 1997, the last tax year
subject to an IRS study of EITC compliance (released in September
2000), a number of new promising compliance measures (described in
Chapter 7) have been introduced, but it is too early to tell how effective
they have been in reducing the error rate. For example, beginning in
1999, the tax return contains a simple step-by-step test of EITC eligibility, under which the taxpayer is shown a picture of a stop sign whenever she answers a question that rules out EITC eligibility.
It seems likely, however, that further measures need to be implemented that directly address two major sources of EITC error: the rules
concerning ‘‘qualifying child’’ and filing status. In September 2000,
the U.S. Treasury issued a new compliance proposal—a set of initiatives that would address these and other sources of EITC errors (U.S.
Treasury 2000b). We will discuss the Treasury proposal, and then note
which elements were adopted in the tax act of 2001.
Treasury Compliance Proposal
The Treasury compliance proposal contained both administrative
and legislative initiatives. We will first look at several of the new administrative initiatives. The first is to immediately notify taxpayers
who appear to be nonqualifying parents. This initiative is aimed at the
largest source of EITC errors: taxpayers claiming children who fail to
meet the EITC residency test. As we noted earlier, the IRS is develop-
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ing a new database containing information on custody agreements from
the Federal Case Registry of Child Support Orders and other administrative data. This database will be the most reliable source that the IRS
has to identify EITC claims with residency errors. Late in 2000, the
IRS sent notices to noncustodial parents who claimed the EITC on
their 1999 tax returns, explaining the EITC residency rule and alerting
taxpayers that they might not be eligible for the credit for tax year
2000. The notice advised taxpayers how to correct any errors on their
recent returns involving the EITC.
The second administrative initiative is to improve compliance
among paid tax preparers. Because paid preparers file about 60 percent
of all EITC returns, the IRS has begun implementing EITC education
and enforcement programs aimed at tax return preparers. In the fall of
1999, the IRS visited thousands of paid preparers who had prepared at
least 100 EITC returns during the previous filing season. In these
visits, IRS Revenue Agents provided instruction on EITC rules and
reminded preparers that they are required to exercise due diligence in
preparing EITC claims. In addition, fines were issued to preparers
who had not met their due diligence responsibilities. In 2000, the IRS
expanded the number of preparers it visited and also revisited a subset
of the previous year’s participants to see if they had improved the
quality of their preparation, and it imposed penalties where warranted.
The third administrative initiative is to expand the use of IRS authority to deny questionable claims. In 1998, Congress provided the
IRS with expanded authority to deny certain questionable EITC claims
during the initial processing of returns without the need for an audit.
Since 1998, the IRS has expanded its use of this process to automatically deny questionable claims. In 2000, the IRS attempted to deny
the EITC unless both the taxpayer and the spouse provided valid social
security numbers.
As we stated previously, the Treasury compliance proposal also
contains several new legislative initiatives. The first is to enhance the
use of the IRS’s new dependent database (noted above). The legislation would permit the IRS to use mathematical error authority to deny
EITC claims if the Federal Case Registry indicates that the taxpayer is
the noncustodial parent of the child claimed on the tax return. This
authority would permit the IRS to deny the claims during the initial
processing of the returns, before refunds are paid out, and without the
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need for an audit. Taxpayers could still obtain the EITC by responding
to the mathematical error notice and providing evidence of their eligibility for the credit.
The second legislative initiative is to simplify the EITC rules for
married taxpayers who no longer reside with their spouses. Under
current law, a married taxpayer must generally file jointly with his or
her spouse in order to receive the EITC. If a married taxpayer does
not file jointly with his or her spouse, the taxpayer may receive the
EITC only if the taxpayer lived apart from the spouse for the last half
of the year and the taxpayer paid over half the costs of maintaining the
home in which they and their dependent children resided. The household maintenance and dependency support tests prevent many low income separated taxpayers from qualifying for the EITC because they
are often receiving help from family members or receiving state benefits through TANF. However, many individuals do not appear to understand the subtleties of these requirements or may not have been able to
afford an attorney and obtain a legal separation from their estranged
spouse, resulting in unintentional errors. Under the Treasury initiative,
married taxpayers who file separate returns would be allowed to claim
the EITC if they lived with their son, daughter, or stepchild for over
six months during the year, and they lived apart from their spouse
for the last six months of the year. The household maintenance and
dependency support tests would not apply in determining eligibility for
the EITC.
The third legislative initiative is to simplify the AGI tiebreaker rule
for parents in low income households. Because many taxpayers live
with their children in extended families, there is confusion about which
adult in a household is supposed to claim the EITC. Under current
law, if more than one person can claim the same child for the EITC,
only the person with the highest modified AGI is allowed to claim the
credit. The Treasury proposes that a parent be allowed to claim his or
her child for EITC purposes even if they live with someone with higher
income, as long as three conditions are met: 1) the taxpayer with the
lower income is the parent of the child, 2) no other taxpayer claims the
qualifying child for the EITC, and 3) the higher income taxpayer does
not have income in excess of the maximum cut-off for the EITC for
families with two or more children ($31,152 in tax year 2000). The
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IRS Taxpayer Advocate and the American Bar Association have called
for similar reforms of the AGI tiebreaker test.
Finally, the Treasury proposed two further simplifications. Under
the first, the definition of ‘‘earned income’’ would be made the same
for EITC purposes as for the rest of the individual income tax. Hence,
nontaxable earned income (largely 401(k) plan contributions) would
no longer be included in earned income when computing the EITC.
Under the second, the definition of ‘‘dependent child’’ used for personal exemptions and child tax credits would conform more closely to
the definition of child used for EITC purposes. A simple residency
test, like the one currently used for EITC purposes, would replace the
more complicated support test used to determine if a child is a dependent of the taxpayer.
Tax Act of 2001
The tax act of 2001 adopted several measures to reduce the EITC
error rate. It modified the tie-breaker rule and simplified the definition
of ‘‘qualifying child.’’ It authorized the IRS, beginning in 2004, to use
math error authority to deny the EITC if the Federal Case Registry of
Child Support Orders indicates that the taxpayer is the noncustodial
parent of the child. It replaced ‘‘modified’’ AGI with AGI, and excluded nontaxable employee compensation from the definition of
earned income (for EITC purposes).
Clarifying the EITC on the 1040 and 1040A Tax Returns
Surprisingly, the EITC is included not in the tax credits section on
the 1040 return but in a later section entitled ‘‘payments,’’ where the
taxpayer is instructed to add the EITC to federal income tax withheld
and estimated payments. The EITC line directly follows the lines for
tax withheld and estimated payments, seeming to imply that it is another payment from the taxpayer to the government. This instruction
does lead to the correct answer about the proper check to be written by
the household or the government, but including it in the ‘‘payments’’
section may confuse many taxpayers about the nature and purpose of
the EITC.
The reason for this confusing treatment is that the EITC is a refundable tax credit. Thus, in the section for regular (nonrefundable)
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credits, it is necessary to ask the taxpayer to check whether total credits
exceed tax liability before credits; if so, the taxpayer is not entitled to
a check from the government for the difference, but is instructed to
enter 0. With the refundable EITC, however, the taxpayer is entitled
to a check for the difference, so it must be handled differently. The
CTC, made refundable by the 2001 tax act, is also placed in the payments section.
We recommend that the Payments section be divided into two adjacent sections, the first entitled Refundable Credits and the second, Payments. The EITC and the CTC would be in the Refundable Credits
section, and all payments from the taxpayer (or employer) to the government (withheld tax, estimated payments, etc.) would be in the Payments section. In the future, if any nonrefundable credit is made
refundable, it can be relocated to the Refundable Credits section. The
use of the section heading Refundable Credit would inform taxpayers
that the EITC is indeed a credit, not a payment, but a credit that is
somehow different from regular (nonrefundable) credits. By promoting citizen awareness that there are two kinds of tax credits—
nonrefundable and refundable—it may stimulate discussion of whether
particular credits should be left nonrefundable or be made refundable.
On the simpler 1040A return, the EITC and payments (such as tax
withheld) are grouped in a section entitled ‘‘Tax, Credits, and Payments,’’ so the taxpayer does not automatically assume the EITC is a
‘‘payment.’’ But, instead of following the regular tax credits, the EITC
follows tax withheld and estimated payments, seeming to imply it is a
payment rather than the credit. We recommend that the EITC (and the
CTC) be relocated immediately following the regular tax credits, and
before the payments, so that it is more likely that taxpayers will assume
the EITC is a credit, not a payment.

SUMMARY
The EITC program operates very effectively and with substantial
popular support. It achieves the important goal of providing substantial income assistance to low and moderate income working households, and it does so with relatively few negative effects. Nevertheless,
our review identified some problems with the 2001 EITC—problems
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that are strongly interrelated. The changes we have proposed—
reducing the phase-out rate, instituting a more generous benefit schedule for married couples, and increasing the benefit for families with
three or more children—would make a substantial impact in mitigating
these problems and do so at modest cost. Our proposed changes would
reduce negative work incentives, reduce the efficiency cost of the
EITC, improve fairness and economic opportunity, reduce the marriage
penalty, and reduce poverty among larger working families. Our proposal is similar to several other recent proposals to modify EITC parameters and to the new schedule for married couples adopted in the
tax act of 2001. Although recent proposals to integrate the EITC with
the CTC and the dependent exemption are interesting and deserve serious consideration, we choose to offer recommendations that can be
implemented through the EITC itself. The EITC change in the tax bill
of 2001 provides modest marriage penalty relief for married-couple
families, but it does not go nearly as far in that direction as the proposal
we make.
Based on our review of several compliance studies, we conclude
that the compliance problem is primarily the result of confusion resulting from the complexity of rules concerning ‘‘qualifying child’’ and
filing status. We recommend most of the initiatives recently proposed
by the U.S. Treasury (2000b) and other analysts for reducing this complexity, some of which were adopted in the tax act of 2001. Finally,
for clarity, we recommend a change in the position of the EITC on the
1040 and 1040A tax returns so that it is clear to the taxpayer that the
EITC is a refundable tax credit, rather than a ‘‘payment.’’

Notes
1. As of December 2001, the federal minimum wage was $5.15. In 2000, Congress
considered, but did not pass, a proposal to raise it to $6.15.
2. In 1998 the poverty threshold for a family of four was $16,660 (U.S. Committee
on Ways and Means 2000, p.1301). For 2001 we project a threshold 6.7 percent
higher, or $17,776.
3. Let E* be the income at which the household’s net payment under the income tax
is zero. We find E* as follows. At Y  31,200, TBC  0.1(31,200  19,200)
 1,200; also, CTC  1,200. But, EITC ⬎ 0 because it phases out to zero at
43,178. Thus, E* must be greater than 31,200, so at E*, TBC  1,200 
0.15(E  31,200). EITC  4,808  0.1598(E  13,090). TBC equals CTC
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4.

5.
6.

7.
8.

 EITC where 1,200  0.15(E  31,200)  1,200  4,808  0.1598(E 
13,090). Solving for E yields E*  37,378.
Let E* be the income at which the household’s net payment under the income tax
is zero. We find E* as follows. E* is greater than 31,200, so at E*, TBC 
0.1(E  19,200). EITC  4,808  0.1598(E  13,090). TBC equals CTC 
EITC where 0.1(E  19,200)  1,200  4,808  0.1598(E  13,090). Solving for E yields E*  38,567.
EITC  4008  0.2106(19,200  13,090)  2,721.
Technically, the CTC was already refundable in the case of certain families with
three or more children meeting complex criteria, but in 2001, net payments to
such families were only $0.8 billion out of the $19.9 billion total cost of the
CTC.
The beginning and end of the phase-out range are increased by $1,000 for years
2002–2004 and $2,000 for years 2005–2007.
For married couple households with one child, EITC benefits increase by $399.50
 0.1598  $2,500.

9
The EITC in the
Twenty-first Century
In the first decade of the twenty-first century, it is almost impossible to imagine U.S. income-transfer policy without the EITC. Prior to
the inception of the EITC in 1975, assistance for poor families was
provided primarily through AFDC, food stamps, and Medicaid. Cash
assistance for poor working families was literally non-existent. AFDC
was already unpopular, and its negative labor supply incentives were
already well-known among economists. Proposals to reform AFDC
had been around for a decade. The most promising of these, the negative income tax, had even been field-tested in a series of famous experiments, but no genuine reform of AFDC would be forthcoming for
nearly two decades.
In a remarkable sequence of events, the EITC, established with a
very modest purpose and an equally limited budget, became a program
that fit perfectly into the changing economic and political landscape of
the 1990s and the 2000s. The designers of the EITC could hardly have
guessed that the EITC would be expanded by both Republican and
Democratic presidents, that the number of families benefitting from
the program would have tripled in size within 25 years, or that EITC
expenditures would have risen in real terms by almost 800 percent. It
is unlikely that they expected the EITC to become such a politically
popular program, with support across the broad ideological spectrum
of American politics. They certainly couldn’t have foreseen that the
EITC would, by the end of the 1990s, become the largest cash transfer
program for poor and near-poor workers and their families.
Nor could they have foreseen how central the EITC would become
to the labor market realities of the 1990s and 2000s. When labor markets for less-skilled workers deteriorated substantially and earnings inequality rose in the 1980s and 1990s, the EITC was available to boost
incomes of poor working families. When President Clinton sought in
1993 to make good on his pledge to ‘‘make work pay,’’ he did not need
to design a new program from scratch because the EITC could do
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precisely that, once it was suitably expanded. When President Clinton’s pledge to ‘‘end welfare as we know it’’ resulted in a dismantling
of entitlements for poor families and when many former AFDC recipients were pushed into self-support, the EITC was available to supplement the low earnings their often meager labor market skills could
command. The early years of welfare reform would almost certainly
have been far worse for women and children in the absence of the
EITC. Its policy ascendance relative to the minimum wage is now
well-established: whatever the minimum wage can do, the EITC can
do more efficiently, with fewer negative consequences, and with better
target efficiency.
The EITC is now a program that we clearly need and that we could
ill do without. It has become a vital part, if not the central feature, of
the safety net as it is now understood in the 2000s.
As we have documented amply in this book, we now know a great
deal about the EITC and about the direct and indirect economic impacts it has on workers and families. There are many accomplishments
and some issues that could be addressed. Every income-transfer program, including the EITC, alters individual incomes and wages and
thus creates incentives and disincentives for work, marriage, fertility,
and other behaviors. A decade’s worth of high-quality research has
consistently shown that the EITC has some positive effects on the labor
force participation of the worst-off EITC workers—a first for any U.S.
transfer program—and some negative effects on the labor force participation of the best-off EITC workers. There are some concerns about
efficiency cost. Marriage penalties do exist on balance. Compared to
AFDC, however, these negative impacts are orders of magnitude
smaller. The EITC is truly an example of a well-designed, highly
flexible government transfer program, one that has accomplished what
used to be considered impossible—transfer income with relatively few
economic distortions.
As we look forward to the next decade of the EITC, what do we
see? We certainly expect the basic structure of the EITC with its characteristic phase-in, stationary, and phase-out regions to remain intact.
Substantial future expansion of the program is unlikely in our view.
Phase-in rates of 34 and 40 percent, the rates prevailing in 2001, are
probably as high as they can be feasibly set without either imposing
higher phase-out rates—which we would strongly oppose—or extend-
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ing the recipient population much higher into the family income distribution with the higher costs that entails. Even our own proposal,
offered in Chapter 8, makes only a modest increase in the phase-in rate
to 42 percent for families with three or more children.
We do think it is well-worth making marginal adjustments to the
program along the lines we proposed in Chapter 8—reducing the
phase-out rate and establishing separate, slightly more generous benefit
schedules for married couples and for families with three or more children. Of these changes, lowering the phase-out rate for families with
two or more children, would accomplish the most, because it simultaneously mitigates negative labor supply incentives and reduces the
marriage penalty. The EITC marriage relief in the tax act of 2001 is
much less effective than what we propose. It is also worth addressing
EITC tax simplification, especially the definition of a ‘‘qualifying
child.’’ Support for the EITC would be broader if compliance problems
could be reduced.
Nothing we can foresee suggests that transfer policy or labor markets will change in ways that will make the EITC less important. The
old world of AFDC, with unlimited lifetime receipt, is gone forever;
TANF, with its lifetime receipt limits and work requirements, is here to
stay. In the 2000s, many women with few labor market skills will
undoubtedly be entering the labor market, probably in an economy less
booming than the 1990s. Also here to stay, it appears, is the poorer
labor market position of less-skilled, less-educated workers. Most
economists believe that these labor market changes reflect underlying
changes in labor demand driven by changes in technology, especially
computerization. That trend is very unlikely to change in ways that
would benefit less-skilled workers. Globalization of the economy is
another contributing factor, and that, too, is unlikely to be reversed.
Policies to promote human capital investment will be important, but
there certainly will remain workers whose skills leave them without
the ability to earn middle-class incomes.
In our view, continued, generous assistance to these workers is
fully appropriate. It is very much in the American tradition of helping
the ‘‘deserving poor,’’ here expanded to include families above the
poverty line but well below middle class. And, in that effort, the EITC
will remain the policy instrument of choice for the foreseeable future.

Appendix A
The Algebra of the Earned Income Tax Credit
The EITC phases in according to labor earnings E but phases out according to income Y (from both labor and capital). If investment income exceeds
a threshold, then the household is ineligible for the EITC. The EITC schedule
is described by the following parameters:
Em ⳱ earnings at which the phase-in range ends and the credit reaches
its maximum,
Cm ⳱ the maximum credit,
Yb ⳱ income at which the phase out begins,
Ye ⳱ income at which the phase out ends as the credit reaches zero (the
EITC phase-out income),
pi ⳱ the phase-in rate,
po ⳱ the phase-out rate,
I ⳱ investment income,
I* ⳱ investment income threshold.
Provided I ⱕ I*, the credit C for a household with labor earnings E and total
income Y is given by:
C ⳱ piE if E ⱕ Em,
C ⳱ Cm if Em ⱕ E and Y ⱕ Yb,
C ⳱ Cm ⳮ po (Y ⳮ Yb) if Em ⱕ E and Yo ⱕ Y ⱕ Ye,
C ⳱ 0 if Y ⱖ Ye.
To obtain Ye set C ⳱ Cm ⳮ po (Y ⳮ Yb) ⳱ 0 and solve for Y to obtain:
Ye ⳱ (Cm/po) Ⳮ Yb ⳱ (piEm/po) Ⳮ Yb.
But if I ⬎ I*, then C ⳱ 0.
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Appendix B
The Effect of the EITC on Labor Supply:
An Indifference Curve and Budget
Constraint Approach
In this appendix, we present the effect of the EITC on labor supply using
the standard indifference curve/budget constraint apparatus. We assume familiarity with standard labor supply analysis, emphasizing the way the EITC
alters the budget constraint and how it affects labor supply choices. There are
three cases to consider for hours of work, one for each range of the EITC, and
four more for labor force participation.
We begin with the analysis of hours of work. It is best to regard these
analyses as a model of the labor supply decision of a primary worker, that
is, one who faces the entire EITC schedule. When we consider labor force
participation issues, we focus primarily on the decision of a secondary worker.
Figure B.1 shows the case of a worker in a household with earned income
sufficiently low in the absence of the EITC that it is operating on the phasein range of the EITC. The budget line without the EITC is the lower line with
a constant slope. With the EITC, the budget line is the upper kinked one,
with slopes w ⳯ (1 Ⳮ c) in the phase-in range, w in the stationary range, and
w ⳯ (1 ⳮ p) in the phase-out range; w is the wage rate, c is the phase-in rate,
and p is the phase-out rate. The vertical distance between the two budget lines
shows the amount of the EITC cash grant. The two horizontal dotted lines
identify the two income levels that define the three EITC ranges. The indifference curves have their conventional shape; they identify combinations of income and leisure that provide equal utility.
Equilibrium in the absence of the EITC is at A, with hours of work HA.
The EITC budget line generates a substitution effect because the net wage is
now higher and an income effect because total income at the current labor
supply is increased by the amount of the credit. The substitution effect is shown
by the movement along the original indifference curve from A to A⬘; the dotted
budget line, which is used to identify A⬘, is the income-compensated budget
line, containing just enough income to reach the original indifference curve
at the new wage. The substitution effect increases hours of work. There is
also an income effect, equal to the vertical distance between the incomecompensated budget line and the new budget line. The income effect causes
desired hours of work to fall, shown here as the movement from A⬘ to B.
The net effect on desired hours of work is uncertain because the income
and substitution effects conflict. As shown in the figure, the income effect is
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Figure B.1 The Effect of the EITC on Hours of Work—A Household on
the Phase-in Range
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smaller than the substitution effect, so hours of work increase from HA to HB,
but the opposite result is also possible. It is likely that the substitution effect
will outweigh the income effect when A is located far down the budget line
(i.e., representing very low earnings). In that case, the credit at A is smaller
and thus the negative income effect is also smaller.
Figure B.2 shows the case for a primary worker whose current hours of
work places him/her on the stationary range of the EITC. The original equilibrium point is A with hours of work HA. Since the credit is constant along
this range, the EITC operates as a pure income effect with no change in the
net wage. Desired hours of work fall to point B with hours HB.
Finally, Figure B.3 shows the situation for a worker whose current hours
of work places him or her on the phase-out range of the EITC. Along the
phase-out range, the EITC has the standard negative effects of a means-tested
transfer program. The original equilibrium point is point A with hours of
work HA. The credit both lowers the individual’s net wage to w ⳯ (1 ⳮp)
and raises the household’s income by the amount of the credit. There is both
a substitution effect and an income effect, and both operate to reduce desired
hours of work. The substitution effect is shown as the movement from point
A (on the no-EITC budget line) to point A⬘ on the dotted, income-compensated
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Figure B.2 The Effect of the EITC on Hours of Work—A Household on
the Stationary Range of the EITC
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budget line. The income effect is the movement across indifference curves
from A⬘ to B on the new budget line. Desired hours of work fall to point B
with hours HB.
The effects of the EITC on labor force participation are shown in Figures
B.4 to B.7. Figure B.4 is probably the most common and important case. It
shows the case of a nonworking person in a household with no earned income.
A typical case might be a household receiving AFDC or TANF. The original
budget line includes nonlabor income shown by the upward shift of the budget
line, so that income at zero hours of work is equal to some positive amount.
The original equilibrium is the corner solution at A, with zero hours of work.
In the situation shown here, the nonlabor income is lost and replaced by the
familiar EITC budget line. There is no income effect in this case, because the
household is made no richer by the EITC at its original equilibrium point.
The substitution effect here is strong enough to induce participation in the
labor market, and hours of work increase to point B with work hours HB.
In Figure B.5, we show the situation for a nonworker in a household with
earnings from another individual that leaves the household on the phase-in
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Figure B.3 The Effect of the EITC on Hours of Work—A Household on
the Phase-out Range of the EITC
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Figure B.4 The Effect of the EITC on Labor Force Participation—A
Household with No Earners
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Figure B.5 The Effect of the EITC on Labor Force Participation—A
Household on the Phase-in Range of the EITC
Income
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range. Here, and in Figures B.6 and B.7, we model the case as one of sequential labor supply decision making. This type of model simplifies the analysis
considerably and allows us to treat the earned income and EITC of the working family member as exogenous to the labor supply decision of the current
nonworker. The initial budget line without the EITC has a small vertical
portion reflecting the earnings of the other family member, and it is relatively
flat, reflecting a low wage rate. The initial equilibrium is at A with zero hours
of work. With the EITC the budget line is shifted up, reflecting the credit
based on the earnings of the other worker, and it is steeper, because the household is still operating along the phase-in range of the EITC.
There are conflicting effects in this case. There is a small income effect,
stemming from the credit already received, that acts to reduce participation.
Against this, however, is a positive substitution effect, stemming from the
higher net wage resulting from the phase-in rate. We have shown this to be
sufficient to induce participation but, in general, this outcome is not certain.
Figure B.6 shows the case of a worker in a household with other earnings
that place it on the EITC stationary range. In this case, the EITC may reduce
participation. There is no substitution effect because the credit is constant, at
least over the initial portion of the EITC budget constraint. There is an income effect stemming from the credit, however, and it could be substantial
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Figure B.6 The Effect of the EITC on Labor Force Participation—A
Household on the Stationary Range of the EITC
Income
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because the credit is at its maximum. The original equilibrium is at A with
positive hours of work, HA. The EITC alters the budget constraint first by
shifting it vertically upward by the maximum amount of the credit and second
by flattening it as the phase-out range kicks in. There is at least an income
effect, and possibly also a substitution effect, depending where on the original
budget constraint the second earner is located. In Figure B.6, the EITC is
sufficient to cause withdrawal from the labor market (point B, where HB ⳱ 0);
it could, however, simply reduce hours of work while leaving them still
positive.
Finally, Figure B.7 shows the case of a secondary worker in an EITC
household on the phase-out range. Again, the original equilibrium is at A
with work hours HA. The EITC shifts the budget constraint up by the amount
of the credit, but it now also flattens the buget constraint via the phase-out
rate, which reduces the net wage. Here, there is both an income effect and a
substitution effect, both reducing labor supply. The substitution effect is the
movement from A to A⬘; the income effect is the movement from A⬘ to B.
Again, the figure shows a complete reduction in labor supply at point B, but
a smaller decrease that leaves hours of work positive is also possible.
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Figure B.7 The Effect of the EITC on Labor Force Participation—A
Household on the Phase-out Range of the EITC
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Study

Data/Sample

Method

Findings

Comments

Dickert, Houser, and
Scholz (1995)

Survey of Income and
Program Participation,
1990
Families with children and
low assets, not selfemployed.

Structural labor force
participation model
that includes broad tax
and transfer policy
changes, including
EITC and AFDC.

1993 EITC expansion
increased LFPR of
single parents 3.3
percentage points and
of primary earners 0.7
percentage points;
reduced LFPR of
secondary earners by
unspecified amount.

Careful modeling of
taxes and transfers.
Bivariate probit model
estimated.

Eissa and Liebman
(1996)

CPS, 1985–91.
Single women, age 16–44.
Examine impact of 1986
EITC expansion.

Natural experiment:
Single mothers
compared to single
women without
children. Similar
comparisons for
women without high
school degree and
women with high
school degree.
Reduced form analysis
with controls for
individual and policy
variables.

2.4–4.1-percentagepoint increase in
LFPR for all single
mothers, depending
on sample and control
group. Stronger
results for less
educated women, who
are more likely to be
affected by EITC.
1.9-percentage-point
increase in LFPR for
all single mothers
(RF).

Reasonably strong
effects for relatively
small change in EITC.
LFPR of single women
without children is
very high at baseline
(⬎95%) so any
increase may be
infeasible.
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Appendix Table B.1 Effect of EITC on Labor Force Participation

Eissa and Hoynes
(1998)

CPS, 1985–97.
Married couples, both
husband and wife are
ages 25–54, wife has less
than 12 years of
education.
Before and after 1993 EITC
expansion.

Married women:
1.8–4.3-percentagepoint decrease in
LFPR, with larger
effect for women with
2Ⳮ children (NE).
1.2-percentage-point
decrease (RF). LFPR
increases 9% on
phase-in range,
decreases 5–6% on
flat and phase-out
(RF).
Married men:
0.7–1.6-percentagepoint increase, larger
effect for men with
2Ⳮ children (NE).
0.2-percentage-point
increase (RF).

Careful and attentive to
data and methods.
Labor force
participation effects
for married men
unlikely given their
very high baseline
rate.

(continued)
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Natural experiment:
Married men and
women with children
compared to married
men and women
without children.
Reduced form labor
supply model with
wage and nonlabor
income effects.
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Appendix Table B.1 (continued)
Data/Sample

Method

Findings

Comments

CPS, 1985–97.
Single mothers, age 19–44.

Natural experiment:
LFPR of mothers
compared with LFPR
of single women
without children.
Structural labor force
participation model
that includes broad tax
and transfer policy
changes, including
EITC and AFDC.

7–10-percentage-point
increase in LFPR of
single mothers
between 1990 and
1996 (NE).
Change in income taxes
(largely EITC)
increased LFPR of all
single mothers 1.5 to
2.0 percentage points
between 1992 and
1996, accounting for
35% of total change in
LFPR for all single
mothers (SM).

Very careful and
exhaustive study with
multiple outcome
measures and
attention to wide
range of policy
measures. Very
difficult to fully
characterize changes
in AFDC regulations
at state level in
structural model.

CPS, 1980–98.
Single and married
mothers, age 18–44,
1986 and 1998.

Natural experiment:
Low wage single
mothers compared to
higher wage single
mothers and to low
wage single women
without children. Low
wage married mothers
compared to higher
wage married mothers

Single mothers:
13–18-percentage-point
increase in LFPR for
low wage single
mothers compared to
higher wage single
mothers; 23percentage-point
increase in LFPR for
low wage single

Natural experiment
results include impact
of welfare reform and
other policy changes
that may also have
increased LFPR.

Meyer and Rosenbaum
(1999, 2000)

Ellwood (2000)

Appendix B

Study

NOTES: NE⳱natural experiment; RF⳱reduced form; SM⳱structural model.
LFPR⳱number of persons who are either employed or looking for work.
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and to low wage
married women
without children. Also
examines behavior of
low wage married
women by whether
husband’s income
created positive,
negative, or no EITC
work incentives. All
wages are predicted;
low and higher wage
refer to quartile
positions.
Reduced form model to
identify trend in labor
force participation not
due to changes in
unemployment rate
and welfare reform.

mothers compared to
single women without
children (NE).
Approximately 30%
of growth in Labor
Forced Participation
attributed to EITC
(RF).
Married mothers
3–7-percentage-point
decrease in Labor
Forced Participation
of low wage married
mothers (NE). 13percentage-point
increase in Labor
Forced Participation
for low wage women
with positive EITC
work incentives (NE).
No impact on low
wage married mothers
compared to low wage
married women
without children
(NE).
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Study

Data/Sample

Method

Findings

Comments

Hoffman and Seidman
(1990)

PSID, 1988.
All recipient households.

Simulation using
structural labor supply
estimates from Seattle
and Denver Income
Maintenance
Experiments (SIME/
DIME)

ⳮ2.1%, all recipients;
Ⳮ2.2% on phase-in;
ⳮ2.3% on flat range;
ⳮ2.8% on phase-out.

Assumes behavioral
response to EITC is
identical to income
and substitution
effects from SIME/
DIME.

Dickert, Houser, and
Scholz (1995)

Survey of Income and
Program
Participation, 1990.
Families with children
and low assets, not
self-employed.
Examine impact of 1993
EITC expansion.

Simulations using range
of estimates from
kinked budget set
labor supply studies
and from negative
income tax
experiments.

For all recipients, most
estimates fall between
ⳮ0.5% and ⳮ1.5%.
Hours of work
increase along phasein range (2–6%) and
decrease along flat
(ⳮ1%) and phase-out
(ⳮ1.5%) ranges.
Largest negative
effects for wives.

Very detailed attention
to tax and transfer
programs. Assumes
behavioral response to
EITC is identical to
income and
substitution effects
from literature.
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Appendix Table B.2 Estimated Effect on EITC on Hours of Work

CPS, 1985–91.
Single women, age
16–44.
Examine impact of 1996
EITC expansion

Natural experiment
comparison of single
women with and
without children.

Either small positive
effect or no impact.

Short time period and
relatively modest
change in EITC.

Eissa and Hoynes
(2000).

CPS, 1985–97.
Married couples, both
husband and wife are
ages 25–54, wife has
less than 12 years of
education.

Reduced form labor
supply model with
varying sets of
instrumental
variables.

Married women:
1993 EITC expansion
decreased average
hours of work 1% to
6%. Large positive
effect (8% to 50%) for
workers on phase-in,
small positive effect
for workers on flat
range, and negative
(2% to 20%) for
workers on phase-out.
Married men:
1993 EITC expansion
decreased average
hours of work about
2%. 4% increase for
workers on phase-in,
no effect for workers
on flat-range, and
ⳮ3% to ⳮ4% for
workers on phase-out.

Estimated effects for
women are not very
robust.
No correction for
selection bias in wage
estimates.
Describe estimates as
‘‘preliminary.’’
Some implausible
estimates.
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Eissa and Liebman
(1996)

Appendix C
The Efficiency Cost of the EITC
In this appendix, we examine the efficiency cost (or deadweight loss) of
the EITC using the standard indifference curve/budget constraint apparatus.
We assume familiarity with standard labor supply analysis; see Appendix B
for a full discussion.
Figure C.1 shows a standard labor supply diagram with leisure and hours
worked on the horizontal axis and income on the vertical axis. The EITC
program is shown by the kinked budget line. The linear budget line is the
budget line without the EITC. We focus here on an EITC recipient on the
phase-out range.
In response to the EITC, the individual has moved from point A on indifference curve U0 to point B on indifference curve U1. The EITC induces the
person to choose more hours of leisure (less hours of work), Z1 instead of Z0.
Figure C.1 The Efficiency Cost of the EITC for a Recipient on the PhaseOut Range
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The amount of the EITC is CB (the difference between the person’s income
including the EITC, Z1B, and the person’s wage income, Z1C). If instead of
the EITC, the person were given a lump-sum income supplement of only CD
(which is less than CB), the person would also have reached indifference curve
U1 (at point S). CD is defined as the equivalent variation; it measures how
much better off (in monetary terms) the EITC has made this individual. Thus,
the person’s welfare gain from the EITC is CD, which is less than the EITC
received of CB. The difference, BD, is the efficiency cost of the EITC, the
difference between the cost of the program and the welfare gain to the recipient. To summarize: credit ⳱ CB, welfare gain (equivalent variation) ⳱ CD,
and efficiency cost ⳱ BD.
Figure C.2 shows an EITC-ineligible taxpayer financing the EITC
through a wage tax. In response to wage tax, the person has moved from point
A on indifference curve U0 to point B on indifference curve U1. The wage tax
in this example induces the person to choose more hours of leisure (less hours
of work), Z1 instead of Z0. The amount of the tax is CB, which is the difference between the person’s before-tax wage income (Z1C) and the person’s
after-tax wage income (Z1B). If instead of the wage tax, the person were given
Figure C.2 The Efficiency Cost of the EITC for a Taxpayer
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a lump-sum tax CD (which is greater than CB), the person would also have
reached U1, so, exactly as in Figure C.1, CD is the equivalent variation. Thus,
the person’s welfare loss from the wage tax is CD, which is greater than the
tax of CB. The difference, BD, is the efficiency cost of the EITC to the
taxpayer. To summarize: tax ⳱ CB, welfare loss (equivalent variation) ⳱
CD, and efficiency cost ⳱ BD.
The credit received by the recipient equals the tax paid by the taxpayer.
Hence, the welfare loss to the taxpayer exceeds the welfare gain to the recipient.

Appendix D
Variations on Proposed EITC Reform
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Table 1D. Alternative EITC Reform Plans

Family and
Marital Status

Phase-in
rate
(%)

Income
at which
phase-in
ends
($)

Income
Income
at which
at which
Maximum phase-out Phase-out phase-out
credit
begins
rate
ends
($)
($)
(%)
($)

Without reduction in phase-out rate
Two children
Single

40.0

10,020

4,008

13,090

21.06

32,121

Married

40.0

12,020

4,808

13,090

21.06

35,891

Three or more
children
Single

42.0

10,980

4,612

13,090

21.06

34,989

Married

42.0

12,980

5,452

13,090

21.06

38,978

4,760

364

5,950

7.65

10,710

Without separate married-couple schedule
Married
No children

7.65

One child

34.0

7,140

2,428

13,090

15.98

28,283

Two children

40.0

10,020

4,008

13,090

15.98

38,171

⬎Two children

42.0

10,980

4,612

13,090

15.98

41,949

40.0

10,020

4,008

13,090

15.98

38,171

40.0

12,020

4,808

13,090

15.98

43,178

Without third child benefit
⬎Two children
Single
Married

NOTE: Only family/marital status groups with changes are shown; bolded entries are
changes from full reform plan.
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